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Chapter 1
Introduction
There are three main reasons for undertaking a survey of
the relations between Germany and Mexico on the eve of World
War 11. First, only one specific work exists on the topic,
and it was published in Germany. All other publications,
whether in Spanish, English, French or German deal very
limitedly or indirectly with the relationship between the
two countries in the prewar period."'" These secondary
sources fail to describe and analyze properly the political
■'"A good example for a more general treatment of the
subject is the more recent book of Reiner Pommerin, Das 3.
Reich und Lateinamerika, Dusseldorf: Droste, 1977. Here the
German trade and the intrusion of the Fascist ideology is in
the foreground. Other accounts deal with German relations to
specific South American countries, e ,g. Arnold Ebel, Da s 3.
Reich und Argent inien (1933-1942) , Kftln/Wien, 1971 and K&the
Harms-Balt zer
,
Die Nat ional isier ung der deutschen
Einwanderer und ihrer Nachkommen in Brasil ien al s Problem
der deutsch-brasilianischen Be zieh ungen 1930-1933 , Diss.
phi 1., Hamburg/Berlin, 1971. In view of the vital German
immigration to Chile and subsequent cooperation between the
two countries, it seems that there is a research gap
relative to investigating the German-Ch ilean relations
during the respective period.
1
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and economic implications of both sides' foreign policy.
The second reason is the geographical location of
Mexico. It represents the Achilles’ heel of the United
States and thus the topic involves more than bilateral
relations. Hence external political influences and trade
agreements with Mexico naturally drew the interest of the
United States. Its interference must be seen on two levels:
first, the business interest, in particular by the oil
companies before and after the expropriation in 1938; and
secondly in the political realm of the Good Neighbor policy.
Thus it is desirable to look at a complex set of foreign
relations, especially in the triangle formed between
Washington, Mexico City and Berlin.
Finally, there was and is a good deal of rhetoric on the
subject. While the German trade inroads in Latin America
were at least rationalized by some critics in order to curb
them, German political and ideological penetration by
propaganda aroused uneasiness and more often fear. This
psychological component was often treated emotional and
2
Volland, Das 3 . Raich und Mex iko , Frankfur t/Bern :
Lang, 1976. This book is an excellent survey about the
relations between 1933 and 1942. It concentrates, however,
on the oil barter deal in 1938/9 and does not use any
American primary material.
3irrational, and on both sides of the Rio Grande writers and
political observers tended to express their anxieties about
the 'Fifth Column' in exaggerated, sometimes even paranoid
fashions. Of course, as we will see, these antagonists of
National Socialism found evidence of German agitation in
Mexico. They failed, however, to put this evidence in
context of the political reality, meaning that the perceived
German threat was harmless vis a vis its counter forces. For
this reason, the thesis will attempt to show that the degree
of German propaganda was clearly outweighed by the political
success of the Cardenas administration and thus was doomed
to insignificance. One might add that the Reich did not even
perceive any intention to a 'spiritual conquest of Latin
America' - as Franco imagined it after winning the Spanish
Civil War. The only goal Germany might have aimed at, was a
dissolution of the western hemisphere solidarity.
Why was the period 1936 - 1939 chosen? Primarily,
because this span covers the time of the most dynamic
relationship between Mexico and Germany since the Mexican
3
Revolution. The reasons for an increased mutual interest
are manifold. Essentially, at the beginning of 1936, foreign
policy became more important, because the domestic positions
3
See Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico,
Chicago/London: University of Chicago 198177
4of both countries were consolidated. In Mexico, Cardenas had
finally secured power after his break with Calles and the
Jefe Max imo's subsequent exile. This step had brought the
political machinery under presidential control and was
consistently stabilized by various reforms in the years to
come.
In Germany, Hitler had also manifested his leadership,
though by totalitarian means. After his seizure of power, he
soon received dictatorial power. Step by step, he eliminated
the domestic opposition. The procedure was called
euphemistically 'Gleichschaltung' - political coordination
but was in fact a ruthless purge, as seen in
the
assassinations of the SA leaders in 1934. Thus the stage for
an enhanced concentration on foreign affairs in the two
countries was set.
From these consolidated positions at home, good motives
for a renewed cooperation between Germany and Mexico were
easily found. Despite almost diametrical political
' Wei tan schauungen ,' economic and trade goals complemented
each other. Recovering from the world-wide depression,
Germany needed raw material, while Mexico needed industrial
goods. Moreover Germany planned to extend her export
markets, while the Cardenas administration sought an
economic counterbalance to its overwhelming trade partner,
the United States.
5Yet, Mexico's strengthened economic ties with the Reich
brought along political responsibilities. In face of
Germany's radicalized, self-asserting power politics in
Europe, the Cardenas government and the president himself
were not shy to express their opposition to German
atrocities. However, the mutual economic interest of the two
nations prevented an ideological conflict. Thus trade
determined the political and diplomatic climate between
Mexico and Germany and not vice versa. Often the two spheres
were separated and two isolated policies were pursued.
The concept of business-as-usual and its separation from
politics in the relations between the two countries will be
the central thesis. It guaranteed vital relations despite
the rapidly worsening European situation.
Only the outbreak of World War II brought an end of the
dynamic economic cooperation, although the diplomatic
relations were maintained and Mexico declared her neutrality
pragmatic attitude was and is very common. Take
today's situation between the U.S.S.R and the U.S.: while
the rhetoric in political and ideological matters on both
sides is unrestrained and plain spoken, the grain deals are
untouched. As it was in Mexico, domestic and nationalcentric
reasons are prevailing: the American farmer lobby today
looks for any outlet of its products - no matter to whom -,
as Cardenas had to sell his oil to Germany in 1938. In both
cases no other lucrative customers exist or existed.
6in the European conflict on September 4, 1939. Therefore
1939 constitutes the upper borderline for this paper. The
declaration of neutrality terminated further business
without political consideration. For instance, continued
Mexican delivery of oil would have meant to support the
Reich's war cause and thus meant to take sides.
Ultimately, it must be emphasized that the German-
Mexican relations were only of secondary importance. Public
attention in the antebellum period was directed to the
European situation and the countries' domestic problems in
the aftermath of the depression in the early 1930'5. In
particular, the press focused on these issues and despite
say - the vital interest of the oil companies in the
expropriation dispute, the Mexican and American newspapers'
and journals' headlines are filled with the European crisis.
Mexico's geopolitical importance, of course, drew some
attention, but the German-Mex ican relations and even the oil
dispute were only perceived as being of minor significance
in the light of the events in Europe and domestic economic
recovery.
The method will be in accordance with the purpose: only
when German-Mex ican relations directly affected those
between Mexico and the U.S. will reference be made, a.g . in
the case of German propaganda in Mexico, also in connection
with the oil nationalization and finally in trade relations.
7Political and economic momenta will not be analyzed
separately since
the destinction between factors that are 'economic'
and those that are 'non economic' is, indeed, a
useless and nonsensical device from the point of
view of logic, and should be replaced by a
distinction between 'relevant' and 'irrelevant'
factors, or 'more relevant' and 'less relevant'. And
this
... dividing line should not be expected to be
the same for different problems.^
By this token, the structure of this thesis was chosen.
The economic cooperation constitutes the first part of the
paper and political disturbances the second. However, this
system will juxtapose the two, and demonstrate the
flourishing trade relations while ideological disagreements
increased. Consequently, cross references will be made
consistent!y.
The most valuable source consists of unpublished
documents of the German Foreign Office relating to Mexico’s
petroleum (1936-193 9). Most of these papers came from the
German legation in Mexico City and the Foreign Office (AA =
Auswartiges Amt) in Berlin. In addition, the PocuiTients on
German Fore ign Pol ic y 1918-1945 , series D and the recently
published series C, have been used.
c:
Gunnar Myrdal, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped
Reg ions, London: G. Duckworth, 1957 , p. 10.
Mexican primary material includes personal and public
documents of President Cardenas. Moreover the official
government newspaper EJL Nac iona 1 and releases from the
government press department (DAPP) were selectively
ex am ined
.
North American sources are State Department papers
(FRUS) relating to Mexico. Despite their volume, only a few
deal explicitly with German influence in Mexico. If they do,
they concentrate on trade matters or in general with the
Nazi's commercial breakthrough in Latin America after the
mid-1 930'5.
6
In addition to these official and semi-official sources,
many contemporary articles of German, Mexican and especially
American journals and newspapers were reviewed in order to
obtain a sense of the public opinion.
6
See Hans-Jurgen Schroder, "Die 'Neue Deutsche
Sudameri kapol itik, ' Dokumente 1934-1936 ," Jahrbuch fur
Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft
Lateinamerikas, No. 12 (1975), pp. 408-433.
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Chapter 2
Germany and Mexico Until 1936: Economic
Cooperation and Political Confrontation
In contrast to other European nations and the United
States, Germany had never pursued an openly imperialistic
role in Mexico and Central America. Therefore German direct
political influence did not exist and cultural ties were
limited. The Zimmermann note of 1917 can be seen as an
accident or except ion. Despite German involvement during
9 .
the violent stage of the Mexican Revolution, official ties
were rather loose. The fact that neither side considered
establishing an embassy instead of a legation emphasizes
this political lai sse z-fai re, even though Mexico always
stressed publicly her good relations with Germany during the
1920'5, probably in order to determine its "self
Frank L. Kluckhohn, The Mex ic an Challenge, New York:
Doubleday/Doran, 1939, p. 79.
o
See Friedrich Katz, Deutschl and , Diaz und die
mex i kani sc he Revolution : Pi e deut sche Pol iti k i~n Mex Iko
1870-1920
,
Berlin-Ost: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenscha ften ,
1964.
9
10
preservation" against the "Colossus of the North."
The cultural relations between the two countries were
also rather modest. Since German emigration to Mexico was
very small, direct influences of German civilization were
limited. However, Mexico always displayed a certain
respect, sometimes even admiration for Germany. Leaving
aside Germany's rich tradition, one reason was the advanced
status of German research about Mexico, carried forward by
scholars such as Walter Lehmann and Konrad Theodor Preuss.
Moreover Mexico appreciated the capability of Germans to
accommodate: the small German colony adapted "the most" to
the circumstances of language and customs, as the Mexican
minister in Berlin, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, remarked in 1924.
4
In sum, cultural exchange was very limited and causing
little friction. Xenophobia was rarely displayed towards
Germans in Mexico.
On the other hand, trade relations were more lively and
complementary: while Germany delivered capital goods and
pharmaceuticals, Mexico sent raw materials: petroleum, zinc
Gruening, Mex ico and its Heritage, New York:
Greenwood Press, 1968 (Ist ed. 1928), p. 553.
4
Klaus Vo Hand, Das 3. Reich und Mexico, Fr ankfur t/Bern:
Lang, 1976, p. 23.
11
and lead plus agricultural products. During the four
decades between 1897 and 1934 Mexico's exports contributed
only to an average of 0.5% of Germany's total imports, which
was not more than what the exports to Germany by Guatemala,
Mexico's much smaller southern neighbor, exported to
Germany. In contrast, Germany's exports to Mexico accounted
for second or third rank (behind the United States and
England) in Mexico's impor t/expor t trade. These mutual
economic interests nourished the friendly relations up to
1935.
5
Hitler's " Machtubernahme" (seizure of power) on January
30, 1933 initially did not change this harmonic economic
cooperation. His often quoted statement "If we had Mexico,
our problem would be solved" and other remarks concerning
imperialistic intentions with Mexico or Latin America
originate from Rauschning's books. They are of limited
Bast, "Mexico und die deutsche Einfuhr in vier
Jahrzehnten (1897-1936) Zeitschrift fur Erdkunde 5, 1937 ,
p. 54 9.
"Hermann Rauschning, Danzig's Senate President in 1933 and
former advisor to Hitler. See e.g. Gesprache mi t Hi tie r,
Zurich/Wien/New York: Europa Verlag , 1940 . This book was an
effort to activate against the Nazi threat.
12
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value. First, the authenticity is not guaranteed and
secondly, their historical value is dubious in light of
Hitler's megalomania. Hitler's main and more "real"
interests concerning
"
Lebensraum," as documented in Mein
Kampf, always focused on the expansion to Eastern Europe.
Even the United States played a minor role in his strategic
Q
deliberations until 1941.
In 1933, important personal changes took place in the
German Foreign Office. Freiherr Heinrich Rudt von
Co 11 enberg-Bodigheim (short: Rudt) , a convinced National
Socialist, became the minister of the German legation in
Q
Mexico City. In Berlin, in the Department 111 of the
Foreign Office, which was responsible for Mexico, the
employees adapted the new ideology. It is worthwhile to
'See Theodor Schieder, Hermann Rauschning s "Gesprache mit
Hi tier " al s Geschichtsquelle. Opladen: Wes tdeutscher Ver lag ,
1972. See also Volland pp. 29-42.
®See Gerhard L. Weinberg, "Hitler's Image of the U.5.,"
The American Historical Review 69, 4, July 1964 , pp .
1006-1021.
Q
The chief of the AO, the foreign organization of the Nazi
Party, praised Rudt as a very reliable party member in a
letter to Rudolf Hess, the party's ideological watch dog.
See Bohle to Hess, Nov. 15, 1933. Cited in Reiner Pommerin,
Das 3. Reich und Lateinamerika, Dusseldorf: Droste, 1977,
pp. 36f .
13
mention that Hermann Davidsen, the economic coordinator
("Referent") for Mexico, was a true expert with a deep
understanding of Mexico, as the documents reveal.
The world-wide depression required a new foreign trade
strategy, in particular in regulating balance of payments.
Germany's "New Plan" (1934) promised the solution of this
problem. It was designed by the Economics Minister Hj almar
Schacht in order to achieve autarchy.
For Latin America and its important raw materials the
device of the " Askimar ks" was implemented. Under this
system, the German government allowed foreign firms to
export goods to Germany and to receive payment into special
foreigners' accounts (Aski) , which could be used to purchase
German goods.
lo
The London Economist commented: "Since
Askimarks are always quoted at a big discount [up to 40 % ] /
this method amounts to one more of the many disguised forms
of currency depreciation."
ll
ne
Moreover under Schacht's "New Plan" the German
10
See Otto Nathan, The Na zi Economic System, Durham: Duke
Univ. Press, 1944.
Econom is t, Nov. 5, 1938.
14
government assumed control
of all imports, in order to
secure - with her limited foreign exchange - the largest
possible amount of foreign raw materials for her armament
industry. In selecting imports, she followed a policy of
bilateral balancing with countries whose trade balance with
it was active. This practise was the main factor in causing
the U.S. and England to loose a considerable part of its
export trade in Latin America to Germany, which naturally
1 2
led to harsh criticism in U.S. business circles. The
distribution increase of German imports in Latin America can
be traced in the following table:
TO ,
See for example Virginia Prewett, "Nazi Trade Invades
Mexico," Amer ican Mercur y 52, 1941, p. 33 6. A good summary
provides Paul B. Taylor, "Problems of Geman-American
Relations," Fore ign Pol ic y Re po rts, Vol. XIV No. 9, July
1938, pp. 98-108. See also chapter 8 in this book.
15
Imports of Nine Latin American Co un tr ies from Germany
(Percentages of total imports)
Source: Percy W. Bidwell , "Latin America, Germany
and the Hull Program," Foreign Affairs 17, 2, Jan.
1939, p. 375.
Mexico entered the Aski system in the fall of 1934 and
showed interest to use this bilateral barter system for her
own Six Year Plan. With Lazzaro Cardenas in office
(1934-1940) the policy of industrial development was
1 3
initiated. Thus trade relations soon improved, with
Germany sending machinery, while Mexico delivered mainly
minerals. In May 1937 the new Mexican minister in Berlin,
General Juan F. Azcarate , could announce to the Secretaria
de Relaciones Exteriores that "the possibilities of German-
Mexican trade are magnificent." He continued:
James W. Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution: Federal
Ex penditure and Social Change since 1910, Berkeley: Univ . of
California Press, 1967.
Country 1913 1929 1933 1937
Argentina 16.9 11.5 10.0 10.3
Bra zi1 17.5 12.7 12.0 23.9
Ch il e 24.6 15.5 11.4 26.0
Columbia 14.1 14.4 17.8 13.4
Guatemala 20.3 14.2 12.3 32.4
Mexico 13.1 8.0 12.3 15.6
Pe ru 17.3 10.0 10.3 19.7
Ur ug uay 15.5 10.2 10.3 19.7
Venezuela 14.4 9.2 11.4 13. 6
16
No creo que haya en el mundo otros dos paises que se
complementer! tan bien en sus producciones como
Alemania y Mexico. ... Alemania siempre necesitara
nuestros minerales para su industria y pa ra la
guerra. Tales minerales de exportacion mexicana como
el cobre, piano, antimonio, mercurio, grafito,
manganeso, petroleo etc., son necesarios para la
vid a diaria de Alemania, y estrategicos para la
g uerra.
14
Apparently both sides realized the quid pro quo under which
the trade took place.
The consistent and flourishing cooperation in trade
matters cannot be followed in political relations. Until
1936, both sides respected the other's form of nationalism.
With the break of Cardenas and Calles in June 1935 a change
was foreshadowed. The defense and containment of the
Callistas' influence resulted in a coalition between
Cardenas and the labor movement. This coalition was
manifested in the CTM under the leadership of Vicente
Lombardo Toledano and enabled Cardenas to pursue a state
socialism, favoring strikes, land redistribution programs
and public funds for industrialization projects. Cardenas
opposed liberal capitalism, but he also supported certain
bourgeois groups and accepted certain principles of
capitalism under the condition the state could regulate free
14
My emphasis. Quoted from Volland, pp. 235 f .
17
• 15
enterprise and - say - labor rights. Then Shulgovski's
A
thesis that Cardenas tended to a realization of the Soviet
economic system is an exaggerated view. The integration of
leftist groups in his government was essential for his
struggle against Calles and the realization of his own state
socialism, based on the Mexican condition and the
constitut ion.
Hence the elimination of the Callistas only provided the
condition for a political divergence between the Reich and
Mexico. The more fundamental reason of the confrontation,
but not a break, was then the rising ex pans ioni st ic and
external power politics of Germany. In particular, the Civil
War in Spain put both countries in opposite camps.
Cardenas, together with the Soviet Union, supported the
Republican Azana government, while Germany sided with
General Franco's Falange. The details will be treated in a
1C / sXJCardenas supported class struggle. Ration Beteta
emphasized this in a speech about the Six Year Plan of the
PNR: "... two social classes created by the right of private
property: those who possess the instruments of production,
and the proletariat. In this struggle the party does not
remain neutral, but frankly decides in favor of the
workers..." in Ramon Beteta, The Mexican Revolution: a
Defense, Mexico City: DAPP, 1937 , pp. 44f.
1
.Anatol Mex ico en la Encr uc ijad a de su
Historia, Mexico, D.F.: Ediciones de Cultura Popular S.A~
1968, p. 214.
18
later chapter, but to anticipate the result, it can be said
that the quality of both countries' support for Spain was
essentially different. Mexico's help mainly consisted of
moral support, while Germany invested a considerable amount
of war material and later even sent the legendary "Legion
Condor." On the other hand, the number of Mexican volunteers
and her material support was comparatively small. However,
Mexico's moral obligation to side with Spain's Republicans
was clear for Cardenas from the beginning. He noted in his
diary:
El gobierno de Mexico esta obligado moral y
pol i t icamente a dar su apoyo al gobierno republ icano
de Espana, constituido legalmente y presidio por el
senor don Manuel Azana.
The opposite official position in Spain's Civil War was
the main root of political disturbances, because both sides
were actively involved. Other incidents, which took place in
both countries' local spheres, were handled with more
tolerance. Dr. Leonides Andreu Almazan, the brother of the
presidential candidate Juan in 1940 , commented from Berlin
in April 1936 to his Foreign Office in Mexico about the
remilitarization of the Rhineland:
el acto de remil i tar i zac ion de la zona renana,
17''/'., s
Lazaro Cardenas, Apuntes, Vol. I, Mexico: Universidad
Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1972 , p. 355 .
19
puede ser considerado mas que como la
recuperacion por parte del Reich de la plena
soberania sobre toao su terr i torio. .. Lo que si es
atacable
... es el rompimiento de los tratados, cuyo
caracter sagrado obligaba a Alemania a buscar otro
procedimiento... Tambien es atacable en todos
sentidos la polftica internac ional alemana,
consistente en hacer constantemente ofrecimientos de
paz y de mutuo entend im iento y no cumpl ir los . . .
On the other hand, the German legation also kept out of
Mexico's internal affairs. Germany's minister Rud t
constantly reported about Mexico's political position to the
1 9
German Foreign Office in Berlin, but the documents do not
indicate any official complaints to Mexico's government.
Only in one case, when a German company ("El Anfora") was
harrassed by a strike wave in the mid 1930'5, the legation
referred the case to the Mexican administration. Foreign
Minister Eduardo Hay personally apologized and promised to
2 0
resolve the problem.
] o sio
Almazan, Mexican legation in Berlin to SRE, April 6,
1936. Quoted from Volland pp. 231 f.
19
All documents are identified with their date and
microfilm number from the Records o f the German Foreign
Of f ice (AA)
,
Economic Policy Department IXa , Petroleum
Mexico. For a political report for the year 1936, see Georg
Ahrens to AA, August 22, 1936, E 416120-22.
20
Report of the commercial attache Burandt to AA, Dec. 14,
1936.
20
Overall, the inherent political concepts of Cardenas'
Mexico -- democratic state socialism, Pan and Latin-
Americanism and anti-fascism did not influence trade
relations. In fact, the economic cooperation provided
continued diplomatic relations. The editorial in _EI Nac iona 1
commented at the end of 1936 very positively about barter
deals with Nazi Germany. This was the case despite the
clear indications of aggressive fascism such as in Spain,
Japan's attack on China, Italy's invasion of Abyssinia and
the formation of the Ant i Com in ter n pact.
The increased economic ties and their underlying
compensation concept can be followed by the balanced terms
of trade:
Source: Vo 11 and, p.79.
The table indicates that both the German exports to Mexico
and the German imports from Mexico rose in value more than
Nacional
, editorial, Dec. 15, 1936.
Year German imports from German exports to
Mexico (in millions Mexico (in millions
of Reichsmark) of Reichsmark)
1935 38.1 34. 0
1936 56.4 51.1
193 7 64. 5 65.7
21
60% in the three years between 1935 and 1937.
Simultaneously, the trade values were balanced, thus
succeeding in the purpose of Schacht's New Plan. The trade
increase took place despite the rising political tensions in
Europe. Thus a trend to isolate political considerations
from economic necessities crystallized in trade matters, a
technique, which was even more used in the Mexican oil sales
to Germany in 1938 and 1939. This will be the topic of the
nex t chapter.
Chapter 3
Fruitless Negotiations about German Oil Concessions
in Mexico: 1936 - 1938
Petroleum in the 1930's did not have the significance
which it has today. Even as late as 1950 , some West
European countries received around 90% of their energy from
coal Petroleum's importance in the form of gasoline was
reflected in the development of the car industry and served
as fuel for diesel engines and as a heat energy source.
Since Europe's consumer car industry was relatively
underdeveloped, at least compared to the U.S., oil had its
particular significance in the military realm. Hence oilpoor
Germany needed this natural resource as fuel for military
vehicles (tanks, jeeps etc.) , for its airforce and
especially for the diesel engines of its ships and
submarines. Mexico's heavy oil was in particular usable as
diesel fuel and hence the German Navy was very interested in
it. Thus oil was, despite its overall industrial
I
Richard L. Gordon, The Evolution of Energy Policy in
Western Europe, New York: Praeger, 1970 , p. 18.
22
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insignificance, of vital importance of Hitler's rearmament
program after 1933.
Germany's attempts to obtain direct petroleum supplies
from Mexico took place, unsuccessfully up to 193 8 , through
two channels: first, middlemen tried to secure Mexican oil
to Germany. Here the most notable role was played by the
American business man William Rhodes Davis. His successful
mediation will be treated later in this chapter. Secondly,
Germany's naval high command (OKM) and the ministry of the
army (RWM) directly attempted to achieve oil concessions in
Mex ico
.
Direct German Negotiations with Mexico for Oil
Concessions or Participation Projects
The Reich's main reason for direct cooperation with
Mexico's government was to achieve a diversification of
energy sources and thus enhanced independence from other oil
suppliers such as:
Standard Oil and Royal Dutch Shell
W. R. Davi s
the Near East. Here the implicit difficulties of
2
See L.O. Prendergast, "Press War on Mexico," Nation 147,
Sept. 3, 1938, pp. 222-225.
24
British control over the Suez Canal were
considered.
Moreover it became apparent that the autarchy efforts, as
documented in the "New Plan" were unrealistic in the case of
oil. But by far the most salient advantage of direct
. . 4
negotations was the possibility of barter deals.
Initially, the negotiations about various projects were
informal. For example, at the end of 1936, the transfer of
all concessions of the Milmo family at the Rio Bravo del
Norte failed. The chief command of the Navy (OKM) saw too
many transportation problems (500 km to the Atlantic coast)
, c.
and an insecurity in regard to the petroleum's quality.
Therefore, the OKM advised to search for already "developed
oil pools and good transport possibilities."
In early 1937 , former President Francisco Leon de la
Barra, then ambassador to France, had asked the German
3
Otto Nathan, The Na zi Economic System, Durham: Duke Univ.
Press, 1944, p. 43.
(Hardy bank, the German representative of Davis) to
Wilhelm Keppler (economic advisor of Hitler), Aug. 9, 1936 .
s
Bastian (OKM) to AA, March 19, 1937.
6
lb id .
25
embassy in Paris for information on whether a German company
would be interested in participating in drillings in
7
Mexico's national oil fields. This idea of private German
o
participation, however, was rejected by the RWM.
In March 1937, with the new founded Administrac ion
General del Pe troleo Nacional (AGPN) , the successor of
Petromex, new possibilities were opened. The goal was now to
achieve results with official Mexican oil institutions.
AGPN ' s director Manuel Santillan and the director of the
German Dresdner Bank, Karl-Ernst Erk , as Germany's official
representative soon assured cooperation. The bank was
responsible for the creation of a company (Gesell schaf t
fur
Über see isc he Bergbaul iche Un ter nehm ungen) which was designed
Q
for participation in oil projects with the AGPN.
Er k and a German geologist, Professor Alfred Bentz,
Wolf (German embassy, Paris) to AA, Feb. 22, 1937.
8-
Klaus Volland, Da s 3 . Re ich und Mex ico , Fr ankf ur t/Bern :
Lang , 1976, p . 89.
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Dossiernote Davidsen, Sept. 14 , 1937.
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travelled to Mexico in September 1937.500n, Santillan and
Er k agreed about negotiations of three projects, of which
the AGPN was in charge:
1. "El Plan" at the Isthmus of Tehuantepec
2. " Tronconces y Potrerillo," south of the Poza-Rica
distr ic t
3. "Ojital y Potrero," also south of Po za-Rica.
As Professor Bentz explained in his report, the foreseeable
contract provided that both parts, the German company and
the AGPN, would share the costs. Then, a regal la (royalty)
had to be paid in oil to the AGPN, and the rest would be
split between the companies. Thus, the rights on development
and exploitation would be "practically equivalent to a
concession." Further negotiations then revolved over the
percentage of the royalties. Er k imagined 10% as reasonable,
while the AGPN thought that a 20 - 45% royalty of the
exploited oil would be adequate. Apparently the recent
contract with the Ag ui la, a Shell subsidiary, which provided
10
Kluckhohn, the New York Times reporter in Mexico, made
one person out of Er k and Bentz. See Frank L. Kluckhohn,
The Mexican Challenge, New York: Doubleday/Doran, 1939,
p. 110.
Volland, pp. 92f .
to AA, Nov. 10, 193 7.
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between 15 - 35% royalties (according to the richness of the
oil field)
, was used as a blueprint for the AGPN
'
s
bargaining position.
J
Erk's efforts proved to be fruitless. Henceforth the
change of Mexico's oil politics are mainly responsible. In
mid-November, Santillan had concluded a major oil agreement
with British interests (_E_l Aguila) which announced a pooling
arrangement allowing the government a share of oil
production in return for confirmatory concessions in its
rich Poza-Rica fields. Even though Santillan personally
assured Er k that their contract "would be concluded next or
second no agreement was accomplished. The minister
of the German legation Rud t "even believed that the British
success is to be welcomed, since it can serve to encourage
German projects in Mexico.
This "new orientation of the Mexican petroleum policy"
l6
Frankfurter Zeitung, "Mexikos Pakt mit der Shell,"
Nov. 25, 1937.
14
Erk to Pilder, Dec. 12, 1937.
15 Rud tto AA, Nov. 25
, 1937, E 416564 .
ter Zeitung , Nov. 16, 1937
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did not materialize. The Aguila contract provoked criticism
by the labor union and in particular of its eloquent leader
Toledano As Er k put it, a German company must "affect
13
Lombardo Toledano
...
like a red cape affects a bull."
Even though on February 24, 193 8 Cardenas empowered
Sant ill an to conclude the Isthmus contract (with regalia of
20%) , time ran out: On March 18, 1938 Cardenas pronounced
the nationalization of Mexican oil, which ended all
prospects of German participations or concessions of
Mexico's oil resources. On April 6 Rud t cabled to Er k who
was in La Paz : "Santillan informed [that] President
[Cardenas] has recommended to suspend Isthmus contract.
Suspension can be 14 days but also 2 years." Er k reacted
with frustration: "I have to admit that this cable hit me
19
hard, since my ...work of 5 months [is now] for nothing."
Mexico's main motive to integrate Germany in its oil
industry before the nationalization is best summarized in
Rudt's report from December 14, 1937. The Mexican efforts
attempted "to contain the dominating Amer ic an economic
See for example El Nacional
,
end of November 1937.
18
Erk to Pilder, Dec. 12, 1937.
19
See Dresdner Bank to Davidsen, AA, February 22, 193 8 (E
416816) and March 25, 1938 (E 416842).
29
• 7 0
influence." The Aguila contract also has to be seen from
this standpoint. The U.S. accounted for about 62% of total
oil world production at that time, while the British had a
substantial share of the rest. Mexico's cooperation with
Germany in oil projects thus indicated her desire "to create
a certain counterbalance against the overwhelming English
22
and American oil interests in Mexico." But direct German
contacts with Mexico was not the only inroad for Mexico's
oil. An important intermediary role in this respect was
played by the American businessman William Rhodes Davis.
W.R. Davis and His Connections to Germany Until 1938
In the mid 30's Davis controlled a complicated
consortia'll of oil companies and enjoyed good financial
sources through the First National Bank in Boston. He owned
several marketing and production firms in England, Sweden,
23
Germany, Mexico and the U.S. In Hamburg for example Davis
owned the refinery
" Eurotank."
20
Rudt's emphasis. Rud tto AA, Dec. 14 , 1937, E 416641.
01 if
xMunchener Neueste Nachrichten, March 24, 1938.
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The role of Davis up to 1938 is still unclear. Sure is
only that " the economic ambassador" - as he perceived
- had informal contacts with German high officials
2S .
m the RWM since 1934. His reputation in the U.S., Mexico
and Germany may be best described as a mixture of disgust
and admiration. Nobody fully trusted him, but his
international connections made him very valuable. Rudt
raised doubts about Davis' "reliability and honesty" and
described him as "an optimist, who prefers to believe, what
he desires and [who] perceives proposals as accepted, when
they are not refused abruptly."
Davis' various projected barter deals between Germany
and Mexico were not realized in the period between 1936 and
beginning 1938 . Davis planned a "three corner business:"
Germany would exchange drilling and railroad equipment for
Mexican oil. The petroleum was supposed to be refined in
Davis' Eurotank in Hamburg and then to be distributed to
Ireland, Italy and other countries. The profit then was
2 4 »• ,
Rud t to AA, June 11, 1937, E 416195-99.
pp. 8 3f.
26
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2 7
projected for purchases of (J.S. cotton by Germany. This
business never materialized. Also the German commercial
attache, Hans Burandt, opposed Davis' proposals such as
German electricity installations against oil, pipelines
against rice, and German industrial goods against cotton and
• o ft
iron ore.
Burandt knew that both, Finance Minister Eduardo Suarez
s 2 9
and President Cardenas personally, disliked Davis. At the
30
end of 1936 "the oil mystery man" was responsible for the
"Sabalo affair." The formation of the Mexican Sabalo
Transportation Co. - together with the American Sinclair
company - in early 1936 had involved bribery of high Mexican
officials, which finally led to the resignation of the
3 1
president of Petromex , Ortiz Rubio. The scandal had
aroused the Mexican public and did not improve the
27
Ibid
.
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to AA, June 11, 193 7, E 416205.
3QTulsa Daily World, May 3, 1938.
o 1
Ortiz Rubio, by the way, had been the Mexican minister
in Berlin in the mid-20's. See Volland, p. 85.
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reputation of Davis m Mexico.
The German legation also took a critical stance toward
Davis' assertions that he had "ties with important
personalities in the German government," in particular with
Hj almar Schacht , the president of the Reichsbank (1933 -1939)
and Minister of Economics (1934-193 7), and the Fuhrer
himself. J A quick survey in the Reichskanzlei (Reich
office) of Hitler revealed that "Herr Davis is not
documented among the persons, who were received ... by the
Fuhrer However, the economic coordinator for Mexico,
Hermann Davidsen, remarked that "it is, of course, possible
that Davis was introduced to the Fuhrer at a different
opportunity." In any case, Davis in general tended to
exaggerate his connections with high political officials.
This fact probably attributed to the ironic labeling of
Davis by the American press as "Little Caesar."
Nevertheless Davis channeled petroleum through Eurotank
3 2
See El Nacional
,
December 1 936 issues.
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note of July, 24, 1937.
lb id
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to the German Navy and allegedly to the Air Force. But
most of these supplies derived from American sources, since
the Sabalo affair ended Davis' eager plans to deliver more
oil from Mexico. The Navy was then the best customer of
Davis, and their working relationship was apparently close.
Whenever oil and Davis were mentioned together, the Navy
showed a vital interest. But as Dr. Friedrich Fetzer, the
commissioner of the high command of the Navy (OKM) ,
emphasized: "German oil interests in Mexico must be treated
with highest confidentiality." Thus the Navy's oil
purchases were regarded as an independent business of the
free market and not as official deals with the Mexican
government with Davis as mediator, which was in fact
undesired at this point in time. Hence the Navy expressed
satisfaction with Davis' Eurotank supplies, because he
delivered regularly and under the world market price, but
the Navy also desired to keep the matter confidential.
In September and October 1937 German officials, like
Erk
,
who were interested in Mexican oil and were already
36
Rudt to AA, June 11, 1937, E 416195-99.
37
Rud tto AA, May 12, 1938, E 417324-27
38Bastian (OKM) to AA, June 19, 1937
34
negotiating, stated that informal and friendly ties should
be maintained with Davis, because "in times of emergence
[he] could be useful." As we will see below this proved to
be a wise prediction. Yet, the German legation was advised
to keep Davis away from oil deals between Germany and
\9
Mexico. Taking Rudt' s opinion about Davis into account, this
advise was surely superfluous.
Thus, in conclusion, direct oil concessions between the
German and Mexican government did not materialize. The
pending negotiations were suspended when Cardenas announced
the nationalization of the oil industry. On the other hand,
the American businessman Davis continued to supply Germany,
and especially the navy, with Mexican oil. These sales were
considered as free market business. Soon, however, the
nature of these oil sales changed. Since Mexico faced the
boycott of the American oil companies, she was forced to
sell the bulk of her oil to Germany. In this context, Davis
served as an important connecting link between the German
and Mexican government. The development of these events and
the nature of the resulting oil contracts will be now
ex amined
.
39
Davidsen note of Sept. 14 , 1937.
Chapter 4
Mexico's Oil Supplies to Nazi Germany in
1938 and 1939
On March 18, 1938 President Cardenas announced the oil
expropriation of the British and American oil companies in
Mexico, after a wage dispute between the companies and their
workers could not be The reasons for the
nationalization were clearly domestic, "for the dignity of
Mexico" and "in defense of her sovereignity," as Cardenas
himself put it. Nevertheless Cardenas chose the date in
accordance with an externally favorable constellation. After
a meeting with close advisors he noted in his diary Apuntes
on March 10
,
1938:
Hicimos consider ac iones de las c ircunstanc ias que
podrfan presentarse si gobiernos como el de
Inglaterra y Estados Unidos, interesados en
respalder a las ampresas petroleras presionaban al
gobierno de Mexico con medidas violentas, pero
a relatively unbiased contemporary account see:
Charles A. Thomson, "The Mexican Oil Dispute," Fore ig n
Policy Reports, Vol. XIV no. 11, Aug. 15, 1938, pp. 122-133.
O / s
Lazaro Cardenas, Apuntes, Vol. I, Mexico, D.F.:
LJniversidad Nac ional Autonoma de Mexico, 1972
, p. 355.
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tomamos tambien en cuenta que se presenta ya la
amenaza de una nueva guerra mundial con las
pr ovocac iones que desarrolla el imper ial i smo nazi-
faszista y que esto los detendria de ag red ir a
Mexico, en el caso de decretar la ex pr opr iac ion.
On March 13 Germany announced the "reunion of Austria
with the Third Reich" (An sc hi uss) , which may be the
"circumstance" Cardenas had waited for. He knew that the
German menace against the balance of power in Europe plus
the Good Neighbor policy - so well established by U.S.
ambassador Josephus Daniels - would prevent any U.S.
military action and would strengthen the bargain position
for Mex ico.
The expropriation, however, was not a planned plot
between Germany and Mexico, as Shulgovski First of
all, Cardenas condemned the annexation of Austria as
"desbordam iento imper ial ista" and called it ironically
• /v Cl
Hitler's " hazana." Moreover the president's position was
manifested in the League of Nations in Geneva. Mexico was
lb id
. , p . 38 8.
Shulgovski, Mex ico en la Encrucijada de su
Historia, Trans., Mexico, D.F.: EcTiciones de Cultura PopulaT
S. A., 1968 , p . 368.
Apuntes, p. 390.
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the only member who protested on March 19 "contre
1 aggression exter ieure dont la Republique d'Autnche vient
d'etre victime
. Also Rud t' s report from March 21, 1938
confirms the non- involvenent of the Reich: "The Mexican
protest in Geneva against the Anschluss of Austria ... was
caused by internal domestic motives [which] do not touch
7
Germa n-Mex ican economic questions."
Secondly, Mexico's political importance for Germany was
of minor significance. The voluntary cooperation between
Mexico and her oil problans, and Hitler's massive rearmament
projects is just uncombinable in view of the fundamental
difference of their political credos. This fact is also true
for the later oil deal between the two countries through the
intermediary Davis. Only pragmatism forced by Mexico's
isolated petroleum industry fostered the economic
cooperation which Cardenas only reluctantly followed. Thus
Cardenas' timing can at best be seen as an opportunistic
move in the interest of Mexico.
Soon after the expropriation, the British and American
£
Klaus Volland, Das 3 . Re ich und Mexico, Fr ankfur t/ Be rn :
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oil companies boycotted the Mexican oil. The two Anglo
governments quietly backed the companies' efforts, even
though Secretary of State Cordell Hull did not "question the
right of Mexico ... to expropriate properties within its
9
jurisdiction." Since Standard Oil of New Jersey and the
Royal Dutch Shell controlled 83% of the world tonnage of oil
at that time, two questions immediately arose for Cardenas:
first, how could Mexico export her petroleum; and secondly,
who would buy it?
Shortly after the nationalization, Cardenas sent a high
Mexican official directly to France to try to negotiate an
agreement on oil with the French government. But the French
declined because of opposition by the British government,
France's Mexico also attempted to sell her petroleum
products in Latin America. Extensive negotiations were
O
See e.g David E. Cronon, Jo sephus Daniels in Mex ico,
Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1960. For the extent of
the boycott see Merill Rippy, Qi 1 and The Mex ican
Revolution, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972 , pp. 226 -23 5. The best
summary g ives Lorenzo Meyer, Mex ico and the United States in
the Oil Controversy 1917-1942 , Trans. Muriel Va scone el los ,
Austin/London: Univ. of Texas Press, 1977, pp. 200-213.
of State, Press Releases, April 2 , 1938.
Cited in Thomson, p. 12 8.
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carried out to this end with the ABC-co un tr ies, Cuba,
Paraguay, Uruguay and the Central American countries.
However
,
...
these iniatives ran up against interference by
the State Department and the American [oil]
companies ... [succeeding] in preventing agreements.
... They temporarily lowered the prices of their own
products in order to undercut and thereby shut out
the Mexican industry.
11
Moreover the boycott was extended to cut off Mexico's
supply of the indispensable materials to keep the oil
industry running. In this situation, Mexico turned to
Germany, because it could "not very well dump the oil into
12
the sea from sheer idealism."
The German administration and the high command of the
army (RWM) reacted cautiously; thus reported the
"coordinated" German press.
13 Minister Rud t duly reported
about the difficulties of the Mexican oil industry and her
lack of tankers. But he failed to analyze Mexico's attitude
correctly, when he asserted that "the President [Cardenas]
-*-L
. Meyer, pp. 20 2f .
Carleton Millan, Mex ico Reborn, Boston: Houghton-
Mifflin, 1939, p. 214.
13
See De at sc he Al lgemeine Zeitung , April 2, 1938 and
Frankfurter Zeit ung~ March 22, 1938 .
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nas no compunction to supply Germany with oil." Rudt's
lack of understanding of Mexico's politics is probably the
reason that most decisions were made in Berlin, while his
1 c
proposals were consistently neglected.
On May 13 the economic expert for Mexico, David sen, sent
a telegram to the German legation which outlined the German
policy - in accordance with the RWM - for Mexican oil: "1.
On principle no cash for oil available ... only in barter.
2. ... Davis received $ 200.000 for oil delivery Eurotank.
...
4.
...
official steps with the Mexican government not
“I £
desirable." The telegram indicates that Germany should
limit official contacts and that it preferred indirect
receipt of oil through Davis. In a meeting of
representatives of RVM, RWM and the Navy on May 30, 1938
this cautious tactic was again manifested. "No renunciation
of the Mexican market, but only cooperation of mere business
17
aspects," Davidsen noted in a summary.
to AA, April 30, 1938, E 417219.
IS . i*
Even after the expropriation, for example, Rud t still
believed in the achievement of the Isthmus project.
Davidsen to German legation, Mexico City, May
11, 1938, E 417239.
17
Sucnmary Davidsen, May 30, 1938, E 417356.
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Two considerations probably caused this attitude. On the
one hand, the responsible administrators in Berlin were
afraid of external complications in case their ties with
Mexico became too strong. On the other hand, the strong
position of Shell and Standard Oil on the German market had
to be taken into account. In particular, the Navy was
dependent on the almighty oil companies' deliveries. In June
Standard Oil even asked the RWM whether "Germany would
1 8
follow their boycott." The economics ministry assured them
with the vague agreement that Germany would only import
Mexican oil for the "most urgent needs.
Mexico, however, had no time to be cautious. If she did
not want to drown in her oil, Mexico had to look for other
markets (preferably of democracies) besides the traditional
American and British ones. As shown above, these efforts
failed vis a vis the übiquitious influence of the American
companies. Thus, even though Mexico had "no relations or
sympathy with fascist countries and would not willingly sell
to them," Mexico soon was forced to do so.
i8
RWM to AA, June 23, 1938, E 417356.
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On April, 4 the director of Cia. Exportadora del
Petroleo Nacional (the marketing division of PEMEX) ,
Espinosa Mireles, asked the German commercial attache
Burandt whether Germany was interested in Mexican oil. Rud t
had confidentially described Mireles as "friendly to
Germany." Mireles expressed his desire that eventual deals
should be made by a non-German company. Three weeks later,
however, Mireles offered Rekowski, the representative of the
German oil import company Behr & Co. in Mexico, to take over
the full authority of the Exportadora in Germany. According
»«
to Rud t, Mireles intented to "eliminate all intermediaries
and to sell the oil directly to German companies."
A direct contract between the two countries did not
materialize. While Mexico was in time pressure to find
customers for her oil, Germany approached Mexico's official
oil representatives still with caution. In sum, the Reich's
reasons were threefold. First, Germany had to balance her
interests: on the one hand, it had to consider Shell and
Standard Oil, on the other hand it attempted to attain a
good bargaining position with Mexico, which would mean
barter agreements: oil for German goods. Secondly, she had
to consider her significant success in Latin America's
21
Rud t to AA, April 6, 1938, E 417115.
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markets in the preceding years. An open policy at this point
in Mexico would have provoked external complications,
. 22
especially by the U.S. Finally, she had to take into
account the domestic situation in Mexico. Direct contacts
would have provoked leftist criticism, in particular by the
labor union and Lombardo Toledano. Rud t had repeatly warned
of him in his frequent reports about Mexico's internal
situation. All these deliberations resulted in the
conclusion to use Davis again.
The Davis Contracts with Mexico: Germany Receives
Mexican Oil for Barter
The solution for both countries in this situation came
with William R. Davis. After various efforts of other
23
American and British businessmen had failed, Davis met
with Cardenas in May 193 8 and offered to manage the
Hans-Jurgen Schroder, "Die Vereinigten Staaten und
die na t iona1-so zi al ist i sche Handelspol iti k gegenuber
Lateinamer ika 193 7/8 ," Jahrbuch fur Geschichte von Staa t,
Wir tschaf t und Gesell schaf t Lateinamer 1 kas 7, 197 0 , pp .
309-3 71
.
See also Chapter VIII in this book.
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The British Francis w. Rickett and the North American
Bernard E. Smith failed, because the British government had
interferred, after Mexico and England had broken off ties on
May 12, 1933 (see e .g. Kluckhohn pp. 135-7). Moreover the
oil companies and the State Department pressured other
nations not to buy any Mexican oil (see e .g. Lorenzo Meyer,
pp. 200-209) .
nationalized industry en gros , since the "mystery man" had
already begun to ship successfully Mexican oil in the
24
preceding months. Despite Mexican objections against Davis
because of the Sabalo affair, and because of her just
achieved "economic independence," his international
connections and his opportunity to get a tanker fleet
favored his position. In mid-June Davis visited the RWM in
Berlin, where he offered to sell Mexican oil for 40% in cash
and the rest in goods. Even though the meeting on May 30 had
stated to avert direct contacts with Davis, the RWM
supported Davis' plans. On June 20, 1938 Davis signed the
contract with the Exportadora which Cardenas approved on
July 6. Davis bought 12 million barrels .of oil for $ 10
2 7
million and was named PEMEX distributor for Europe. Of the
payment, 60% was to be received in machinery and products,
largely from Germany and the rest would be in cash from
Sweden
®
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The reaction in the U.S. was anger. Soon a "relentless
and ruthless squeeze" started on W.R. Davis by both,
7 9
American oil companies and the British government. The New
York Times reported on October 24, 1938:
Authorization to list 253.450 common shares of the
Panhandle Producing and Refining Company was
withdrawn yesterday by the New York Stock Exchange.
The ... shares ... were to have been delivered by
the oil company to Davis Company, headed by William
Rhodes Davis
...
The King's Bench Division of the
High Court of Justice in London decided on Monday a
civil action against Mr. Davis, ruling that he had
operated a scheme to defraud Carl Frederik Glad [a
Danish businessman] ... In its decision it
characterized Mr. Davis as 'an unsrupulous and
ruthless financier.'^ 0
Askimarks were first used to control the barter deal.
But in September 1938 a special account for Davis was
established at the German-South American Bank in Berlin. The
RWM wanted to assure that "only goods for oil production ...
31
ordered by the Mexican government ... would be admitted."
7 Q
Betty Kirk, Covering the Mexican Front: The Battle of
Europe vs. America, Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1942 ,
p. 172.
3 °New York Times, October 24, 1938. Betty Kirk continued
to defend Davis: "the British court [displayed] hypocritical
righteousness" while the American oil companies "did not
dare press their charges, because Davis threatened to expose
their own dirty linen if they went too far." (Kirk, p. 173)
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Davis was able to keep oil moving for the Mexican
government with a fleet of chartered tankers, largely
• • 32
Scandinavian. Apparently Mexico was satisfied with Davis'
efforts, since on December 8, 1938 a new contract was
3 3
announced. At this point the nature of the barter deal had
changed. Since the considerable flow of petroleum to
Germany could not only be compensated by goods for petroleum
production, other industrial goods were now allowed to be
shipped to Mexico. Moreover, a portion of the deal was now
paid in cash in dollars. A low price, however, was fixed for
these cash payments in order to break the Standard-Dutch
Shell boycott. In July and August 1939 , about 50% of the
sales to Germany was paid in cash amounting to $ 500,000 in
3 5
August. Sometimes the oil found its way to Germany by
detour: A small Texas company purchased Mexican oil to
barter it to Germany for manufactured goods.
3 2
Frank Kluckhohn, The Mex lean Challenge, New York:
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German fears that Davis could receive pressure from
American banks or the U.S. government were not justified.
The German embassy in Washington cabled on August, 20 that
"the State Department [did] not cause banks to refuse
credits to Davis for financing Mexican purchases." In
particular, the "First National Bank in Boston still
finances his [Davis'] business operations."^
Soon the independent oilman had even bigger plans. At
the end of 1938 he was buying oil from Mexico at a rate of
more than a million dollars a month at 30% under the world
market price. He planned to double this volume in 1939.
Since August 1938 the Eastern States Co. in Houston was
responsible for the refining of a good part of the exported
Mexican oil. In April 1939 Davis secured the German market
through a contract with the German control office for oil
n
„
(Über wa chung ss tel 1 e fur Mi ner al ol) . The contract provided
any German goods for direct compensation, while 40% could be
used in Askimarks for U.S. exports. About 2.25 million
tons of oil supplies were planned for 1939, half of it
3 7
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refined oil for gas and diesel. Again, the Navy had a
special interest in these deliveries.^
0
Germany's invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 ended
Davis' eager plans and the German bonanza. All his long term
contracts were cancelled and most of his further attempts of
'continuous voyage,' that is to supply petroleum indirectly
to Germany (e.g. through Italian harbors) , failed.
Direct German Negotiations with Mexico
During 1938/9 German officials were eager to check
Davis' business and later even attempted to establish direct
negotiations with Mexico. Here an important episode which
was confusing in the has to be clarified: the
visit of Jens Schacht, the son of Hjalmar Schacht, to
Mexico. Schacht, accompanied by an economic advisor (von
Watzdorf) , came to Mexico as a representative of Ferrostaal ,
Wilhelm Me ier-Dornberg , Olversorgung der
Kriegsmarine 1935 -45 , Freiburg: Rcmbach, 1973 , pp. 29-49 .
According to the author, Hitler's increased attention
towards England in 1938 resulted in the emergency "Z-Plan"
of the Navy, which required increased oil supplies, (p. 29.)
The futile efforts of achieving oil concessions in Mexico by
the German Navy is described on pp. 39-41.
See Kluckhohn, p. 13 9 and Shulgovski, p. 368 . See also
Josephus Daniels, Shirt-Sleeve Diplomat, Chapel Hill: Univ.
of N. Carolina Press, 1947, p. 252.
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a major German steel company. The RWM had chosen Ferrostaal
as the centralized controlling agency and supervising
commission for the barter deals. This interference was just
an attempt to diminish Davis' importance in his
intermediator role. For this reason, Schacht visited the
German legation in May His efforts proved to be
without success and in July 1939 the RWM dissolved the
mission of Ferrostaal.^
By mid-1939 the German government decided to do without
the go-between and negotiate directly with Mexico. On June
22 a conference took place in the RWM. Rud t who was at that
time in Berlin also attended the meeting. It was decided to
negotiate a direct contract with Mexico in case "Davis has
trouble in Mexico." A more direct relationship was also
favored by the director of the Pi str ibuidora de Petroleos
Mex icanos, Jesus Silva Herzog. According to the commercial
attache" Burandt, Silva Herzog was "a decisive advocate of
direct [oil] business with Germany without the mediation of
Mr. Davis." Of course this attitude of the economic
4 2
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advisor to Cardenas is never mentioned in his books.
Joachim G. A. Hertslet, a young economic expert, then
became the German representative arranging direct German-
-4 6
Mexican agreements. Hertslet traveled mid-July to Mexico.
He soon negotiated with the Mexican Finance Minister Eduardo
Suarez in August 1939 and was apparently successful. Rud t
noted in his diary that the negotiations "seem to take a
favorable course." long term contract was planned and
Suarez welcomed the direct solution in a confidential letter
to Hertslet on August, 26. Probably the conclusion of the
Hi tler-Stal in pact three days before had led Suarez to the
erroneous assumption that peace would last a little bit
longer in Europe. Thus he perhaps feared that the bizarre
pact between the two dictators could lead to oil supplies
from oil rich Bolshevik Russia.
4 5 s' , ￿
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Cardenas : Su Pensam iento Econom ico , Social _y Po litico ,
Mex ico, D.F.: Editorial Nuestro Tiempo, 1975.
was no t "second ranking man in the German
Foreign Economic Ministry, as Rippy (p. 255) asserts.
47
Volland, p. 152.
Hertslet then left for New York at the end of August
where he achieved an unexpected result: Davis transferred
the full authority for his companies in Germany and
48
Luxemburg to Hertslet. Probably Davis had received
knowledge of the direct cooperation efforts and wanted to
secure his German oil market place. In any case, the
outbreak of WW II finished all speculations. Direct German
contacts with the Mexican government broke off and Davis'
long term contracts were cancelled.
Germany was certainly Mexico's best customer during the
period 1938/9 . There is no reliable data available regarding
how much oil Germany actually received. The amount of oil
exported was about 40% less than the oil exported by the
expropriated companies during 1937. Ruth Sheldon in the Gas
and Oil Journal estimated that from 19 March 1938 to 31
March 193 9 Mexican oil exports to England accounted for 34%,
to Germany for 30%, to the U.S. for 19% and to Italy
This contrasts with the estimate of Josephus Daniels. Here
Germany accounted for 48%, Italy 17%, and the U.S. for 20%
48Davidsen note, 14 Sept. 1939.
49
Ruth Sheldon, "Marketing Harasses Mexico Oil Industry
Officials," Oi 1 and Gas Journal 38, 1 June 1939 , pp. 18-20.
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(16% was reexported!). In view of the British and American
boycotts the later estimates seem to be more correct. It is
unlikely that England accounted for one third of the total
exports after the exchange of harsh notes between England
and Mexico, leading to an interruption of the diplomatic
relations. Moreover, the tough attitude of the Shell did not
encourage more business. Thus it can be assumed that at
least half of all Mexican exports went to Germany in
1938/9.
51
The vital oil deals are well expressed in the number of
barrels shipped to Germany. Germany took 2,441,493 barrels
of Mexican oil in 1937, and despite Mexican production
52
problems, Germany purchased 2,097,044 barrels in 1938. In
1939
,
due to enforced boycotts and the outbreak of the war
it dropped to 1,498,383 barrels. German imports of gasoline
from Mexico sharply rose from 11,900,000 metric tons in 1937
Meyer, p. 209.
also Volland pp. 154-6.
c: o + .
Silva Herzog, Petrol eo Mex icana, p. 211. This notion
contradicts his own statement that "lo que Mexico vendio fue
insigni ficante en comparacion con lo que vendio la Standard
Oil Co. de New Jersey." In Jesus Silva Herzog, Histor i a de
la Ex pr opr iac ion de las Empresas Petroleras, 3.ed., Mexico,
D.F.: Instituto Mex icano de Invest lg ac lones Economicas,
1964, p. 162.
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to 40,400,000 metric tons in 1938.^
The supplies were mainly delivered by Davis' hired
tankers, many leaving from Houston (Eastern States
Petroleum) and almost exclusively by barter. Direct
cooperation between Germany and Mexico was on both sides
desired, but not realized. But Davis' contracts made
Morgenthau's and U. S. fears at the end of 1937 true: "We are
just going to wake up and find inside of a year that Italy,
Germany and Japan have taken over Mexico." Morgenthau's
remark also holds true in trade matters, which were, of
course, directly linked with oil barter deals. While the
U.S. share of trade with Mexico declined from 62.2% in 1937
to 57.7% in 1938, Germany's proportion rose from 16% to 19%.
55
The Germans even secured Mexican official support. The
LJ. S Consul in Tampico reported that government offices had
53
Rippy, p. 254.
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Cronon
, p. 17 6.
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Whitney H. Shepardson and William Scroggs, The U. S. in
World Affairs: An Account o f American Foreign Relations,
193 8
, New York: Harper, 1939, p. 257. See also Chapter VIII
in this manuscript.
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been ordered to obtain only German supplies.
s6
Only the
outbreak of WW II ended further lucrative oil barter deals.
Mexico's declaration of neutrality was not accompanied
without hardships. For example, Mexico had made a contract
with Germany to furnish rails to complete the railroad being
built in the South of Mexico (state of Campeche) , which were
to be paid in oil. "Now," Cardenas explained to Daniels,
we cannot get then and our work on that railroad
awaits our ability to get them from some other
country, though from Germany we could get them by
barter. Not only the railroad construction must be
halted but this means loss of employment, at least
for the time being, for the men employed in the
construction of the railroad. This is only one
example of how the war affects people whp have no
connection with it and are remote from it.
In conclusion, Mexico supplied about half of her oil to
Germany in the period between mid-1938 until the outbreak of
war in Europe. At this point the hemispheric solidarity and
the profound political differences prevailed over economic
interests for the first time. Therefore the oil sales to
Germany must be seen as a pragmatic move on behalf of
Cardenas. Germany was the only lucrative customer at the
time, since the American oil companies - in alliance with
p. 71.
57
Daniels
, p. 74.
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the u.S. government - boycotted the Mexican oil. Thus
Cardenas was forced to sell to a country, whose political
beliefs he did not share and rather despised. The next
chapter will illustrate the antipathy of the Mexican
president towards Nazi Germany and examine his subsequent
actions against Hitler's ruthless policies and politics in
Europe .
Chapter 5
Cárdenas' Attitude toward Hitler's
Power Politics and the Fascist Threat
Cardenas’ antipathy toward fascism and dictatorships was
well expressed in his New Year's message of 1938 :
Owing to their own innermost nature, dictatorships
have no right to assume unrestrictedly the direction
of the internal life of peoples, as they could even
seriously endanger the international equilibrium, by
means of enterprises that may plunge the world into
a new conflagration, to the great detriment of the
conquests of civilization and progress, so painfully
achieved by mankind.
Thus Cardenas emphasized the protection of the hemisphere
from dictatorships, by which he certainly had in mind
particularly the fascist ones. His ardent Pan-Americanism is
proof of this credo. But the Mexican president also did
expand his concerns to outside the American continent. In
this respect especially the forum of the League of Nations
served to express Cardenas' opinion of the fascist regimes'
I S' y s
Lazaro Cardenas, New Year's Message 1938 , Mexico, D.F.:
DAPP, 1938, p. 18.
2
See Chapter VIII.
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power politics. Therefore, his representative in Geneva,
/
Isidro Fabela stressed Cardenas' commitment to comply with
the "multilateral principles" of the League's constitution
and to present the president' s
firmeza de sus convicciones en defensa del derecho ,
e spec ialmente cuando este derecho se referia a las
pequenas potencias, victimas de las grandes que
cuidaban y trataban de hacer valer solamente sus
intereses propios aun contraviniendo la esencia del
codigo creador y normativo de la Sociedad de las
Nac iones, con grave y constante peligro para la pa z
internacional.
*
Indeed, as it is well known, Cardenas firmly adhered to this
conviction in word and deed, making Mexico one of the few
League members that stood up to the fascist powers' self-
-4 , .
assertive and imperial Machiavellianism. His specific
attitude and actions against the Reich's violations of
international law will be reviewed in this chapter.
3 • /
J lsidro Fabela, La Pol itica Internacional del Presidente
Cardenas, Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Jus, 1975 , p 7 10.
for example Armando Cardenas Ante el
Mundo: De fensor d e 1 a Republica Espanola , Etiopia ,
Finl and ia~ Africa, Luchas Populares de Asia, Mexico: La
Prensa, and Luis Pad ilia Nervo, Las Rel ac iones
Internac ional es de Mex ico 193 5-1 956 _a traves de los Mensa jes
Pres idenciales, Mexico , D.F.: Secretarla de Relaciones
Extenores, 1957 .
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The Spanish Civil War
Two months after the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War
(July 1, 1936) , Lazaro Cardenas made clear which side he
would actively support in the conflict. On September 1, 1936
he told Congress in his annual report:
El Gobierno de Espana solicito de nuestro Gobierno,
por conducto del Excelentis imo Senor Embajador Don
Felix Gordon Ordaz, la venta de pertrechos de
guerra, solicitud que fue atentida poniendo desde
luego a su disposicion en el puerto de Veracruz,
20.000 fusiles de 7 milimetros y 20.000.000 de
cartuchos de nacional.
S S .
Soon Mexican volunteers followed Cardenas' materiel
support and joined the International Brigades of the
Republican forces. On the other hand, Germany and Italy
supported Franco's rebels. Thus German and Mexican soldiers
met each other for the second time in a military conflict
without being directly in a state of war.° Cardenas felt
that, in supporting the legitimate Azana government, he
acted in accordance with the League's Pact as well as with
Luis Padilla Nervo (prol.) , Las Relaclones
Internacionales d e Mex ico 1 935 -1956 a traves de los Mens aj es
Presidenc lales, Mexico, D.F.: Seer etar la de Relaciones
Exteriores, 1957 , p. 21. Cited in Volland ,p. 237 , footnote
1.
c
In the German-French war of 1870/71 Mexicans had fought
with French troops.
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the Havanna Convention of March 29, 1928.
Consequently, Cardenas instructed Fabela in January 1937
to protest against the German and Italian violations of the
League's stipulations:
Espec ificamente en el conflicto espanol , el Gobierno
mexicano reconoce que Espana, Estado miembro de la
Sociedad de las Naciones, agredido por las potencias
totalitarias Alemania e Italia, tiene derecho a la
protecci6n moral, politica y diplomatica, y a la
ayuda material de los demas Estados miembros, de
acuerdo con las d isposic iones expresas y terminantes
del pacto.
/
Moreover, Cardenas asked Roosevelt to use LJ. S. influence
"para hacer cesar la intervene ion de contingentes
extranjeros en la lucha interna que sostiene el pueblo
Q
He pointed out that an intervention
"
por medio de
gestiones" by the U.S. would shorten the rebellion and wane
7
Isidro Fabela pointed out that Article 10 of the Pact
called for action against external aggression was evident.
On the other hand, Article 111 of the Havanna Conference
prohibited shipment of war supplies except to a legitimate
government in the case where the rebels' belligerency had
not been recognized. Fabela claimed this to be the case with
Franco, and therefore Mexico was within the limits of the
Havanna Conference. See Mem oria d e SRE, September 1937
-August 1938, Vol. I, Mexico, D.F.: DAPP, 1938, pp. 213 f .
B
Fabela
, p. 10.
9 ><■ s
Lazaro Cardenas, Apun tes, Vol. I, Mexico, D.F.:
Universidad Nac ional AutSnoma de Mexico, 1972 , p. 370.
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the haughty attitude that Germany and Italy would assume, if
the rebels won.
Source: Los Agachados de Ríus , No. 95: Franco
y Dios, S.A. (18 June 1972), p. 63
In fact, before the 1937 LJ.S. Neutrality Act, the U. S.
had sanctioned arms supplies to Spain and even offered the
possibility of Mexico’s buying U. S. arms for tr ansshi pmen t
to But this diplomatic front collapsed with
12
America's neutrality declaration.
10
Ibid.
U
FRUS 1 936, Vo 1 . 11, p. 530.
Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vo 1 . 1.,
New York: Macmillan Co., 1948 , pp. 4 8 Of. See also Richard
P. Traina, American Dipiomacy and the Spanish Civil War ,
Bloomington/London: Indiana Univ. Press, 196 8, es pec i ally
chapter 7 ("The Good Neighbor") , pp. 144-1 57.
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Moreover Mexico supported an abortive attempt of Cuba at
the Eight Pan-American Conference in Lima (1938 ) to use the
Conference as a negotiator between the antagonistic forces
of the Spanish conflict. Yet, the Mexican delegation made
clear that this proposal
no significaria que el Gobierno Mexicano reconoce la
beligerencia de quienes se han levantado contra el
Gobierno constituido
, pues para el Gobierno de
Mexico, el unico Gobierno legitimo es el que preside
el senor Azana, en Barcelona.
After all, Mexican support for the Azaria government,
both in terms of weapons and men, was rather small in
comparison with the Reich's massive supplies to Franco. In
the last four months of 1936 Mexico had delivered weapons
1 4
and munitions in the value of $ 1.5 million. "Yet, in view
of the fact that Mexico was neither a military power nor an
industrial center, the quantities sent to Spain loom
l s
large." In contrast, the Reich's expenditures on Novemoer
de Relaciones Exteriores, Mem or ia 193 8/9 ,
Mexico, D.F.: SRE, 193 9 , p. 416. Cited in Voll
and
, pi 23 7,
footnote 3
.
14
William 0. Scroggs, "Mexican Oil in World Politics,"
Foreign Affairs XVII, 1938/9 , p. 174, and El Nacional, Sept.
2, 1937.
15
Lois Elwyn Smith, Mex ico and the Spanish Repub 1 icans,
Berkely: Univ. of California Press, 19 55 , p. 19TT
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7, 1936 already accounted for 41.7 million Reichsmark, at
least the tenfold amount of Mexico's contribution.^ 8 The
unequal amount of support is also seen in terms of men.
While Smith estimated 150 Mexicans - which included the
painter David Alfaro Siqueiros - fighting with the
International Brigades, the Reich's massive contribution
was expressed by the "Legion Condor" which fought on the
sid e o f Franco.
Thus, "perhaps the greatest value of Mexican arms
18
shipments lay in the intangible realm of morale."
Cardenas' diary entries emphasized Mexico's moral and
IQ ,
political obligation and the ideological solidarity with
Republican Spain.
2B
This attitude is also well proved by the
Mexican refugee policy in regard to the Spanish
Manfred Merkes, Die deutscha Politik im Spanischen
Burger krieg 1936-1939 , Bonn: Histonsche Forschungen Bd. 18,
1969, p. 71.
■
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Smith, p. 196.
18
lb id
. , p. 191.
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Apuntes, p. 355.
20
lb id . , p . 37 0.
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Republ leans.
However, there are more reasons for Cardenas' support of
Azana. The president perceived the international nature of
Franco's forces as most disturbing. It violated
international law as expressed in the non-intervention
article of the League's Covenant which he saw as
"inalienable." Volland pointed out that the psychological
moment, derived by Mexico's own historical experience of
interventions, amplified Cardenas' resentment.
J His
protests of Japan's aggression against China and of Italy's
invasion of Abyssinia support this reasoning. in this
respect, the business aspect of the weapon sales must be
seen as a minor motive, since it was a logical consequence
of Cardenas' political and legal stance. After all, the
strong cultural relations to the "Madre Patria," which in
particular flourished in the last years before the outbreak
of hostilities with the Republican leftists, explains
Cardenas' strong commitment to the Azana cause.
Smith, pp. 198-295; Jerry Edwin Tyler, The Cardenas
Doctrine and 2 oth Cent ur y Mex ica n For eig n Pol ic^y, Diss.:
Louisiana State Univ., 1974, pp. 68ff.; and Ramon Beteta,
"Mexico's Foreign Relations," The Annal s o f th e Amer ica n
Ac ad em y of Pol itical and Social Science 208, 1940, pp. 17 6f .
22
Fabela
, p . 10.
23
Klaus Vo 11 and, Das 3. Reich und Mex ico , Fr ankf ur t/Ber n :
Lang, 1976, p. 70.
With Germany and Mexico in opposite camps in the Spanish
Civil War, the political relations between them
deteriorated. In fact, the Spanish conflict set a caesura
in the relations between the two countries. Now only
pragmatism, supported by an increase in trade relations,
guaranteed further diplomatic relations,
24
which proved to
be helpful when Davis' oil deliveries started in 1938.
Thus a paradoxical situation arose: all the same time
that Revolutionary Mexico was supplying arms and food to
Republican Spain, she was furnishing a critical war
commodity to the Reich, Franco's ally. Consequently,
political and economic policies were kept separate on both
sides. Minor incidents which could jeopardize this
pragmatism were usually protracted or often pushed aside.
For example, when caricatures "in grotesque forms" of Hitler
and Mussolini were carried through Mexico's streets in the
Workers' May Day celebration, Mexico's government did not
feel obliged to intervene. It argued that "the
manifestation was under the sole responsibility of the
workers." Despite strong protests of Minister Rudt, Mexico
refused to apologize to Germany. This was before the
Davis' oil deliveries started.
24
lb id . , pp. 72-81.
25
New York Times, May 15, 1937, p. 4.
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When the Mexican oil was shipped to Germany, the
official Mexican attitude changed, at least superficially: a
mural by Juan O'Gorman in the new waiting room of the
central airport pictured Hitler and Mussolini as a hydra-
headed snake emerging from the labyrinth of an inferno. It
y f.
was removed. Ironically the order came from General
Mugica, one of the most leftist members of Cardenas'
cabinet. The accommodation in political public affairs
averted any unnecessary erosion of diplomatic relations and
thus smoothed the economic "teamwork." The Cardenas
administration knew its quid pr o quo.
Nevertheless, Cardenas saw no reasons to display
hypocritical friendliness towards Germany. On August 22,
1939 he noted in his diary: "Of rec im ien to del gobierno
aleman de la mas alta cond ecorac ion. Rehusada. The
"Rehusada" did not need any explanation. The European events
until then had convinced him about the true nature of German
National Socialism. Two cases in point are the annexation
of Austria and the Czechoslovakian crisis.
York Times, Nov. 7, 1938, p. 21.
Apuntes , p. 42 9.
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The Annexation of Austria
The Anschluss of Austria (March 12, 1938) preceded the
oil nationalization by only six days (March 18, 1938) .
Probably Cardenas used the annexation as an opportune moment
to proclaim the oil expropriation. However, there is no
evidence for a direct German participation in the Mexican
29
move.
Mexico was the only League member which protested
against Hitler's
" hazana" and "de sbo rd am ien to imper ial i sta ,"
as Cardenas descibed it in his diary. At that point,
Cardenas still followed closely his principles, though he
recognized that the League had failed in its aggression
preventing functions. Thus the protest at the Geneva forum
was harsh and unequivocal:
La y c ireunstanc ias que causaron la muerte
politica de Austria significan un grave atentado al
Pacto de las Nac iones y a los sagrados principios
del Derecho In ternac ional
.
Austria ha dejado de
existir como Estado i nde pend ien te por obra de una
exterior que viola fl ag ran tern en te nuestro
Chapter IV.
29
See also Volland pp. 112f.
Apuntes
, p. 39 0.
O 1
Ibid. See also Fabela, p. 72.
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pac to constit ut ivo , asi como los Tratados de
Versailles y San German que consaaran la
i ndepend enc ia de Austria como inalienable.
So why did Cardenas' representative in Geneva, Isidro
Fabela, and Ramon Beteta, "the brains of the foreign
”3 "3
office,still fall back on the institution of the League?
First of all, as in the case of the Spanish Civil War,
Cardenas felt morally obliged to express his disgust for the
Reich's ex pans ioni st ic and ruthless foreign policy. As
early as May 1936, he had perceived Mexico's role in the
34
League of Nations as a tribune against imperialism. In
view of the relative insignificance of Mexico's voice in
foreign policies, the European forum helped to polish
Mexico's international reputation, at least in the
democratic countries. It also admonished the U. S. - despite
Good Neighbor policy - about the ugly nature of annexation
of one neighbor by another: " una tribuna en Europa contra el
predominio de nuestros vecinos
32
Fabela, pp. 72f . Here the whole text is printed, pp.
72-74.
p. 181, footnote 15.
Apuntes, p. 350.
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By the same token, Cardenas warned and reminded the
League that if it did not fulfill its obligations in such
cases, then even more serious problems would face the
o r
world. This, of course, was a futile move in view of the
League's non-existent means to enforce its principles,
similar to the United Nations' position today.
Finally, at that time there was no reason for Cardenas
not to protest and thus to express his genuine concerns and
opinion. The ongoing negotiations about German oil
concessions in Mexico were now untenable anyway, since
Mexico exuberantly celebrated her achieved "economic
independence." Cardenas could not know that he would be soon
forced to sell oil to the Reich. Half a year later, after
the first barter deals with Germany through Davis were
concluded, the official Cardenas reacted more cautiously.
The Czechoslovakian Crisis
Fabela saw two main reasons for Germany's desire of
hegemony over Czechoslovakia. First, that the Prague
government could become "un pueblo opositor a sus
[Germany's] planes y un auxiliar muy util a los franceses y
s
See Beteta, p. 73f . : "El mundo caera en una
con fl agr ac io n mucho mas grave que la que ahora se quiere
evitar, fuera del sistema de la Liga de las Naciones."
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rusos." And second, that Germany was interested in the
• 3 7
"abundant raw materials, that it needs."
When the Czechoslovakian Crisis came in the summer of
1938, Cardenas secretly proposed to President Roosevelt the
establishment of an inter-American boycott against aggressor
nations, though such a move would cost Mexico the important
German market for her oil. Cardenas noted in his diary on
September 28, 193 8:
Por conducto del senor embajador Daniels dirigi hoy
carta al senor presidente Roosevelt ... por la
agresion de Alemania a Checosl ov aqui a, ofreciendo
Mexico una col abor ac i£n inmediata, prohibiendo el
envio a Alemania de mater ias primas, inclusive el
petroleo y sus derivados ... El simple anuncio de un
boicot America para los jpaises ag re so res.
influina grandemente en la opinion in ternac ional .
His diary entry, however, failed to mention the condition
for this boycott: According to Josephus Daniels, Cardenas
39
only planned to implement the' suggest ion "in case of war."
One day later Cardenas seriously questioned the success
Fabela, Cartas al Presidente Cardenas, Mexico,
D.F.: Offset Altamira, 1947, p. 320.
38
Apun tes , pp . 398 f .
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Josephus Daniels, Shirt-Sleeve Diplomat, Chapel Hill:
Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1947 , pp. T2IT7PP-
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of the Munich Conference: " Debemos pensar que todos [Hitler,
Mussolini, Chamberlain and Daladier] sacrificaran a
Checosi ov aqui a ."
4
As it is well known, the conference took
place without the Prague government. Consequently, the
Mexican president did not share Chamberlain's hope "peace
for our time." Cardenas wrote in his diary on October 2,
1938:
La amputacion que acaba de sufr ir Checosiovaquia por
la agresion de Alemania, apoyada por Italia y
sancionada por Inglaterra y Francia no asegurara la
pa z en Euro pa. Los paisas imper ial i s tas se habran de
encontrar algun dia con fuerzas super iores que los
detendran en su loca carrera de conquista y
atropellos. ... Si las democracias de hoy han sido
impotentes para defender la liber tad de los pueblos,
el tiempo hara* sonar la hora de las justas
• • 41
re iv i nd ic ac lones .
Yet, depite this clear language and his historical
clear-sightedness, Cardenas did not officially protest. Nor
did he undertake anything after the "Er led ig ung" (the
finishing up) of the last part of Czechoslovakia in March
193 9. Though Mexico did not recognize the territorial
conquest of the multiethnic nation, clfrdenas' altered
4 Q
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position in avoiding "his European forum" is obvious. Taking
into account his ardent public defense in preceding similar
cases (Abyssinia, China, Spanish Civil War, Austria etc.)
and his unchanged private attitude towards Nazi-Germany as
expressed in his diary, his restraint can only be explained
in terms of the excellent mutual economic relations with the
Re i c h .
In the earlier chapters we had described the various
negotiations for Mexican oil between the two countries which
ultimately had led to the Davis contracts in June and July
1938. Thus, at the time of the European crisis, Germany had
become the most vital customer of Mexican oil. Moreover,
barter deals and the Askimark devices enhanced both
countries' trade relations. Consequently, Cardenas'
official and public position reflected Real pol iti k in the
purest sense: despite strongest ideological scruples,
economic considerations led Cardenas to act pragmatically,
that was to remain politically silent. Therefore, he only
intervened in a very moderate manner and in an almost
private nature. Two days before the Munich Conference,
Cardenas sent a telegram to Hitler and Czechoslovakian
v
President Banes in which he urged them "to avoid a
conflagration" and find a peaceful solution in the Sudeten
43,
Crisis. The earlier strong-worded protests now
d i sappeared .
Nevertheless, in conclusion, Cardenas' resentment
against Hitler's tour de force in Europe, accompanied by the
dictator's consistent violations of international law, was
quite obvious and outspoken. The circumstances - that is to
say the economic realities - conditioned Cardenas' actions
in Mexico as well as in Geneva.
In any case, Cardenas' attitude essentially reflected
his position as a protagonist for the extension of the Calvo
...
44
clause on an international, multilateral level. Cardenas
was strongly opposed against any kind of foreign
intervention. In this respect the goal of the Calvo Clause
can be compared with the one of the League of Nations or the
Pan-American Conferences. "The purpose of the Calvo Clause
4 3
New York Times, Sept. 29, 1938. According to the
article, Cardenas wrote: "In accord with the sentiment of
the Mexican people I consider it my duty to appeal in the
most sincere manner possible to the serene judgment of Your
Excellency to the end that a conflagration may be avoided."
44
See Jerry Edwin Tyler, The Cardenas Doc tr ine and 20 th
Century Mexican Foreiqn Policy, Di ss. Lo ui siana State Univ.,
1974.
4 sSee 5See Chapter VIII.
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is to place foreigners on the same level as nationals in
regard to the submission of their difficulties to the
exclusive jurisdiction of domestic courts. On a global
scale, the multilateral principles of the League of Nations
and, for the Western hemisphere, of the Pan-American Pacts
and Declarations, proposed "collective security" or at least
multilateral consultations in times of conflict. In any
case, international law was sought to be enforced.
Consequently, both Calvo Clause and the international
organizations have and had the ultimate goal to avoid d irec t
foreign intervention. The similarity of Cardenas' line of
argument in Geneva and in the situation after the oil
expropriation is striking, though he based it on different
principles. Therefore, the Mexican president persistently
insisted and warned both national and international
violators to be " fiel al pacto."
In this legal struggle, Cardenas often stood fairly
alone, especially in Geneva. Despite the acknowledged
weaknesses of the League, he perceived Mexico's entrance in
it as " uno de los mas brillantes triunfos diplomaticos de
nuestra Canciller ia ."47 0n the one hand, the League offered
, p . 17 8.
47
Apuntes, p. 350.
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him and his country, unexperienced and unacknowledged in
foreign affairs, an international podium to express his
anti-fascist, ant i-intervent ioni st and anti-imperialistic
4 8
credo. On the other hand, this intensified involvement in
international policies served Cardenas to strengthen
Mexico's position against her Northern neighbor, the United
States. Therefore, Cardenas suspected that "la posicioVi
i nternac ional que ha alcanzado Mexico ind iscutiblemente la
ha resentido el gobierno de los Estados Unidos." This
resentment on behalf of the U.S. probably was intensified by
her growing isolation policy and by the fact that the U.S.
was not a member of the League.
Cardenas' opposition to fascism was not confined to
Europe alone. The Mexican President faced the Nazi threat at
home as well. However, as the next chapter reveals, the
various contemporary accounts about the Nazis' ideological
penetration in Mexico have to be placed in perspective.
Three case studies will serve this purpose. Moreover we will
examine to which extent ant i-comm uni sm and anti-semitism
permeated Mexico and thus served the Nazi cause.
4 8
The developing Third World countries today use the
United Nations in a similar fashion.
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Chapter 6
The Nazis in Mexico
The German Threat in Latin America: An Introduction
The Pan-American Conferences of Buenos Aires (1936) and
Lima (1933) indicated the general desires of an united
Western Hemisphere front vis a vis the perceived German
threat. With the war clouds moving fast over Europe, all
American states displayed considerable concern about the
growing ideological fascist penetration. The inroads for
such political agitation usually found its way through three
channels:
1. The organization of Germans living abroad was
tightened and then used or abused for the Nazi
c ause.
2. Media propaganda such as pamphlets, newspapers,
films and radio served to spread out the Nazi
id eolog y.
3. German agents sought direct or indirect
participation in local movements and political
organi zations.
The second and third channels of German propaganda inroads
Chapter VIII in this manuscript.
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will be treated later as separate investigations within the
context of the Mexican case.
The ideological training and cultivation of a German
national identity for Germans living abroad, the
Ausland sdeut sc he had already been supported by Imperial
Germany as well as by the Weimar Republic. This specific
foreign policy aim was now especially stressed after Hitler
had risen to power. The two most important vehicles of this
policy were, among others, the Vol ksbund Deutsche im Ausland
(VDA)
,
an organization that administered official subsidies
for German schools, theaters and newspapers amounting
annually to 3.5 million RM in Latin America. As the most
significant ideological instrument abroad functioned the
Ausland so rg an i sat ion (AO) , the foreign organization of the
National Socialist Party. With Ernst Wilhelm Bohle as
Gauleiter (director of the AO) - a protege* of chief party
administrator Rudolf Hess - this agency became the most
Albrecht von Gleich, "Germany and Latin America,"
RAND Corp. Memorandum RM 5523 , Santa Monica: June 1968 ,
p. 15.
Katz, "Einige Grundzuge der Politik des
deutschen Imper ial i smus in Lateinamer ika von 1858 bis 1941,"
in Friedrich Katz et al
~
Der deutsc he Fa schi smus in
La te inamer ika 1 933 -1 943
,
Berl l n (East) : 196 6~, pi 22. The
Spanish ed it ion is titled: Hi tl er Sobre Am dr ica Latina : El
Fa sci smo en La t inoamer ica
,
1 933 -43
,
Mexico
,
D. F. : Ed l tor iaT
Fondo de Cultura Popular, 1968.
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agressive vehicle in promoting Nazism among German
communities in foreign countries.^
Moreover, German cultural institutions such as the
Fichtebund and the Ibero-Amerikanische For schungsinstitut,
both working from Hamburg, were engaged in propaganda
activities in Latin America.
3
Such unofficial agencies as
well as the official organizations were both active in
Mexico, even though not to such a degree as in other Latin
American countries with traditional strong German
immigration, notably the ABC countries, Uruguay and
Pa rag uay.
The fear of a German "Fifth column" in Latin America was
nourished by events in Brazil and Argentina. In Brazil,
Germans were held responsible for an abortive putsch in May
1938. Already in 1932 the European fascist movanents had
inspired the formation of an authoritarian Brazilian party,
Alton Frye, Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere
1933-1941
,
New Haven/London: Yale Un iv . Press, 196 7 , ppT
T5-3TT
s
lb id ~ p . 18 .
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the Integral ists. The group supported President Vargas'
abrogation of the constitution and his assumption of
dictatorial powers in 1937, but Integral ist leaders were
obviously disappointed that they did not receive a prominent
role in the new scheme of politics. This discontent led the
party to attempt a coup d'etat in May 193 8. Since Nazi
involvement in the plot was undoubted by the Vargas
government, stern actions against German communities and
associations were taken which culminated in the banning of
7
the AO one year later.
In Argentina, German immigrants and their various Nazi
organizations carried out successful propaganda since
Q
Hitler's seizure of power. Up to mid-1938 German activities
were left relatively undisturbed by the Argentine
authorities, even though the public became more and more
alert and solicitous about the open display of Nazi
ideology. This alertness became heightened after the alleged
Stanley E. Hilton, " Acao Integralista Brasileira:
Fascism in Brazil, 1932-1938 ," Luso-Bra zili a n Review 9,
1972/3
, N0.2,.2, pp. 3-29.
7
See Frye, p. 15-31.
o
See Andreas Winckler, "Argentina and Germany in 1938/9 ,"
Unpublished Paper, UT, 1983.
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German involvement in the abortive coup in Brazil,
Argentina's northern neighbor. The Argentine administration
now took first steps to curb Nazi public actions such as
meetings under the Swastica and propaganda through German
Q
schools.
The final spark that led the Argentine authorities to
firm actions against German activities was the so-called
Patagonia affair. In March 1939 the newspaper No tic ias
Gra f ica s published a document, purporting to be a dispatch
to the Reich's Colonial Policy Office which described Nazi
plans for the collection of secret intelligence in
preparation for German annexation of Patagonia. This area of
the country was known to have oil reserves and is of great
strategic importance since it dominates the Straits of
Magellan, the Southern route from the Atlantic to the
Pacific coasts.
Even though the German embassy immediately denied the
document's authenticity, the Argentine police arrested
Alfred Muller, deputy Landesg r uppenl ei ter of the Nazi Party
in Argentina and one of the authors of the reputed
conspiracy. Since the original could not be traced, Muller
9
See Arnold Ebel
,
>
Das 3. Ra ich und Argent in ien:
193 3-1941
,
Koln/Wien: Bohlau, 1971.
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obtained his release in May, but the case occupied the
Argentine courts well into the summer before it was finally
d i smissed .
The extended legal proceedings, however, stimulated the
nationalistic voice in the Argentine press and accounted for
a new wave of alarm over the dangers of the Quinta Col urn na,
the paramilitary German fifth column, throughout Argentina.
Now public opinion seriously pressed the government for
action. On 15 May a long expected decree was issued
regulating the activities of foreign associations in
Argentina. All such bodies were in future obliged to provide
both the Ministry of the Interior and the police with full
details of their organizations, their purpose and names of
members. Other measures curtailed their activities and
ninety days were given to comply with these new
reg ulat ions .
These two examples show that the general, often
undefined fear of the German threat was justified and not
mere paranoia. In general, the Department Pol. IX of
Norman P. MacDonald, Hi tl er over Latin Am er ic a ,
London: Jarrolds, 1940, pp. 54-60.
pp. 62f . and Ebel , pp. 412ff.
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Ribbentrop's foreign office which was responsible for South
America aimed for three main goals:
the creation and fostering of anti-American
att i t ud e
the economic penetration
the political and ideological expansion on behalf
of German National Socialism.
We already described how the trade relations between
Mexico and Germany had prospered. They developed and were
perceived very satisfactory on both sides. The widening of
the economic cooperation can be called successful in view of
both countries' goals. The political penetration in Mexico,
however, caused difficulties.
An acknowledged goal of the German secret diplomacy
was the preliminary neutralization of South America,
since [the foreign office] did not have any
illusions about the fundamental antifascist attitude
of Mexico [after she sided with the Spanish
Republic] and the total U. S. dependence of the
Central American 'Banana' Republics.
Thus apparently Lazaro Cardenas' government discouraged
extensive endeavors on behalf of the German propaganda
machine. Volland emphasizes the reasons of this
fr ui tl essness :
19 \t
Manfred Kossok,
" Sonderauftr ag Sudamenka, Zur Politik
des deutschen Faschismus gegenuber Lateinamerika 1941/1942 ,"
in Der deutsche Imperial istnus und der zweite Weltkrieg, Vol.
3, Berlin (East) : 1962, p. 71. My translation.
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A political alliance between the Third Reich and
Mexico was already impossible because of
...
the
trade hegemony of the U.S.; [moreover] the growing
influence of the Mexican left in the period after
1935 [after the Calles-Cardenas break]
,
the power
constellation in WW II plus the national socialistic
orientation towards race policy excluded such an
alliance. 13
Nevertheless some German national socialistic influences
can be traced in Mexico. They appeared in different, but
distinctively Mexican organizations and movements such as
the Sinar qui s tas, Dorados and the Cedillo revolt. First,
however, before we apply the term, the circumscription of
"Fascism" is indispensable. A clarification is necessary in
order to detect parallels and analogies between the Mexican
right wing ideologies and appearances on the one hand and
fascism on the other. Moreover the term's inflationary
usage at the time, in particular in left wing circles (in
the same prolific manner Fascists used the term
"communism") , is another reason for its closer
investigation.
Volland, Das 3 . Reich und Mex ico , Frankfur t/Bern :
Lang, 1976, p. 200. My translation.
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What Is Fascism?
The term "fascism" is here used in its costumary
connotation as the collective term for its subordinated
versions such as Italian Fascism, German National Socialism
and the Spanish Falangismo. Later the specific German
fascist characteristics will be pointed out in the context
of the Mexican case studies.
As Ernst Nolte remarked, one handy definition of the
phenomenon is impossible:
The original interpretations of political trends,
however, are always formed, before objective study
forms them, _ijn the con frontat ions o f soc ia 1
ex istence itsel f. Applied to a given phenomenon they
represent a conception rather than a description.
Nolte identifies seven conceptions of Fascism, depending on
the historical and ideological points of view of their
authors. Without examining these conceptions which the
historian "has to assume ... rather than initiate them," one
has to keep them in mind as variations of the
Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, New
York/Chicago/San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1966, p. 16. My emphasis. The book was originally published
in German: Der Fa schismus in seiner Epoche; die Ac ti o n
fran^aise, der ital ienische Faschismus, der
Nat ional so zi al i smus, Mun icn : Piper , 1965 .
lb id . , pp. 16-21.
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generalizations here to follow. Since there is no synthetic
theory about fascism, a typological approach will be
pursued. This method will examine and determine the typical,
external as well as inherent, principles and features of
fascism, which sum define the term.
For Harold J. Laski, "fascism is power built upon terror
and organized and maintained by the fear of terror and the
hopes to which conquest gives This simple
definition contains several essential elements of fascism.
First and probably most important is the deep-rooted desire
for power for power
1
s sake
.
If a constitutive principle in fascism exists at
all, it is simply and solely the principle that
power is the sole good and that values attach only
to those expedients which sustain and enlarge it.
7
All other elements of fascism only support this - often
misinterpreted - Nietschean "will to power." These
scattered, wide ranging elements might be devided into two
categories: one forms the co nd i t ion of fascism and the other
*| r
Harold Laski
,
"The Meaning of Fascism," in Harold Laski ,
Re fl ect ions on the Revol ut ion o f Our Time, London: G. Allen
& Unwin Ltd., 1943, p. 103. Republished in New York by A. M.
Kelley in 1968.
17 Ibid.
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forms its myth. Both serve ultimately the systematical
attainment of terror. Therefore fascism needs appropriate
organization for its condition, while hopes and beliefs
generate its mythol og ic al justification.
The condition represents no more than formal extension,
through the employment of the machinery of the state, of the
leading business principles to encompass the entire
population. Indeed these economic principles applied to
politics appear as part of the fascist organization.
Every business practises towards its own staff the
'leader' and the 'authority' principles, and it
und ev iat i ngl y aspires towards the 'total' principle.
That is to say, all officers and staff members are
appointed and removed from on top entirely at the
discretion of management (leader principle) , and
authority is from the top down, responsibility from
the bottom up (authority principle) . And every
employer attempts to control so far as humanly
possible the attitudes, beliefs, and points of view
(Weltanschauung) of his employers and every section
of the public with which he comes in contact (total
19
pr inc ipi e) .
According to these principles the fascist regimes were
set up. The National Socialists managed to organize and thus
control, dictate and infringe upon every aspect of daily
A. Brady, The Spirit and Str uc ture of Germ an
Fascism, New York/London: The Viking Press, TT9T7 , p. 37 6 .
19
Ibid.
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life. Rig id hierarchy guaranteed the flow of orders from top
to bottom. Pi sc ipl ine and obedience was incorporated at
every level of the political machinery. Everybody was
somehow organized; first in the party itself and secondly in
its various subdivisions in respect to the member's gender,
age and inclination: Storm Troop, Special Guard, Labor
Front, Hitler Youth, Federation of German Girls etc.
Moreover sport clubs, choral societies, art clubs and other
cultural associations served this tota 1 organization which
was centralized for the sake of better control.
On top of all this stands the 1eader. His personality is
twofold. On the one hand, he must be immensely above his
followers - built upon the religious impulse and thus
appearing as God-chosen and infallible - while on the other
hand he must be also one with them and of them. In short,
"distance must not interfere with the sense of intimate
87
2 0
communion ."
Myth constitutes the other aspect of fascism. It is the
interpretation of the fascist organization and its inherent
ideology that is designed to gain po pul ar suppor t. With
regard to the latter, it may be laid down as an
indispensable condition that, without some measure of
popular support, fascism - even with the aid of the military
becomes next to impossible to put across at the
beg inning .
x
Myth then is designed purely and simply as a means
for circumventing opposition, and its propositions
are regarded as equivalent to 'true' and undeniable
facts if they can be successfully put across, since
...
success is the measure of 'truth’ as well as of
2 0
Laski
, o. 129. The fascist leaders, Laski warns, are,
however, by no means revolutionaries
in the sense that Luther and Calvin, Cromwell and
Washington, Marx and Lenin, were revolutionaries.
Men such as these were driven by a purpose wider
than the end of satisfying themselves. They were
seeking to change the behaviour of men in terms of
principles to which they attached the significance
of universality. ... They were the servants, the
priests, as it were, of the doctrine they professed,
and not its masters. ... They were not seeking to
elevate their own private ambitions to the status of
universal principle. To class such men with Hitler
and Mussolini is to identify the revolutionary with
the outlaw. The distinction is a fundamental one if
the nature of fascism is to be understood. (Ibid.,
p. 116)
Brady, p. 376.
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This nihilistic approach to 'truth' explains fascism and
its myth as its antithesi s to marx i sm. Therefore Nolte
defines
fascism as anti-marxism which seeks to destroy the
enemy by the evolvement of a radically opposed and
yet related ideology and by the use of almost
identical and yet typically modified methods,
always, however, within the unyieldinq framework of
national self-assertion and autonomy.
2"^
This definition implies that without marxism there is no
fascism. Thus fascism develops its energies, its
attractiveness and its impact on the population through
oppo si t ion and as an anti-thesis. Genuine new political
approaches are lacking. Its ideology is no ideology, because
it does not stand by itself, while for example marxism and
its variations dispose an independent theory. Thus fascism
has no doctrine, but exists only as a r eac tion and rej ec tion
as seen in anti-semitism and Ant i Com in tern. That is the
reason why National Socialism rapidly grew out of the blame
on the Versailles treaty and created the Dole hs tossi eg end e
(stab in the back legend) . These negative values, supported
by the myth, again serve the ultimate goal of fascism: the
22
lb id.
, pp. 3 78f.
p. 20f . My emphasis.
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seizure of power. The anti-doctrine is the reason why
"fascism attempts ... to put across to the people a 'self-
denying ordinance' through conversion of the disinherited to
the theology of their self-confessed betters."
2^
Nolte's definition also includes the self-serving
position of fascism. Its different versions act "within the
unyielding framework of national self-assertion and
autonomy." Thus fascism does not claim to be a unified,
universal type, but it allows to be used within the specific
national case .
So how is the myth, the fascist monopoly of 'truth,'
obtained? The main tool is propaganda, meaning the
propagation of (the reputed) doctrine and is based upon the
conquest of attitude, of belief, of point of view. It
proceeds on two levels, the persuasive or educational level,
and secondly, the coercive level. The second "does not
dispense with persuasion, but it adds thereto the compulsion
to conform."
25
By this token, the only valid criterion in
the program for the public is what is effective,
what will
succeed and what will suppress, or deflect, or undermine
2
Brady, p. 37 9.
25
lb id . , p . 38 3.
90
. • 2 6
opposition.
Logically, fascism admits rio compr om ise with its
opposite. In the words of Laski, "it is the rising of the
underworld against the habits of an ordered cosmos." The
success of fascism must be total. A multi-party system is
incompatible. In this sense fascism forms a movement rather
than a party. Consequently, the rule of law must be replaced
by that of terror and rights, and consists in what the
fascist dictator proclaims. However, condition and myth
ultimately serve to evoke acquiesence in his authority,
since terror alone is not a method which permits of
Brady points out, the difference between nonfascist
capitalist states and fascist states is to be found not in
the content, but in the level on which propaganda is
promoted. The non fascist countries are still on the
persuasive level, which tries to sell itself to the public,
while the fascist are fully oriented on the coercive level:
"it has sold the public to itself, and those who do not
belief, who do not conform are branded as 'traitors' to the
state and treated accordingly." (See Brady, p. 384) Thus
the essence of fascism derives from "the outcome of
capitalism in decay." (Laski ,p. 100)
7 Las ki , p. 13 5.
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permanent power.
This short description of the typical elements of
fascism will be the equipment with which the fascist
tendencies in the different right wing organizations will be
detected. Ultimately these fascist characteristics, however,
remain 'fascistoid' in Mexico, because they all did not
develop beyond the early stages while fascism shows its real
face, with all facets displayed, after its seizure of power.
As already indicated, the term fascism hitherto was used
as a collective term under which National Socialism and
Falangismo formed a subdivision. Now, particular national
socialistic characteristics will be referred to within the
context of fascistoid elements of Mexican groups, parties
and movements.
2 8
device of the mythological diffusion is the
trans figur a ted glorification o f the pas t. It supports the
belief that each person has his allotted function, graded to
his talents, which he must perform, and from which alone he
may obtain his due need. This device promotes the theory of
Social Darwinism, "the survival of the fittest," which
Spengler, approved by the Nazis as a prophet of the New
Germany, condensed in the sentence "Man is a beast of prey."
It justifies the condition and the hierarchy by supporting
the formation of medieval caste systems. Man is arrayed
against man and each should 'stick to his last.' By the way,
here lies the seed of racist theory. In sum, the mystified
past serves to justify and cloud the reality of the present.
The Sinarquistas
One thing has to be said at the outset and borne in mind
throughout the treatment of the Sinarquistas: "Even there
were elements of fascist ideology in their thought and
elements of Hispanidad and ultranationalism, nonetheless
29
first, and fundamentally Sinarquismo was Roman Catholic."
The Sinarquistas originated in 1936 with the foundation
of a group which named itself the Centro Ant i-Com unista.
One of the founding fathers was the German Hellmuth Oskar
Schreiter, a chemical engineer by profession but then a
language professor at the state college of Guanajuato. But
he
was anything but a Mexican idealist. ... He carried
an old, 'low-number' German Nazi Party card ... and
served as president of the province's Nazi Fichte
Bund. His real job in Mexico can be best described
quite simply: Hellmuth Oskar Schreiter was a Nazi
agent.
The group was relatively unsuccessful until the name of
the organization was changed in May 1937 to Un io n Nac iona 1
2 9
Albert L. Michaels, "Fascism and Si nar qui smo," A Journal
of Church and State (Waco, Texas) 8 (2) , Spring 1966 ,
p. 236 .
h 0
Allan Chase, Falange: The Axis Secret Army in the
Amer icas, New York: G. P. PutnalrPs Sons, 1943, pp. 16 6FT
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Sinarquist a (UNS) at their meeting in Leon.
" Sinarqui smo"
derives from Greek and means 'With Order' as opposed to
anarchy. The movement which did not perceive itself as a
political party soon spread out from its state of origin,
Guanajuato. Its main strength, as Whitaker observed, "lay in
the spontaneous reaction of a large number of the Mexican
3 1
people to the vices of the Mexican Revolutionary regime."
One of the vices was for example the strict separation of
church and state as seen in Cardenas' ardent endeavor of
secular public education, which became a main target of the
Sinarquistas.
Whitaker's observation may be sup pi amen ted by the idea
that the reaction against the Mexican government was
nourished by the simultaneous success of the European
fascists. From them Sinarquismo drew the methods and
techniques for its cause. "The marriage between clerical
fascism and Nazism gave birth to the Sinarquista
mov ament .
"
3-*-Arthur P. Whitaker, Inter-American Affairs 1942 , New
York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1943 , p. 29.
than iel and Sylvia Weyl , The Reconque st of Mex ico : The
Years of Lazaro Cardenas, New York: Columbia Univ. Press“7
1942, pT 361.
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One of its founders, Jose Antonio Urquiza, for example,
made contacts in Spain to the Falangistas, when he fought
for Franco in the Spanish Civil War.
33
After his return and
the foundation of the UNS, Urquiza soon was murdered and
becaue the first official martyr of the Sinarqusta movement.
Kirk assumed that his martyrdom was due to the simalarity of
Urquiza's first name, which coincided with the Falange's
y -34
important martyr Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera.
From the beginning, Nazi and fascist influences were
apparent. In the tangled genealogical chart of Sinarquismo
one finds the name of General Wilhelm von Faupel , the
president of the Ibero-Amer ican Insti tut e in Berlin, also
Hitler's first envoy to General Franco and later military
advisor to the Argentine General Staff. Faupel did not
disguise Germany's aims in Latin America, as his speech in
March 1939 indicated:
33
Mario Gill (pseud.) , La De*cad a Barbara, Mexico, D.F.
Ediciones Parallelo 20, 1957 , p. 139.
34
3etty Kirk, Cover ing the Mex ican Front, Norman: Univ. of
Oklahoma Press, 1942 , p. 317. In my view, Kirk overrates
this fact, since already in 1941 some 70 martyrs existed
according the Sinarquist's 'Handbook for Chiefs' of 1941.
Shedd, "Thunder on the Right in Mexico,"
Har per 1 s Mag a zine, 190, April 1945, p. 417.
p. 14.
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Germany must pour educationists, scientists and
linguists into South America with the object of
counteracting the U. S. propaganda there. Radio,
press and film propaganda must be used to offset
United States influence. And South Americans must be
invited in increasing numbers to Germany so that
they may see how far ahead we are of all other
nations in our culture and social measures.
37
However, the direct influence of Faupel's institute on the
Sinarquitas was rather limited, even though Chase calls it
oo
Faupel's "Mexican masterpiece." Moreover the already
mentioned Hellmuth Schreiter appeared in the Sinarqui stas'
annals. "The professor not only advised thorn but got them
O Q
funds from local Nazis.
But more important than these single figures and
isolated idols was the impact of the Nazi organizational
system. Again, one has to bear in mind that the now
described borrowed fascist techniques are but one aspect of
the internal structure of Sinarquismo. It used the fascist
means for different, distinctively Mexican ends. The most
striking external simalarity was the Si nar qui sta s' system of
detailed, carefully planned, minutely directed organization,
3 7
Ibid.
33
Chase
, p. 16 5.
Shedd
, p . 418.
thus a direct application of the movement's name: without
anarchy, but with order. As in Nazi Germany, this
organization was held militarily and had recruited a well-
drilled, disciplined army. All members were 'soldiers' and
were controlled by the leadership, or j efe, principle. The
analogy to the Fuhrer or Duce mentality is obvious. However,
the Mexican Supreme Je fe was changed every few years by the
UNS National Committee - "a secret group, admitted but
unknown" - "presumably to make sure no one man can build up
a personal following ." As with the Nazis' Gaus ystem,
regional Sinarquista offices administered the movement's
organization. "Detail is magnificently systematized from
the top; nothing is initiated from below, although
exhaustive monthly reports are required from every group.
Indeed, this system applies to Brady's description of
fascist organization where "authority is from the top down,
..4 2
responsibility from the bottom up.
Moreover the Sinarquistas attempted to incorporate and
organize women and the youth, reminiscent to Germany's
40lb id
. , p. 415.
41
Ibid.
42
See the preceding section in this chapter: "What is
Fa sc ism?"
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Hi tierjug end (Hitler Youth) and Bund deutscher Madchen
(Union of German girls) . In short, the UNS copied some of
the successful features of fascist organization. It was
hierarchical, highly centralized and coordinated from the
National Committee down through the regional and municipal
committees, to subcommittees and sections. In each category
obedience to one's superior had to be complete.^
Sinarquismo refused to use established means, such as
voting, to come to power. As the European fascists, it
perceived itself as a revolutionary movement. Nevertheless
the political atmosphere was that within which the
Sinarquistas operated. Albert L. Michaels found it as
"perhaps one of the greatest paradoxes of the [Mexican]
Revolution" that the Sinarquistas - as opponents of the
Cardenas government - launched their most effective campaign
for the allegiance of the Mexican campesino in the middle of
the Cardenas administration.
44
Sinarquismo promised to
liquidate the Mexican Revolution by national 'renovation.'
It challenged the system from within 'out never succeeded
in
such a sweeping manner as in which Hitler had destroyed the
4
ward Ski lien, "A Note on Sinarquism," Commonweal , XL,
9 June, 1944, p. 177.
44
Michaels
, p. 238.
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Weimar Republic. As the Nazis envisaged a corporate "Aryan"
state, the Sinar qui stas' ultimate goal was a corporate
clerical state. However, one party rule in a syndicalist
spirit - with all workers belonging to one Sinarquist union
never materialized. This idea had already had its
forerunner in the Italian fascist model. Despite the UNS
appeal to many Mexicans of all classes, the competition with
the Revolutionary Party, reorganized by Cardenas, proved to
be too strong .
There is another important factor in the development of
fascist power which correlates with Sinarquismo:
Harold Laski called fascism the defense of the
middle class against the onslaught of the masses. A
similar phenomenon was noted in the Royal Institute
of International Affairs' study on nationalism:
"The nearer the middle class are reduced by the
pressure of economic circumstances to the economic
level of the proletariat, the more desperately they
struggle to maintain their superior social status."
Sinarquista leaders considered themselves to be of
the middle classes. They were young, cultured and
intelligent. Mostly under thirty-two of age, they
had abandoned lucrative careers as doctors, lawyers,
engineers, and bureaucrats to lead what they hoped
would be a spiritual revival of the Mexican
masses.
The National Socialists' early supporters derived exactly
Hugh G. Campbell, The Rad ical Rig ht in Mex ico
1929-1949
,
Diss. Univ . of California, 1968 , pp. 239f.
p. 239.
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from this same group of young, eager but unsatisfied
academics torn by the economic disaster of the early 1930's
and by the political stalemate between right and left in the
Weimar Republic.
Further ex ter nal parallels existed in even minor details
and symbols: the official uniform of the Sinarquistas was a
green shirt, though most members were so poor that they
could not afford this outfit; instead they wore armbands
with a green map of Mexico imposed on a white circle as an
insignia. The members had their own special form of salute,
moreover songs and banners played an important part in their
various meetings and processions.^
Nationalism was the propelling force for the Sinarquismo
movement. But its version displayed a set of purely Mexican
symbols and based on the proposition that Mexico was a
Catholic nation possessing the European tradition of
individualism. The Sinarquista slogan called for "one race,
one culture, one language and one religion." The last
component, religion, makes the crucial difference to the
German national socialistic anti-clerical, though not
overtly displayed, stance. The Sinarquista leader Juan
7
sk ill in, p. 17 6.
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Ignacio Padilla saw history as a battle between those who
believed in God and those who rebelled against Him.
Therefore Sinarquista songs rang with the love of God and
religious symbolism. Such words as 'Dios' , 'Cristo Rey' ,
' cruz'
r
and 'redencion' filled almost all the Sinarquista
corridos. Moreover the hymn emphasized this religious
fervor mixed with Mexican nationalism.
50
Ultimately not a
Fuhrer led the Sinar qui s tas , but God, the heavens and their
faith. Consequently, they renounced the "paganism" of Hitler
Germany, when they spelled out their foreign policy position
in May 1941.
The movement's leaders always renounced allegations
calling them fascists. But the external resemblance to the
European totalitarian regimes plus their open anti-communism
and anti-semitism seduced to this determination. Its
hierarchical organization was built on fascist models and
oriented itself in particular at the German example, the
48 , /
See Juan Ignacio Padilla, Si nar qui smo contr ar ev ol uc ion ,
Mexico, D.F.: Editor Polis, 1949.
49
See Michaels passim.
50
lb id
. , pp. 242ff.
51
Kirk, p. 316.
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most thorough totalitarian system of all. Yet, the foreign
ideologies, the Sinarquistas claimed, were alien to them:
It [Sinarquismo] is opposed to that which would
impose foreign symbols upon Mexico, alien flags, ...
communist or fascist devices. Sinarquismo is a
Mexican movement made by Mexicans.
2
But nonetheless Sinarquismo and German Nazism and the other
fascist movements shared a love of display, marching,
emblems, and flags. Cynical promises - another borrowed
technique serving mythological reasons - plus appeals to the
profound religiosity of the Indian served Sinarquismo to
attract a large section of peasants and to reach down to the
very foundation of Mexican life.
33
The Sinarquistas were
still operating on the persuasive level. With these 1 every-
man-a-king' panacea, they managed to win both the hacendados
and the landless peons to their banners - "just as Hitler
54
had won both the landed Junkers and the simple Bauer n."
This c ompar i son , however, does not hold true,
because of the
simple fact that Junkers as part of the nineteenth century
feudal system did not more exist. Hitler drew his support
32
Mario Gil (pseud.) , _EI Sinarqui smo: Su Prig en, Su
Esencia, Su Mision, Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Ol in,
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from business circles and the middle class. In any case,
Hitler's (and especially Goebbel's) dictum about the
greatest lies being the ones that gain the widest acceptance
was certainly applied by the Sinarquistas, too.
By the same token, the Sinarquistas used mysticism and
nostalgia for the idealization of their goals. They looked
back to the early colonial days with a desire to reaffirm
the pattern of six teen th-century Spain when the hierarchy of
the Church and the noble landowners was unquestioned. Hernan
and Iturbide (as symbol for Spanish monarchy) are
their heroes while those of revolutionary Mexico from
Hidalgo to Cardenas are clearly the villains.
3
A final
simalarity was that "like the Nazis, the Sinarquistas [had]
very little sense of humor
Yet, the differences are more fundamental than the
similarities, since they include the substance of the
movement rather than its external appearance.
The socialistic popular nationalism of the
Revolution met its challenge not in a fascism
looking for external salvation, but in Sinarquismo,
a native Mexican popular nationalism which had its
roots in the Mexican character and in the failures
Chase, op. 168 f .
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of the Revolution.
These failures of the Revolution, as perceived by the
Sinarquistas, consisted of the secularization of the state,
the so vietiza t i o n of Mexico, the deficiencies of Mexico's
agrarian reform and her sell out to foreign forces, in
particular to the U. S. and Judaism. "Sinarquistas, however,
CO
did more than question the Revolution; they rejected it."
Yet, while the fascist countries gloried in violence and
exalted war, Sinarquistas relied on peaceful solutions
without arms, but by passive resistance. Probably the
futility of armed resistance in the Cristero revolt
(1926-1929) convinced the Sinarquistas to choose unbloody
ways despite their violent and aggressive polamics as seen
in their corridos. They envisioned a change not by reform
but by peaceful "conquest of the peoples' hearts." They
sought a new nationalism based on religious brotherhood
D
disregarding skin color. u
p. 238.
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Edward Skillin jr . concluded in Commonweal , one of the
most influential of the catholic publications in the U. S.
,
that "it can be readily seen that not by the widest stretch
of the imagination can Sinarquism be called a democratic
movement in any real sense," and continued:
The Sinarquist organization is authoritarian and
highly centralized; it requires blind obedience on
the part of its members; the elenent of secrecy is
so great that even leaders require secret
countersigns in order to recognize each other.
History has repeatedly shown that a political
machine whose operations are so secret ...
invariably is diverted from its original purposes.
It can be easily be captured, especially when
operating within the Latin American tradition, by a
j efe or caud illo whose dominating purpose is his own
will to power. ... In similar fashion it can become
the organ of a foreign power.
1
Yet, despite the detected, mostly outward similarities
between Sinarquistas and German Nazis, no evidence could be
found for an ac tiv e and direc t German support in terms of
money, ideological indoctrination or organizational aid.
When Sinarquismo spread rapidly between 1937 and 1940, it
always was a genuine Mexican movement. Its appealing force
and dynamics lied in its clerical character rather than in
its fascistoid techniques. Thus the movement's religious
substance attracted, not its superficial, fa sc ist-or i ented
appear ance.
, p. 17 8.
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The Sinarquistas were openly for the social programs of
Hitler and in general pro-Nazi before Pearl Harbor.^
2
Allegedly the Sinarquistas were "controlled" by the Falange
Espanola , getting their money from the Spaniards'
contributions, an accusation they denied. In any case,
whatever influence some Germans might have attained within
the movement, they certainly did not alter its essential
goal of a corporate clerical state and of a Mexico for
Mexicans, and not for same foreign ideology. Betty Kirk's
quote of Julio de Kock, a social scientist who had fled from
Belgium, that "the Sinarquistas' real object [was] to serve
Hitler and the Nazis" does not prove consistent with the
movement's Mexican and religious goals, which they so
ardently pursued. After all, the Sinarquistas supported
the German cause mainly in one respect: they promoted anti-
U.S. feelings in the region.
Shedd, p. 417.
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The Dorados
The Cam isa s Doradas (or Dorados, as they were called in
Mexico) emerged from an ant i-comm uni sm party, the Acc ion
Revoluc ionar ia Mex icana (ARM) in 1935. Their appearance and
their anti-semitic ideology, lacking the Catholic fervor of
the Sinarqui stas, soon brought them in the reputation of
being fascist. Indeed, their outfit reminded of Hitler's
Brown Shirts, since the Dorados' uniforms consisted of a
gold shirt (therefore their name) , worn with black pants and
a palm hat.
Soon the Gold Shirts became a well publicized group
with fascist affiliations because their turbulent
leader, [General] Nicolas Rodriguez, a tall,
swashbuckling, arrogant man with a penchant for
impressive phrases, managed to get his name into the
papers almost daily...
D
c c
....
The name also implied an identification with Pancho
Villa's Dorados who had been the cavalry unit of the
revolutionary general of the North. The Dorados' leader,
General Nicolas Rodriguez had fought with Villa and
therefore claimed linear descent for his group. But, as
Campbell points out, "although only a few of the Gold Shirts
could legitimately lay claim to have fought with Villa, this
identification was well calculated to give the group the
appearance of Revolutionary authenticity as well as
providing a flair which would encourage adventuresome young
men to enlist." See Campbell, p. 13 9.
(T(Z /
Verna Carleton Millan, Mexico Reborn, Boston: Houghton-
Mifflin, 1939, p. 242.
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Indeed, the Dorados' aggressive, fanatical style was very
conspicuous and they were quite open with their sympathy for
Nazi Germany. With their vociferous hatred of Jews and
Communists they actively supported the Nazi cause in this
respect. They even presented a petition to President
￿
Cardenas asking to put curbs on the Jews in Mexico. They
petioned that all Jewish-owned factories to be turned over
to Mexican labor and the Jews' citizenship to be withdrawn.
Moreover they urged Cardenas that all resident Jews must be
forbidden to participate in politics. Every speech by a
Gold Shirt contained a lengthy condemnation of
"International Jewry," which, ironically was no significant
factor in Mexican life vis a vis a very small Jewish
community in Mexico.**®
The xenophobia which focused on the Jew was as equally
strong as the Dorados' paranoia of communism which they
expressed by their opposition to the labor movement and the
local Communist Party. Reminiscent to the street battles
between Brown Shirts and Communists in Berlin in the early
67
New York Times, June 2, 1935. See also Campbell, p. 142.
last section in this Chapter.
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1930'5, the Dorados combatted militant trade unions
69
and
clashed with Mexico's Communists. The most dramatic battle
took place at the end of 1935 at the event of the twenty-
fifth anniversary of the Revolution. Several thousand
members of labor and peasant groups celebrated in a
demonstration at the Zocalo in Mexico City when several
hundred Dorados marched in a counter demonstration on this
main pi aza .
Naturally, a bloody battle ensued. The most
spectacular aspect of this encounter were the
collisions between taxis driven by Chauf fe ur Un ion
members and horses ridden by the tr ad 11 ion al is t-
inclined Dorados.
0
It resulted in six killed and fifty wounded before the
police were capable to regain control of the Zocalo.
The Gold Shirts enjoyed German support in different
ways. First of all, German commercial firms in Mexico City
employed them as strike-breakers, a speciality of the anti-
labor ARM. Campbell suggests that the organization was
C Q
,
Jaime Herrysson Plenn, Mex ico Ma rche s , Indianapolis,
N.Y.: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1939, p. 79.
p. 147. Notice the nostalgia outlook of the
tnounted Dorados.
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Verna Carleton Millan, Mexico Reborn, Boston: Houghton-
Mifflin, 1939, p. 243.
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founded at the instigation of Calles to serve as a force to
keep labor in line.
72
After all, one source reports that
"employment" by German business houses in Mexico resulted
from "pressure [by] the Nazi legation.
73
Secondly, the German legation apparently gave subsidies
to the Dorados’ ARM.
7 4
This allegation, of course, served
later as an argument to prohibit the Dorados in April 1936
and expel its leader, General Rodriguez. Cardenas certainly
had no sympathy for fascism in any form. If indeed the
German legation actively supported the Dorados - only one
source reports this fact of direct intervention with Mexican
internal affairs - it indicates at least the pro-Nazi
character of the Dorados.
Thirdly, the Gold Shirts also found favor with General
Saturnino Cedillo, who, however, avoided any open
association with them. Nevertheless, the Dorados received
aid from subordinate officials in Cedillo 1 s agriculture
ministry, including Ernst von Merck, ex-artillery officer in
p. 139.
73
Plenn, p. 79.
7 4Mill an, p. 243.
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the Kaiser's army and Cedillo's primary military advisor.
The scattered elements of the resolved ARM subsequently
supported in turn the abortive Cedillo revolt in 1938 .
The affiliation of the Dorados with Nazism sometimes
produced odd and curious results. In order to bring the
racial doctrines of National Socialism and the Dorados'
version of it into congruence, "scientific evidence" was
found to equate Mexicans with the Nordic race. Dr. Kr urn
Heller - in 1938 director of special Nazi broadcasts to
Mexico - wrote to Rodriguez in May 1935:
...
Mexicans and Germans are the same race, Nordics
all, not only because the Spaniards were Goths, but
because the Toltecs were immigrants from the North,
the same as the primitive Germans, ... and the first
Aztec Indians were blueeyed and with blonde hair and
[only] the mixture with [Spanish Moors] brought
about a dark skin. Serious studies by ethnologists
of first rank prove the racial equality of the
Mexicans and Nordics and this can be shown today
even by blood tests.
Embarrassing was only that the German anti-Hitler
Pr o-Cul tur e Le ag u e in Mexico publicised a copy of a Nazi
Party official letter, scolding a German who married "a
person of a second-race, a Mexican." Eventually the ’sinner'
was thrown out of the Nazi party and ultimately the man was
, p. 78.
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7
fired from his job in a German firm.
The Dorados in fact enjoyed the support of Germans in
Mexico and probably even directly through the German
legation. This aid, however, constituted only a small part
of the income it received from other sources, in particular
from businessmen paying them for their valuable strike
breaking jobs.
The Dorados' anti-Communism and anti-semitism resembled
in substance Nazi ideology as well as their exterior
appearance in regard to clothing, parades and in general
their paramilitary behavior. Their ultranationalism however,
only applied to Mexico. They adapted Cardenas' slogan
"Mexico for the Mexicans" but appeared to mean "Mexico for
certain Mexicans." Nonetheless the Dorados vehemently
7 7
denied the charge which accused them of being fascists.
They rather used the term to accuse their opponents. "The
dictatorship of the proletariat is nothing but fascist
7 8
dictatorship with another name."
7 6
lb id .
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As long as Calles remained the strong man in Mexico, the
Gold Shirts and their party ARM went about their activities
unmolested by the government. With the Cardenas-Calles
break, however, and the subsequent expulsion of Calles,
Cardenas went to action. The described events at the Zocalo,
the alleged affiliation with the German legation plus the
aggressive anti-labor attitude were reasons enough for a
police search of the Dorado headquarters in Mexico City.
Sixteen members were arrested and General Rodriguez was
accused of attempting to cause inter-labor conflicts and
finally expelled from the country. Despite continued,
though less flamboyant action of the group, in particular in
Monterrey, the official dissolution in April 1936 caused the
fragmentation of the ARM and the Dorados ultimately
disappeared in political insignificance after the Cedillo
rebellion. In sum, the Dorados' role in Mexican politics and
in regard to their connection with Germans, the Camisas
Doradas remained only an episode of Mexican history.
Michaels, p. 236.
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The Cedillo Rebellion
German involvement in the Cedillo rebellion seems to be
very likely, though most supporting evidence was produced by
leftist groups, usually under the leadership of Lombardo
Toledano. Evidence often derived from rumors, allegations,
implications and concerned American reporters fearing a
civil war and an ideological stalemate in Mexico. Even the
published documents of the revolt only "implicate the
8 0
totalitarian ministries in Mexico City."
General Saturnino Cedillo was one of the last caud illos
of Mexico and had emerged from the Revolution as the
predominant military leader in his native state of San Luis
Potosi. During the conflict between Calles and Cafrdenas he
had sided with Cardenas and was later named to the important
post of the minister of agriculture. This assignment, as
Plenn perceived it, was "the signal for a concentration of
rightest forces."
81
Indeed, Cedillo soon became the catalyst
of the reaction against the leftist swing which Cardenas'
administration promised. This was also the reason for
Cedillo's resignation of his cabinet post in August 1937 .
and Weyl , p. 361.
Plenn
, p. 21.
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Allegedly, Cedillo used his post to support his right-
wing attitudes. "The Gold Shirts were now getting more aid
from officials, either in cash or jobs for their members."
82
Responsible for Cedillo's support of this pro-Nazi group was
supposedly Ernest von Merck, the caudillo's personal
military advisor. Through him, "influences of German and
Italian fascism trickled into the private councils of the
Ced il 1 istas ."
8 3
Thus von Merck, the "German dril lm aster ,"
served as the primary proof for a Nazi-Cedillo conspiracy in
O A
the eyes of his opponents.
After Cedillo had resigned from his minister post, he
returned to his home state of San Luis to prepare his
coup. About this time, the CTM asked Cardenas to remove
Cedillo from his state to a safe spot. Moreover,
82
Ibid.
, p. 91.
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Ibid.
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For Anatol Shulgovski, the Russian historian using
Marxist secondary sources, von Merck (he mispells his name
as Mark) "received instructions directly from the German
ambassador [sic] in Mexico, von Kollenberg ."[s ic : Rud t von
Collenberg-3od igheim] Moreover, Shulgovski associates
officials of the Re ichs wehr, the German army, with the
rebellion. Disguised as 'tourists' they visited Sonora and
San Luis Potosi and had "confidential conversations with
Heinrich Nort, one of Cedillo's
' all eg ad os.'
" The Russian
historian concludes with Jose Diaz, the General Secretary of
the Spanish Communist party that "the armed insurrection of
the General traitor Cedillo ... [was] directed and financed
by the fascists." See Shulgovski, p. 372-3 74 .
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the Communists published one document after another
proving Cedillo's tie with international Fascism.
The Mexican police, working quietly on the case,
found out that Cedillo was receiving money from
organizations that had suspicious relations with the
German legation and many German business houses.
Indeed, fears now aroused that Cedillo could create
another Spain. During the exiting days after 15 May 1938 ,
the first day of the revolt, other alleged German alliances
with Cedillo were made public. La. Prensa reported that
Jorge Übico, dictator of Guatemala, who was also receiving
Axis aid, was willing to put Guatemala at the disposal of
Cedillo in a manner similar to the way Salazar had done in
8
Portugal in regard to the Franco cause.
Moreover, it became now apparent that racism constituted
one of Cedillo's ideological pillars, particularly anti-
semitism which "bore a Nazi stamp." In the General's
subversive manifesto of May 15, 1938 he declared that he was
fighting against "the Jewish conception," and accused
CaVdenas of identifying Communism with the word
8 s
Millan, p. 251.
Prensa , May 21, 193 8.
, p. 184.
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collectivism. Cedillo's manifesto reveals his position as
of being strongly opposed to Cardenas, his old friend, and
the president’s policies. But the caudillo's complaints did
not coincide with new proposals. This anti-attitude, as we
have seen above, is an essential element of fascism.
Finally, Cedillo was made responsible for the extension
of German influence in Mexico. It was claimed that General
Ramon Yocupicio, governor of Sonora - "the state that gives
O Q
Mexico its presidents and revolutions" - was involved in
the Cedillo plot. Supposedly the Sonora governor received
arms and funds from German agents, who had been drifting
into his state. Suspiciously was also that, "although
Wilhelm HesseLmann [German consul in Guaymas and presumable
ringleader of Axis espionage in Sonora] had no apparent
dealings with the state, he frequently visited General
q n
Yocupicio in Hermosillo . " u
Yocupicio's alleged alliance with fascist forces had
88
The manifesto is published in the Mane he ster Guard ian,
May 31, 1938. Here it is quoted from Campbell, p. 184.
Prewett, Re po r tag e on Mex ico, New York: E.P.
Dutton, 1941, p. 156.
Ken, April 20, 1939, p. 15. Cited in Campbell, p. 183.
117
already begun in 1937 , after Lombardo Toledano had sent his
"agitators" to Sonora in order to organize the workers. Many
of Toledano' s men were jailed by the governor for
"activities deemed dangerous for the state." This had
provoked leftist protest in which Yocupicio was labeled
"fascist and clerical enemy of the workers." A secret report
to Cardenas about the incident exonerated the Sonora
governor. Besides, "Cardenas refused to provoke a conflict
by forcing Yocupicio from power, especially in view of the
fact that while Yocupicio has not the armed forces of
Cedillo at his back, he is immensely popular with the
~91
vigorous Sonorans."
f Q 9
The "officially approved biography" of Cardenas,
written by Nathaniel and Sylvia Weyl , informs us that during
Cedillo's preparatory period, Cardenas had received
voluminous reports concerning Cedillo's negotiations with
Gold Shirt leaders, conservative business groups, and Nazi
agents for the financing of an insurrection against the
Other sources emphasize this fact, even though
91
Randall Pond, "Rights and Lefts in Mexico", Commonweal
27, Dec. 10, 1937, p. 174.
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some charges against Cedillo were brought to Cardenas by
Mexican leftists "who hoped by so doing to discredit the
rightists." Lombardo Toledano, leader of the CTM, exposed
what he said was a plot to overthrow the government.
Pointing to Cedillo' s Las Palomas ranch, where preparations
were getting under way for military action and where
foreigners arrived "on mysterious missions," the workers'
leader gave names and addresses. Consequently, the police
arrested some of the alleged conspirators, after it had
95 f
found "a pile of dynamite bombs." Cardenas, however, had
them released.
Why did Cardenas move so carefully and so slowly in
respect to this perceived fascist threat caused by Cedillo,
while at the same time his "agents ... increased vigilance
9 6
... [and watched] all these steps of Cedillo closely."
The reasons are threefold. First of all, Cedillo had been
hitherto one of the most faithful supporters and a good
friend of Ca*rdenas. Thus the President waited patiently
, p. 183.
Pienn
, p. 92.
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"until events disillusioned the peasantry about Cedillo."
97
He even gave his old comrade of Revolutinary battles several
opportunities to get detached from the movement which
Q O
Cedillo himself had initiated. Cardenas' strong attachment
is documented in his recommendation to Cedillo to accept a
pension and safe conduct to the U.S., after the insurrection
was crushed. It was also reported that Cardenas wept when
he learned that government troops had tracked the caudillo
Q Q
down and killed him. On the other hand, some argued,
Cardenas had his method behind "this charitable madness,
that he [gave] people enough rope to hang themselves and
then quietly tighten[ed] the cord."-'-
99
Next, as Campbell makes his case, Cardenas feared the
involvement with foreign governments which would have caused
international conflicts undesirable for the Mexican
87
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Plenn, p. 93, describes the loophole that Cardenas
provided: "The War Department ordered Cedillo to Michoacan
state as military commander. Cardenas was bringing all
threads together. He wanted to give Cedillo a way out.” But
the caudillo rejected this offer.
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government at the time because of the oil
The confrontation would have been presented from
two sectors: Europe, especially Germany, and the
U.S. The cause of it would have been the revelation
of the aid given by Nazi subversive agents and
United States companies operating in Mexico to the
Secular Radical Right and Cedillo.
Indeed, Cedillo had never made any attempt to hide his
fascist tendencies and even direct contacts with the German
legation, members of which joined him in his "wining and
d ining .
1,103
Finally, for Cardenas it was a matter of political
timing. While keeping the revolt localized to San Luis
Potosf, he - correctly - figured that the rebels 1 drive
would diminish by itself. When the San Luis Potosi state
legislature declared that it would not recognize the federal
government any longer, Cardenas rushed in a courageous move
to the state capital to face the rebels directly and
declared in a communique:
With regard to General Cedillo .. . the Federal
the editorial of _La Prensa, May 19, 1938.
pp. IBof .
10 ®Frank L. Kluckhohn, The Mex ican Challeng e , New York
Doubleday/Doran, 1939, p. 206.
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authorities will grant him all rights as citizen on
the understanding that he must abstain from forming
armed groups and put at the disposition of the chief
of the military zone the arms and munitions that he
has in his power.
04
Cedillo, however, preferred to fight, but his rebellion was
already over before it really began. Cardenas had boosted
the contingency of Federal Troops in the twelve months
before Cedillo declared the state in revolt. Soon Cardenas'
troops controlled the situation and the Cedillo incident was
over .
Overall, it was an all-Mexican affair. As pointed out,
Cedillo surely was supported by German Nazis, morally as
well as ideologically. However, the concrete quantitive
amount of German material sent to Cedillo is quite unclear.
But the numerous reports suggest Axis aid in preparing
Cedillo's military might for his insurrection against the
national government. The Mexican minister of foreign
relations reported that his ministry was aware that Cedillo
had contracted with German firms for the purchase of
airplanes. Cedillo also had asked the German government for
the services of the "German aviator Erich Stephan to act as
lb id
. , p . 210.
instructor for his own budding air corps. None of these
airplanes, however, showed up. Moreover there were
newspaper reports saying that Cedillo had received arms
10 7
through Tampico from Germany.
u '
Millan claims that "German agents helped plan the entire
rebellion, but it was rather difficult for them to pour arms
and men into Mexico as they had done in Spain, fortunately
for Mexico." The analogy with and allusion to the prior
Spanish situation and its factual resemblance, of course,
intensified the perceived threat and placed Cardenas in the
position of defending democracy against fascism. Moreover,
at a time, when "certain Mexican newspapers [were] printing
Nazi propaganda" and when extensions of parent groups as
the National Socialist Party and the Falange Espanola found
response to those Mexicans who had still an ethnic identity
with their relevant European country, at such a time, of
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course, fears of a fascist takeover were playing into the
hands of Cardenas.
For example, the Mexican president found support for his
democratic cause in the United States. Already in January
1938, in view of the expected Cedillo rebellion, U. S.
Congressman Jerry J. O'Connell of Montana had predicted a
Nazi uprising within two months in Mexico and stated: "we
have proof that Germany is supplying arms and ammunition to
an army ... under General Ced illo .
No doubt, Cedillo would have been friendly to Nazi
Germany, if he had been successful with his uprising.
Nevertheless, it seems, that he would not sold out the
country to the fascist powers and in particular to his
German supporters. His revolutionary roots and his
nationalistic love to Mexico- were simply too profound. As
Plenn emphasized, one of the reasons why Cedillo failed,
was, ironically, that he was not fascist enough:
Many enemies of Cedillo quickly labeled him a
fascist. It is undoubtedly true that his arbitrary
methods of government, his authoritarianism, his
absoluteness, are the methods of fascism. It is
true, also, that among his most militant teachers
were groups that want to see a system
of fascism
implanted in Mexico. However, one of Cedillo
1
s big
York Times, Jan. 30, 1938.
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drawbacks as a fuhrer nominee was precisely that he
was not fascist enough. If he had been more of a
fascist, if he had learned [from the alleged German
agents, one might add] more thoroughly the demagogic
methodology of fascism, if his machine had
penetrated the labor movement instead of hostilizing
it, he might have been throwing parties in
Chapultepee today.
Plenn's observation goes to the heart of fascism theory.
Cedillo exactly lacked the will to power for power's sake.
His scruples, his belief in the just cause he was fighting
for and against one of his best friends, President Cardenas,
indeed impeded him to employ the fascist means _ijg toto. His
sympathy to National Socialism was not enough to make him a
full-blooded fascist who could employ ruthlessly the fascist
methods as Hitler had done in Germany.
Anti-Semitism and Anti-Communism
Anti-semitism was one central topic which all Tightest
groups in Mexico (as in many other countries) adapted. The
seed for the prejudice against Jews undoubtly lay in media
propaganda, in particular through the German news services
and by bought newspaper space. "The most direct form of
building up Mexican sympathy for the Nazi program is
undoubtedly the financing of Mexican writers and organizers
mpi enn , p. 96.
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of fascist groups, with a heavy play on anti-sem it ism ."
112
In 1938
,
the fourth edition of the anti-semitic pamphlet
The International Jew appeared in Mexico; moreover the
Protocols of the Elders of Zi were for sale and also
printed in right-wing journal Qm eg a. Both books did not
have a popular sale, yet , they were used "as standard
textbooks by all the fascist and pro-Nazi mouthpieces of
Mex ico . "
If we again apply Laski's definition of fascism as the
defense of the middle class against the onslaught of the
masses, one finds that anti-semitism served the middle class
to find a scapegoat for the economic ills of the middle
112
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The Protocols of the Elders of Zion was the bible of
the Nazis in regard to anti-semitism. In particular Alfred
Rosenberg, the chief ideologist of the Nazi party, supported
the dissemination of the pamphlet. It was an "implausible
forgery concocted by the czarist secret police at the turn
of the century [and] purported to disclose the secret plans
of the so-called international Jewish conspiracy." By the
way, Hitler wrote in Mei n Kampf that it was "incomparably"
done. See Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The War Ag ainst the Jews, New
York: Bantam, 1975, p. 20.
a, Jan. 11, 1938.
pp. 75f.
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class. Consequently, its right-wing publications Omega and
Hombre L i bre frequently carried anti-semitic editorials
which always tied the Jews with the Communists' attack on
the church and private property. Typical headlines were
"Como roban y como han robado al mundo los i srael i tas"
and "Los jud ios y el communismo." The linkage of Jews
with communism may be called a typical fascist feature,
since communism, as we laid down above, constituted the
anti-thesis to fascism.
Paradoxically, the quantity of anti-semitic publications
was highly disproportionate with the regional unimportance
of Jews. Kluckhohn talks of a total of 18,000 Jews in
• 11 q i 2O
Mexico, while Weyl cites 30,000. Both numbers mean
less than 0.1% of the total Mexican population. Hence the
permeation of anti-semitic doctrine must be viewed as a
result of external forces. Since the "Jewish Question" was
Michaels, p. 236.
a
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in particular raised by the German National Socialists, the
German propaganda machine seemed to be responsible for the
relatively successful dissemination of anti-semitism in
Mexico. Frank Kluckhohn, the Ne w York Times reporter in
Mexico at the time, offered an explanation:
The reason for the German paid anti-Jewish
propaganda is not far to seek. The emigration of
large numbers of Jewish refugees to Latin America,
German officials feel, might easily tend to promote
anti-Nazi feeling in Pa n-Amer ica.
Apparently the propaganda even creeped into government
circles. Already up to 1937 , confidential circulars to the
Mexican consular services had advised "to prevent the entry
1 o 0
of Jews." Moreover, the National Revolutionary bloc of
the Senate had asked the Secretary of Gobernacion to compile
and send to Congress a list of Jews in Mexico, a report of
their status under Mexican law, and an estimate of the
amount of capital they had in the country. It was believed
that the anti-semitic campaign resulted from the fear of
. • • 173
Mexican small businessmen of Jewish competition.
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Kluckhohn
, p.
88.
an d weyl , p. 36 0.
York Times, Nov. 8, 1937.
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In August 1938, Fernando Amilpa , a prominent member of
the CTM, delivered a speech in the Chamber of Deputies
attacking the Jews as typical capitalists who had arrived in
Mexico as penniless foreigners and had then come to dominate
Mexico's wealth. Amilpa felt that the Jew was the worst type
of c api tal ist. jn October 1938, the "callous" attitude of
the Secretary of Gobernacion, Ignacio Garcia Tellez, refused
to allow twenty-one Jewish refugees to land on Mexican
I TC
shores. They had to return to their "lands of
persecution" despite proper tourist visas, money deposits in
Mexico and the fact that they came from Nazi concentration
camps. On October 15, 1933, a decree was enacted tending
to cripple all serious efforts of refugee colonization. Two
weeks later, the "notoriously corrupt department of Garcia
Tellez, honeycombed with fascist officials," announced
immigration quotas that gave a thousand gentile immigrants
to each of the three major fascist powers, but limited total
12 7
Jewish entry to a hundred annually.
de la Camara de Diputados, Aug. 18, 1938. Cited
in Michaels, p. 236, footnote 12.
p. 360. See also New York Times, Nov. 2, 1938.
I^6Kl uckhohn
, p. 86.
yl and Weyl , pp. 360 f .
Yet, according to Isidro Fabela , "el Gobierno del Gral.
Lazaro Cardenas ordeno a la delegacion permanente de Mexico
ante la SdeN [League of Nations] ... la defensa de la causa
israel ita. Apparently the Cardenas administration seemed
to be divided on this issue, since even CTM members attacked
Jews in Mexico.
Some smaller organizations such as the Un ion
Nac ional ista Mex icana (UNM) and the Vanguard i a Nac ional ista
Mex ic ana made their hate against the Jews the sole purpose
of their existence. Both groups perceived the newly
established unions which were integrated in the PRM as a
complot of international Jewry conspiracy. In their view,
the CTM was the instrument for enslaving the Mexican worker
by the government and Russian Jews, while the ej ido was a
12 9
Jewish banker's device to enslave the peasant. La
Vanguardia circulated leaflets in Mexico City, entitled
"Jewish Blood, Jewish Blood, and Still More Jewish Blood
Must Flow if Our Beloved Fatherland Is To Be Saved." The
party's "dwarfish fuhrer ," Antonio Escobar admitted "the
1 TO /
■
L
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6 °lsidro Fa be la, La_ Po litica In ternac lonal del Pr es idente
Cardenas, Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Jus, 197 5 , p. 80. See
the
whole chapter "La Tragedia Israelita" in Fabela's book, pp.
75-81.
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Campbell, p. 163.
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full sympathy of the German ministry even though "we are a
13 0
purely Mexican organization." The Vanguards’ emulation
and admiration for the German treatment of Jews must have
been overwhelming , since they boasted that the party had
issued orders to its sections "for a campaign of direct
1 3 1
action to exterminate the 30,000 Jews in Mexico."
One of the examples for the formation of a Mexican group
with a program based on the anti-semitic, anti-communist
formula (which had been so successful in Germany) was the
"openly fascist" group Un ion Nac ional de Veteranos de la
Revol uc ion (UN VR) . The UNVR was opposed to the growing
strength of the working class and therefore it directed
itself toward the task of gathering campesinos and rural
I "3 "3
elements. Soon the emphasis shifted from efforts to gain
land grants toward a general anti-communism.
The UN VR received subsidies from the Con fed er ac ion
Patronal de 1 a Republ ica (CPR) , whose "role was ... in the
and Weyl , p. 36 0.
lb id.
, p. 241.
, p. 161.
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area of propaganda and finance [and which] served the
function of intermediary between Mexican businessmen and
foreign sources and the Secular Radical Right movement."
134
This "employer's union" drew funds for its propaganda
campaigns from the biggest firms, especially the German
hardware and drug importers in Mexico City. Often the
propaganda material came directly from Germany.
This kind of propaganda, printed in Spanish by the
Fichte-Bund in Hamburg and offered to Mexican
employers extremely cheap, was of two sorts: one
destined for employers' instruction, such as
"Tactical Rules for Work Under Economic Warfare
Conditions," and another, such as "Communism is the
Work of International Jewry," to be distributed with
the greatest caution among the workers by various
organizations so that they may not have the least
suspicion of whence they proceed.
The CPRM in turn worked close with the Asoc iacio n
Espanola , Anti-Communista y Anti-Jud la which was founded in
November 1936 by the Spanish lawyer Francisco Cayon y Cos.
This sister organization of the Falange sent
134
lb id . , p. 159.
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See Manchester Guardian, Aug. 31, 1938.
Guardian, Aug. 31, 193 8. Cited in Campbell,
p. 169~.
13
11an, p.24 2.
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propaganda material, printed in Spanish in Germany, to the
-] q
UNVR. Moreover the CPRM supported the Con fed er ac ion de la
Clase Media (CCM) which received a monthly subsidy of 3,000
pesos from one American and five German businessmen. For
the CCM's aim to bring about an anti-communist congress in
Havanna , the party also received the aid of the German,
Italian and Japanese embassies in various Latin American
countries. The CCM's attitude is well reflected in its
congratulation letter to the Japanese charge d'affaires
after the Berl in-Tokyo Pact was signed in November 1936. It
praised the "mighty German and Japanese peoples for the
defense of civilization," protecting it against the "Red
Terror ."
14
-
L
In sum, most groups concentrated their energy almost
entirely against Jews and/or communism, with the typical
an ti-atti tud e of fascists who have nothing more to offer
than criticism and destructive opposition. The emergence of
13 Bpernandez Boyoli and Marron de Anglis, _Lo que no se
Saben de la Rebelion Ced ill ista, Mex ico City: 193 8 , p. 25.
p. 160. See also Weyl and Weyl, p. 361.
Boyoli, pp. 62-66.
Campbell , p. 171.
such organizations, small in size, probably rooted in their
member’s dissatisfaction with the Mexican system and
therefore they channeled their uneasiness and criticism
toward anti-semitism and anti-communism in order to find a
scapegoat. Subsequently, such parties found the majority of
their members in the middle sectors.^-42 However, the solid
and stable political system of Cardenas' Mexico could
tolerate such opposition: when several ringleaders of the
various fascistoid groups were arrested in Mexico City in
1939 and made responsible for anti-Jewish riots, Cardenas
released them after 24 hours, refusing to prosecute them.
"But the President commented caustically, 'lf these men have
any constructive program to offer, we will be glad to hear
of it.'
"I- 42
By this token, the next chapter will show the
limits of German propaganda and Mexican fascists in Mexico.
142
See also L.O. Prendergast, "Oil and Mexico's Future,"
Nat ion 146, June 25, 1938 , pp. 717f.
42
Kirk
, pp. 59f .
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Chapter 7
German Propaganda Inroads
German propaganda in Mexico was primarily directed
against the U.S, since its ultimate goal was to isolate
North America from the Latin American Thus
'Yankee Imperialism' despite Good Neighbor policy was sought
to be discredited. This pragmatic goal even overshadowed the
usual priority of an ardently pursued dissemination of Nazi
' ant i-ideolog y' and was also supported by the Mexican
division of the Spanish Falange which worked hand in hand
wi th the Na zi s
.
On the other hand, the German endeavor caused American
writers to report excessively about the Nazis' ideological
penetration in Mexico. Often these accounts tended to
perceive single pro-German expressions as an indicator of a
successful and übiquitious German propaganda machine. By
this token, this chapter attempts to put both, American
Alton Frye, Na zi Germ any and The American Hem ispher e
1933-1941, New Haven/London: Yale Un iv. Press, 196 7 , pp .
15ff
.
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contemporary articles and German propaganda efforts in
Mexico, into perspective. Moreover the motives and goals of
the antagonistic sides will be examined.
Nazi Propaganda and Its Limits
In order to spread out the German point of view, two
main press services controlled by the Reich were set up. The
Deutsches Nachrichtenburo (DNB) was an official agency which
Goebbels had created to provide "authentic" reports of
German governmental actions and statements. This agency was
supplemented by Tran so zean, a supposedly private news
2
service but with obvious propaganda intentions. Naturally
the Un i ted Press constituted - in the words of the German
ambassador in Chile - "Germany's public enamy No. 1" in
3
Latin America.
The two press services, however, proved to be too
ostentatious propaganda vehicles so that most leading
2lbid
. , p . 23.
Trotz,
" Zur Tatigkeit der deutschen funften
Kolonne in La te inamer ika von 1 933-1945 ," Wissen schaf tl iche
Ze i tschr ift der Univer si tat Ro stoc k , No. 1/2, 1965, p. 124.
My translation.
dailies in the Latin American countries dismissed them.
4
Consequently, the Pro pag andamin i s ter i urn (PROMI) under the
demagogue Joseph Goebbels pursued other ways to influence
the opinion abroad. Therewith, "the campaign would be
heavily subsidized and not limited by financial
consideration," as the PROMI' s general directive emphasized
in 1933 to the Reich representatives of the Western
hemisphere.
One technique was simply bribe, or how it often was
euphemistically circumscribed, "to buy newspaper space." The
Transozean and DNB dispatches were already at free disposal
- in contrast to United Press - but more often German agents
even promised reimbursements if their reports would be
printed without abridging them. The New Yor k Tim e s reporter
Kluckhohn described this habit in Mexico.
Every special interest in Mexico knows that, so long
as what it wants to say does not run contrary to
official policy, the price of a front-page article
in several of the newspapers is two pesos a line ...
[and] are run as news accounts, not advertisements.
Frye, p. 23 and Trotz, p. 125.
sSee 5See Ernst Kris, "German Propaganda Instructions of 1933,"
Social Research, 9, Feb. 1942 , pp. 46-81.
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Editorials also are freely sold by the line.**
Soon, contemporary observers noticed "highly colored
newspaper stories, pro-Nazi editorials and articles.
Besides the already described right wing organs Qmeg a and
Hombre Libre with their strong anti-Jewish content, leading
Mexico City dailies and journals printed pro-German stories.
Prewett reported that Germans sent mimeographed bulletins to
the majority of the newspaper offices in Mexico City every
day. The influential dailies of the capital, Excel sior and
Novedades, were generally regarded as "the journalistic
condottieri of the These articles usually emphasized
the greatness and honesty of Germany's lofty goals of her
national socialistic economy and stressed her
cultural
achievements as opposed to the evils of the "imperialistic"
U.S. By this token, Ultimas Not icias, the evening edition
of
6
Frank L. Kluckhohn, The Mex ican Challenge, New York:
Doubleday/Doran, 1939, p. 84.
Harrysson Plenn, Mex ic o Ma rche s , Ind ianopo lis ,
N.Y. : The Bobb s-Mer r ill Co., 193 9 , p. 71.
Prewett, Repor tag e on Max ico, New York: E.P.
Dutton, 1941, p. 302.
and Sylvia Weyl , The Reconquest
of Mex ico: The
Years of Lazzaro Cardenas, New York: Columbia Univ. Press,
1942
,
pT 3BTT See also Plenn, p. 70 and Kluckhohn p. 85
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Excelsior, polemically commented on a speech by U. S. Senator
Reynolds, who had suspected a German conspiracy in Mexico:
Does the Nazi conspiracy perhaps consist in that the
German automobiles now reach in greater volume ...
that their prices is low, and that they are not
interested in seducing the buyer each year with new
models that leave him broke, and that therefore we
have stopped buying American automobiles?
Or is it part of that terrible propaganda that the
possibility of establishing airlines with German
planes would menace the monopoly of Pan-American
Airways in our countries?
... But, in spite of the demagogic speeches of the
Reynoldses, the people of Latin America know, and
will not easily forget, that the Colossus of the
North has a colossal stomach through which, like the
ventriloquists, it speaks in accordance with its
convenience.
Of course, here the trade rivalries between the U.S. and
Germany are reflected. But more important is the unveiled
sympathy for Nazi Germany's economic achievement of cheaper
industrial goods. The article gives impression to a German
industry for the people in contrast to the capitalist hunger
of the U.S. A considerable amount of disgust for "the
American Way" is generated and that was exactly one of the
main goals of the PROMI : to crack the hemispheric
cooperation and solidarity of the Latin countries and the
U.S.
1 °UI timas Noticias, Jan. 11, 1938. Translated by Plenn,
pp. 74f .
139
Along the same line, Germany's innocent record in the
hemisphere was contrasted against North American
ex pans ioni st ic sins there. One street poster "that was
plastered all over Mexico one night" carried the following
messag e.
We deplore the conduct of some American governments
who ... are trying to protest the noble and
patriotic attitude of the German people in punishing
severely a country that has always been in favor of
domination of the world by illicit means, [while]
these American protests are only attempting to
maintain an archaic doctrine called the Monroe
Doctrine, which is a s.hame against the liberty of
these American peoples.
1
Then the poster asked a rhetorical question which attempted
to turn anti-Americanists into German sympathizers: "Why be
against this patriotic, intelligent, hardworking and
virtuous nation, only to please Uncle Sam?" In the same
manner wrote the pro-German La Semana:
Not with one inch of soil nor with a single one of
her sons should Mexico aid the Yankees, who
submitted [Mexico] to the blackest humiliations.
It reminded the reader at the loss of half of Mexico's
territory in the nineteenth century to the U. S. In the same
issue the journal depicted Hitler, Mussolini
and Petain
p. 299.
ib id . , p. 30 2.
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printing the subtitle in a gothic type. Prewett even
reported about German propaganda bulletins for the Mexican
army. Here Joseph Goebbels' favorite tool of propaganda was
used: constant repetition of the 'truth' as viewed from the
Nazi's standpoint.
33
The "greatest gringo hater in Mexico," Jose" Vasconcelos
also converted his antipathy against the U.S into German
admiration. He had been minister of education in the early
twenties when the great Mexican cultural renaissance (e.g.
the mural ists Rivera, Orozco etc.) began and was one of the
most influential and distinguished Mexican intellectual. As
editor of the weekly magazine Tim on he printed articles,
which "were sprewed forth from Viena 17," the address of the
German "propaganda headquarters."-^
As a consequence of the anti-American press in Mexico
and of a general ant i-"gr ing o" mood in Mexico, American
writers - journalists, travellers, politicians and Americans
living in Mexico - started dedicating their skills to stem
the hostile opinion and began in turn to emphasize the
13
Ibid.
3<3
Betty Kirk, Cover ing The Mex ic an Front: The Ba ttl e of
Europe vs. America, Norman: Univ.
of Oklahoma Press, 194 2 ,
p. 300.
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German menace in Mexico. They felt that this devotion is
urgently necessary, since they observed an apparently
übiquitious German propaganda. Fear and nationalism helped
• • • 1S
to incite their enterprise of counter propaganda. From a
feeling of national self-defense, these writers often
exaggerated the German influence in Mexico as a whole by
overstressing single actions which they perceived as part of
the German agent organization and wide spread propaganda
activity. In this context the quotations above, mostly taken
from accounts of these American writers, have to be placed
in perspective. Single articles and single pro-German
activities are not proof enough for a well defined and well
organized German propaganda activity, though - as we shall
see - iniatives for this were present, but which
nevertheless found their limits.
For this reason one must'not overevaluate reports which
tell about Germans going out to the countryside and showing
propaganda stories in pictures or as movies for the the
illiterates.
16
The same author was also wondering, why
"there are places of business either owned or partially
staffed by Germans facing the entrance of (a) the American
chapter VIII in this book.
p. 303.
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Embassy in Mexico City, (b) the American Consulate and (c)
17
the Ambassador's residence." Some observers even perceived
German "master plans" for the conquest of Mexico and
suspected a perfect espionage organization behind it.
The espionage front was directed by Baron Frederik
von Sc hleebr ugge, who came directly from the
conquest of Poland to organize air, naval and
military espionage... Von Sc hleebr ugg e's henchmen
for his master job here were Karl Kordes ["the Nazi
dictator of the German school"]
18
,
Hans Hellerman,
and George Nicolaus ["who headed a smoothly running
center of the Gestapo in Mexico City],
9
...
So
Germany sent a trio of experts, trained in Spanish
and Latin American psychology and methods, to co-
ordinate and set into action the Axis fifth column
in Mexico. 0
Though this statement was written after the outbreak of
war in Europe, which, of course, heightened fears, the other
quotes underline the general uneasiness already felt before
WW 11. American political observers had seen the
consequences of the persuasive character of the brainwashing
slogans of the PROMI in Europe, justifying the annexation of
ib id
. , p . 29 8.
k
, p . 25 6.
19
Allan Chase, Falange: The Axis Secret Army in the
Americas, New York: G. P. PutnalrTs Sons, 1943, p. 150
20
Kirk p. 297.
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Austria and the acquisation of big chunks of Czechoslovakia.
But the situation in Mexico was different and the promotion
of National Socialism or of any kind of fascism through
directed propaganda from outsid e was impeded by several
factors:
Cardenas' policies
the comparatively small German community in Mexico
FDR's Good Neighbor policy
the cultural differences
First of all and probably most annoying for the
propagandists, there was the immense popularity of Lazaro
s
_
Cardenas. His progressive and innovative state socialism,
his never tiring attention for listening to workers and
peasants and the resulting reform program convinced wide
2 1
portions of the Mexican people. The popularity of the
President is best described by a school teacher who said of
a visit by Cardenas:
" Calles came here at the head of an
army. Cardenas only armor is the love of the people." In
restructuring the Revolutionary Party Cardenas secured the
9 1 /
That the socialist state of Cardenas was the chief
obstacle to the expansion of fascism is also stated by: Rene
Marchand
,
L 'Effort Democratique du Mex ique , Paris: Editions
Fustier, 193 8, pp. 182-1 86.
and Weyl , p. 5.
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support of the peasantry and worker unions as the backbone
of his reform policies. In general, the different
subdivisions within the Party tended to take a left wing
position, in particular the CTM under Lombardo Toledano's
leadership. Leftist oriented organizations clearly
outweighed the right wing ones in regard of size and
influence. Also the former were in general more incorporated
within the one party system.
Comparable to F.D.R.'s New Deal program, Cardenas
policies sought to recover from the Depression without
neglecting factors such as the maintenance of individual
self-respect and social justice. Unlike Hitler's ideology
who promoted military habits and hierarchical patterns by
political organization and tight discipline, Cardenas always
saw and respected the individual first, and perceived him as
a human like any body else without any discrimination based
on rank, skin color, religion or the degree of wealth. With
this attitude, Cardenas won fame. There is also no doubt
that Cardenas had no sympathy whatsoever for Fascism - quite
in contrast to jn sum, his policies were too
populistic to incorporate a contrasting political order such
2 2
See Klaus Volland, Das 3. Reich und Mex ico,
Fr ankf ur t/Bern : Lang, 1976 , pp. 48-52.
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as Nazism, a fact which the PROM I probably realized.
24
Therefore it concentrated on and exploited the already
underlying "Yankee" aversion in Mexico.
The apparently contradictionary fact that even official
newspapers were permitted to publish pro-Hitler articles
probably has two motives. First DAPP
,
the government press
bureau, wanted to demonstrate Cardenas' promise of a free
and democratic press without censorship. Secondly, official
Mexico had to establish and display superficial political
friendliness to her new oil client after the expropriation.
To the first reason one might add that this free press
philosophy was at least practised since the domestic
24. . .
Yet, Cardenas also rejected the Soviet experiment in
socialism because it substituted the "individual boss" with
the "boss-state." Cardenas defined his conception of the
role of the Mexican state: "The function of the Mexican
State is not limited to being a simple watchdog of public
order
...
nor is the State recognized as a monopolist of the
national economy, but our concept of the State is that of a
regulator of the great economic phenomena which occur under
our system of production and distribution of wealth." In
another speech, Cardenas stated that the future of Mexico
lay in consumers' and producers' co-operatives. See Plenn,
p. 140. See also Robert Paul Millon, Mexican Marxist:
Vi cen te Lombard o Toledano, Chapel Hill: The (Jniv. of North
Carolina Press, 1966 , p. 135, footnote 69.
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7 S
governmental policies were not strongly criticised.
The second difficulty for successful German propaganda
and a more technical factor was simply the geographical
inaccessibility of Mexico, while simultaneously a strong
German community - the condition for a promising propaganda
machinery abroad - was lacking. Unlike the ABC countries,
the share of German Re ichsd eut sc he (German nationals) and
Vol ksdeut sche (Germans of Mexican citizenship) was very low
2 5
The expulsion of Frank Kluckhohn, the New York Times
correspondent, in 1939 is a case in point. His critical
articles about Mexico, sometimes based on unreliable
informations, led to the culmination of uneasiness within
the DAPP and government circles. Undersecretary Beteta
thought that Kluckhohn was the worst enemy Mexico had.
Nevertheless he preferred to keep Kluckhohn in for sake of
press freedom. But the trouble was that - in American
ambassador Daniels' words - "the DAPP gives out no news
except that which is propaganda for the government, and
naturally newspaper men resent the attempt to make them
propagandists and this resentment tends to make them more
critical [one might add: more credulous and prone to other
informations] than they would be if they could get the new
as it is." (Josephus Daniels, Shirt Sleeve Diplomat, Chapel
Hill: Univ. of N. Carolina Press, 1947 , p. 409 .) For more
reports about the function of DAPP, see also Plenn, pp.
33 3f. ; Kluckhohn, pp. 257ff.; and Harry Ignatius Stegmaier
jr., From Confrontation to The United States
and Mexico 1938-1945
,
Piss. Univ. of Michigan, 197 0 ,~p. 91.
Interestingly Kluckhohn himself saw the responsibility for
his expulsion in a "small Government clique, including one
official who was quite close to the German Embassy [sic] at
the time." (Daniels, p. 411)
See also the political cartoon about censorship in Mexico
on the next page.
Our "Good Neighbor"
Source: Burt M. McConnell, Mexico at the Bar of
Public Opinion, New York: Mail and Express
Publishing Company, 1939, p. 274.
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in Mexico. The only estimate which could be obtained
suggested that about 6
,
500 Germans were living in Mexico in
1930
,
thus they constituted less than 0.1% of the total
population. in contrast, in Argentina by the mid 1930'5,
250,000 German speaking inhabitants had settled and were
integrated, while still maintaining strong ties with the
Re i c h
.
Yet, the Or tsg ruppenl ei ter , the local leader of the AO
in Mexico, was very active despite of the limited financial
and human resources. Arthur Dietrich was - according to his
Party papers - "volkisch (nationalistic) up to his bones;"
• ■ 2 7
in short, a fanatic Nazi and ardent admirer of Hitler.
Dietrich was also press attache at the German legation
depite his Mexican citizenship which he had attained in
1932.
28
In cooperation with the legation Dietrich was
responsible for the dissemination of German propaganda,
sending weekly "an avalanche of at least eighteen pro-Ax is
9 f\
Iberoamer ikanische Rund sc ha u 1, No . 9, No v. 193 5,
p. 287. See also Friedrich Wilhelm Schroeter, "Das
Deutschtum in Mex iko Per Ausi and sd eut sc he 21, 1938,
p. 517.
, p. 45.
28 Ibid.
, p. 19.
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publications flooding the Mexican newsstand s ."
2
Apparently the cooperation between the AO and the German
diplomats in Mexico went surprisingly smooth. On 16
September 1938, the anniversary of Mexico's declaration of
independence, Exc el sio r published a special section devoted
to the foreign colonies of Mexico. This section was
overwhelmed by German advertisements amid lengthy articles
extolling Nazi culture and Nazi economy, and exalting the
wonderful relations between Mexico and Germany. In the wake
of burgeoning trade relations, Dr. Heinrich Nolte, charge
d'affaires of the German legation, "had sent word around to
all the German firms that they would better take an ad for
n -l
the greater glory of der Fuhrer or else." The political
pressure thus often came directly from the legation and not
from the AO under Dietrich who usually was responsible for
propaganda. Ultimately Dietrich was declared per son a no n
grata and "kicked out" in June 1940 ,
A
apparently for his
2^Kirk
, p. 29 8.
was "surprisingly'
1 because there were institutional
rivalries between AO and Foreign Office which were caused by
overlapping competences. See Frye, pp. 107 - 112.
31pienn
, p. 72.
pp. 298-300.
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continued propaganda efforts on behalf of the Axis, which
were then embarrassing for Mexico in view of her declared
neutrality in the European conflict.
33
The third restraining factor for German propaganda was
the improved relationship between the U.S. and Mexico.
Despite sane disagreements, especially during the boycott of
the oil companies, F.D.R.'s Good Neighbor policy was
faithfully and successfully implemented by Josephus Daniels,
his long-term friend and ambassador to Mexico. Daniels
himself asserts that Roosevelt's doctrine
cenented the friendliest relations on both sides of
the Rio Grande [and that] its acceptance and
practise laid the foundation for the perfect
cooperation which made the Western Hemisphere the
arsenal of united neighbors which at least helped to
save the world from the threat of totalitarianism.
The Good Neighbor policy indeed proved overall
o o
Dietrich's propaganda activities had even worried the
U.S. embassy in Mexico City, as well as State Department
officials in Washington. U.S. army intelligence reports call
him a "master" at his work. (See Harry I. Stegmaier jr.,
From Confrontation to Cooperation: The U.S. and Mex ico
193 8 -1945
,
Diss. Univ. of Michigan, 1970 , p. 91.) The
American charge d'affaires Pierre Boal reminded Mexican
Secretary of Foreign Relations, Eduardo Hay, in that
Dietrich's propaganda efforts were as equally inimical as
the anti-Mexican articles in the U.S. press to friendly
relations between the two countries. (Ibid.)
34
Daniels, pp. VII-IX.
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successful. in the next chapter it will be seen that the
good relations between Mexico and the U. S. led to a mutual
understanding and harmonious agreements on the Pan-American
Conferences on which the hemispheric solidarity vis a vis
the fascist infiltration were discussed.
Finally, the cultural differences represented another
important obstacle for German agents. As de Jong pointed out
National Socialism as an ideology was unacceptable
to the large masses in South America. The continent,
steeped as it was in Spanish ... culture, and with
French cultural influences also at work, did not
fancy Prussianism. The glorification of one race was
downright objectionable to peoples who were being
formed through a m ing 1 ing of races - a process which
was becoming increasingly intensive. The principles
underlying the Nazi movement were the opposite of
those recognised by South and Central America. The
brutish and harsh zeal of the Germans went against
the grain of the somewhat indolent, ceremonious
Latin Americans, who are so strongly imbued with
ideas of personal honour. Those Latin Americans were
all the more painfully struck by every kind of sign
that showed that the National Socialists not only
kept themselves aloof from the growing cultural
unity of that part of the world, but were even
starting to form exclusive, German communities. ...
[The Times (London), June 26, 193 8 , reminds:] "All
that South America asks of the immigrant is that he
should assimilate; and newcomers are liked or
otherwise in proportion to their willingness to
forget the land of their parents."
35
35 Louis de Jong, The German Fifth Column in the Second
World War, Trans. C.M. Geyl, Chicago: Un iv .
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Indeed the racist theories employed by the Nazis arose a
good deal of disgust on behalf of the Mexicans. With
Cardenas' emphasis of Mexico's Indian past (he named his son
Cuauhtemoc) this contrast became even stronger. Moreover
Hi span idad and the inherent Catholic fervor of the Mexican
people was in direct opposition to the Nazi ideology. Yet,
German agents supposedly deviated these cultural
restrictions by employing Spanish Falangistas in Mexico for
their goals. But the Spaniards' success turned out to be
limited
.
Probably the established German propaganda network,
small but efficient, helped to develop the Falange
organization in Mexico, because "the Nazis in Mexico were
able to sell [to the Falangistas] the idea that the triumph
of the Axis in Spain would be the preliminary to the
3 7
establishment of a Falangist state in Mexico." Even though
such plans were utopic in view of the described obstacles
that the German propaganda faced, the roots Spain and Mexico
shared - Hi span idad and Catholic Church - facilitated the
common goal of the Falangistas and Nazis. Stegmaier
evaluates the Spaniards' success.
Gaston Nerval, "Europe versus the United States in
Latin America," Foreign Affairs XV, 4, July 193 7 , pp .
636-63 8.
7
Chase, p. 151
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Because their spoke Spanish fluently, these agents
gained important positions and won the confidence of
influential Mexicans. For this reason, the Falange
proved more effective than the Nazis themselves in
subversive activities. Members of this group could
operate where the Nazis could not, and they were
able to hold key positions, closed to Nazis, in
which they could serve their cause advantageously.
In addition to providing the Nazi organization with
information
...
the Falange also stirred up anti-
United States, anti-Allied feeling.
°
Most of the Falange activity in Mexico, however, took place
after 1940. Therefore its connections to Germany are
reviewed only for the period in interest.
"The most dangerous and deadly of all Franco's
organizations" was the military intelligence service SIM
(Serv ici o In tel igenc i a Mil itar) . Most of their m ember s
were Gestapo- trained "General von Faupel took steps to
strengthen and prepare the SIM to carry the major burden of
Axis espionage in The SIM agents worked from
within the Mexican government and became most important as a
source of information for German agents when the German
p. 98, based on U.S. Military Intelligence
repor ts.
39
K irk, p. 2 85.
40
See Kirk, p. 258, Chase, p. 158 and Stegmaier , p. 98.
se
, p . 15 8.
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diplomatic missions in Mexico were dissolved after Pearl
Harbor.
4 2
Franco's personal representative in Mexico, Ibanez
Serrano, directed Falange activities from the beginning of
the Spanish Civil War. His attitude is not quite clear. In
his book about the Falange, Allan Chase asserts that Serrano
was "the direct link between the Nazis in Europe and the
secret Fascist armies on the American border."
42
On the
other hand, Betty Kirk quotes Serrano saying that he had no
sympathy with the Nazis because of their "paganism."
44
In
Kirk's view Serrano was "a diplomatic stooge" similar to the
German minister Rid t von Collenberg. Her downplay of
Serrano's importance seems more correct than Chase's
exaggerated, sometimes paranoid view about the Falange's
activities in Mexico and Serrano's leading role. Serrano
seemed to have been an ardent Franco admirer and thus
helpful for the Falange in Mexico, but on the other hand, as
a good Catholic, he was both anti-Nazi and ant i-Communi st .
42
See also political cartoon on the next page.
4 2
Chase . p. 15 2.
, p. 282.
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Shades of the Spanish Main
Source: Burt M. McConnell, Mexico at the Bar of
Public Opinion, New York: Mail and Express
Publishing Company, 1939, p. 257.
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In any case, from the beginning of 193 9, the
Falangistas' impact was felt in Mexico. The propelling
forces were recruited in Spain and sent as mil i tantes to the
Americas. These militantes were temporarily under the direct
supervision of Hans Hellerman who had served for a short
while as chief of the Spanish division of the Nazi Party.
Late in 1938, Hellerman trained Falangistas militarily in
45
Mexico. However, they mainly served as troublemakers while
their political influence was of minor insignificance.
The same - German support and little effectiveness, but
a lot of dust stirring - held true for the offspring of
Franco's shocktroops , the Esquadra Tr ad ic ional ista . They in
particular displayed anti-U.S. attitudes under their leader
Leon Osorio. One of Osorio's favorite tactics was to pay a
group to enter movie theaters and give "Bronx cheers" when
Roosevelt appeared in the newsreels. Another time he threw
stink bombs and itching powder in a theater , which showed
Charlie Chaplin's "The Great Dictator,"
47
a movie that
ridiculed Hitler and Mussolini. Leon Osorio was also member
pp. 154ff.
, p. 71.
Kirk , p. 30 7.
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4
of the German Nazi Party.
In sum, the Falange never became politically significant
in Mexico despite a fairly large propaganda machine, which
included the weekly publication Hi span id ad . Hi span id ad
preached the unity of Latin America and the expulsion of the
49
North American oppressors from the country. Even though
the Falange was neither strong nor dangerous, President
Cardenas, angered by Franco's victory in Spain, outlawed the
Falange and expelled its leaders in Nevertheless the
Falangistas' underground work continued and proved to be
helpful for Germany's propaganda in Mexico and even "took
over the major part of its work as Mexican pressure
increased at the beginning of the 40's."^
A Mexican branch of the Nazi Party also existed, headed
by a Banco Germanico official and former AO leader, Ewald
48
Ibid
. , p. 284.
lb id . , p . 28Of .
50
See Albert L. Michaels, "Fascism and Sinar qui smo," A
Journal of Curch and State (Waco, Texas) 8 (2) , Spring 196
6
,
pT 237. “See also Plenn, pp. 68-70 and Millan, pp. 242, 246.
51
Stegmaier, p. 98. See also Kirk, pp. 303ff
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Bork. According to Prewett, the party had 3,800 members
including "the great majority of the adult males of the
German colony." A small storm troop of 250 organizers and
propaganda specialists presented to Mexican sympathizers
national socialist principles and the Reich's
"Weltanschauung" while the German legation "used it as an
instrument to stir up minor trouble The party regularly
received money and instructions from the commercial attache
of the German legation, Hans Burandt.
5^
In conclusion, the iniative for an extended German
propaganda was undoubtedly present in Mexico. This attempt
of direct influence, however, had a limited impact on
Mexico's domestic policies, because of the described
absorbing characteristics of Mexico's political situation.
p. 96. According to Vo 11 and, p. 178, his name
was Borck
.
p. 303.
p. 96.
See also Prewett, p. 303.
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Mexican Troublemakers
Last, but not least the German propaganda reached the
Mexican public by a few, but influential Mexican
personalities who became independently convinced of National
Socialism, thus proclaiming and advertising it as the
Mexican solution.
One of these "Axis' strange was Rudolfo
Brito Foucher who came from a wealthy family in the state of
Tabasco. In 1935 3rito had participated at the downfall of
Tabascan dictator and caud i 11 o Tomas Garrido Canabal . Brito
visited Berlin in the early 1930'5, was greatly impressed
with the Nazi's show of force, discipline and order, and
soon became associated with the various Mexican fascistoid
movements. Strong ant i-Amer icanism and probably more
important, an ardent Catholicism, determined his belief.
For example, Brito believed that the oil expropriation was
S 7
merely another trick of the American imperialists.
Gerardo Murillo, better known as Dr. Atl , the "John
Baptist of Mexican art," was another influential prominent
Kirk
, p. 30 5.
7
See Michaels, p. 237.
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Mexican who openly exalted German Nazism. In a pamphlet he
answered the question "Who will win the war?" with Germany
and predicted that this would lead to a confrontation
between Hitler and the U.S. Since Germany as a nation "with
youth, vigour and faith in themselves" would also defeat the
U.S. - "a weak pacifistic people devoted to pleasure"
- Mexicans were urged to renounce the Havana Pact and assert
c o
their independence from the U.S. Dr. Atl's conclusion
therefore was to side with the winning side: Germany. Betty
Kirk commented ironically: "It would appear that the
Wagnerian gods had been keeping him [Dr. Atl] company on his
mountaintop .
But his disgust for the U.S. formed not the only element
of Dr. Atl's national socialistic philosophy. The
association of communism with Judaism was another of his
favorite themes, blaming the Russian invasion of Finland on
the "ambitions of Israel."
60
Misinterpreting Friedrich
58
See Dr. Atl, La Victoria de Al emania y _la si tuac ion de
America Latina, Mexico, D.F. : Coleccion Accidii MundTaT,
1940, pp. 7-15. See also Michaels, p. 237.
irk, p. 305. The
"
moun ta in top" alluded to Dr. Atl's
home in a cave high on the volcano Popocatepetl.
60
Dr. ATI, "Finlandia heroica," El_ Un iversal , Dec. 5,
1939.
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Nietzsche, Dr. Atl praised war as the highest expression of
the conscience of the species and asserted that all great
success of art and philosophy had been achieved as the
61
result of military conflicts.
In sum, Dr . Atl reflected the attitude of a few
Mexicans, who were looking for a radical nationalistic
solution for a Mexico, which they thought, needed
regeneration and salvation. This sentiment permeated most of
the groups and individuals described above. Yet, these
antagonists of the Mexican system were of minor importance
because the innovative Cardenas administration just offered
more to the masses than promises (or war). Again, fascism
and its national socialist version was present and clearly
detectable in Mexico, in particular through German
agitation, but it fell on no fertile ground in Mexico.
Important counteracting factors - Catholic Church,
Hi span id ad, no immediate communistic threat and finally a
very small amount of Jews in Mexico
- all impeded the
development of a fascist hysteria as a mass movement. And
only as a mass movement, incorporating and devouring all
aspects of daily life and experience, fascism can survive.
Atl
,
Pa z, Neutral id ad , Guerra, Mexico, D.F.:
Coleccion Accion Mundial, 1940 , pp. 29f. See also Michaels,
p. 237 and Kirk, pp. 304ff.
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Thus the following quote, though coined for Argentina's
political situation in mid-1937 but written in the context
of the general Latin American sentiment, held also true for
Mex ico :
The fact is that neither Communists nor Fascists
constitute more than a small minority in Argentina.
There are no reasons for the existence of either of
them as a political force, and it would be an error
to attribute too much significance to the stir one
or the other at times creates. The Argentines [as
many other Latin American countries looking to the
Old World] as a people have a penchant for new fads ,
be it clothes, amusements or political doctrines.
Communism and Fascism, particularly the latter, will
disappear from Argentina as did mah-jong, miniature
golf and the 'art nouveaux' of the architects of
1900.
62
In conclusion, the German threat was more imagined than
real. A current Mexican joke reflected this ambiguity. It
tells that Mexico had a better secret weapon than Hitler: if
he sent an army to the Americas, Mexico would expropriate it
and use it against Mussolini. Nevertheless fears at the
time were very real and are understandable vis a vis the
success of Fascism in Europe. Especially the Nazis were
object of emulation and admiration for various Mexican
Gil, "Repercussions of the Spanish Crisis in
Latin America," Fore ign Af fair s, 15, 3 (April 1937) , p. 551.
F. Cline, The United States and Mexico,
Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1963 (2nd . ed .) ,p. 24 5.
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Radical Rightists. Germans - from the PROM I, privately or
from the legation itself - supported, morally and
financially, these organizations, but ultimately the latter
remained distinctively Mexican. Without genuine desire to
align themselves with the European fascists, most Mexican
right wing groups emerged as a reaction to the state
socialism of Cardenas. They were unliked by the Cardenas
government, though tolerated in the most cases, while in
contrast the Dorados, for example, had developed unmolested
and even with official benevolence, when Calles was still
Mexico’s Je fe Maximo.
Yet, the spectacular appearances of the fascistoid
organizations in Mexico plus the experience of the civil war
in Spain alerted attention, not only within the country
itself, but also north of the Rio Grande. These reactions
and subsequent recommendations for countermeasures in order
to stop the perceived threat will be the topic of the next
c hapter.
Chapter 8
The Counterforces of the German Threat
Lombardo Toledano and the Mexican Left
Naturally, the Mexican left constituted the counterforce
to the perceived fascist threat. One of the foremost leading
antagonists was Vicente Lombardo Toledano, not only the
CTM's general secretary at the time (1936-1941) , but also
head of the anti-Axis oriented La ti n Am er ican Confederation
of Labour. With this power within Mexico and in Latin
America, and as a convinced the nin ter-pi anetary
must be viewed as an influential anti-fascist
force.
Lombardo's opinion found expression in the review
Futuro, which he had founded and directed and which had "the
Robert Paul Millon, Mex ic an Ma rxi st: V i cente Lombard o
Toledano, Chapel Hill: The Univ. of North Carolina Press,
1966.
Kirk, Covering The Mexican Front: The Battle of
Europe vs. America, Norman: Un iv .of Oklahoma Press, 1942 ,
p. 95.
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widest circulation of any left-wing political monthly in
3
Mexico." As early as January 1934, Lombardo had forcefully
attacked Hitler, the "grotesque dictator," for his inhumane
and " ant i-in tell ect ual" The labor leader
considered fascism but a form of capitalism, drawing,
however, a line between the different stages of fascism,
viewed from his Marxist perspective of history as class
s trugg le:
Between democratic capitalism and fascist
capitalism, the first is preferable: the exploited
mass can use its liberty to prepare its decisive
historical action, under fascism the preparation is
very difficult.
At the end of 1937, Lombardo ardently critisized the
violent nature and the consequences of fascism. In his view,
fascism represented
the armed violence of the bourgeois regime which
tries to survive by destroying the positive works of
civilization, throwing the world into the bonfire of
international war and into the barbarity of the
, p. 238.
Vicente Lombardo Toledano, "Hitler, el Grotesco
Dictador de Alemania," Futuro, IV, Jan. 15, 1934 , p. 10.
“’Millon
, p. 10 8.
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cruelest tyranny known to history.
From this far-sighted historical view he concluded that the
fight against fascism is a fight for the Mexican Revolution.
Consequently, Lombardo devoted his political powers equally
to his Marxist belief and Mexico. For example, he used
international labor conferences in Europe to attack in
particular German Nazism. However, he also held the other
Western European capitalist governments responsible for the
rise of fascism: he denounced Chamberlain's appeasement
policy and the "lesser evil" theory which guided the rulers
of France and Britain in the face of Hitler's threats as
"not only a suicidal theory, but a theory contrary to the
g
interests of humanity."
Yet, Lombardo's attacks on the failures of the Western
democracies must be seen in the context of the British
boycott of Mexican oil. Alejandro Carrillo, a close friend
Lombardo Toledano, "El Veinte de Noviembre,"
Futuro, XXII, Dec. 1937, p. 5.
7
See Kirk, pp. 85ff.
®Millon
, p. 109.
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of the labor leader,
9
declared in a speech at the University
of Virginia in July 1938:
Mr. Chamberlain
...
is the very man who advises the
League of Nations to recognize Italy's conquest of
Ethiopia, in violation of the League's Covenant and
of the fundamental tenets of International Law, this
very same Mr. Chamberlain has seen fit to take up
the oil companies' fight against Mexico in the name
of the British Government. To fascist aggressors and
violators of International Law he will do nothing;
it is democratic, weak, law-abiding Mexico he tries
to harm. And all of this, of course, in the name of
Democr ac y!
From 1 938, Lombardo always foresaw and predicted war. A
special edition of Futuro which exclusively reported about
the Munich Conference concluded that war was now an
inevitable consequence of the Munich At the
eve of Germany's invasion of Poland he subsequently
12
attempted to divert German oil purchases to France.
x
was representative of the CTM and Secretary
General of the Workers' University, which was founded in
Mexico City by Lombardo. He was also editor of the left-
wing, CTM-friendly EL Popular .
Carrillo, The Mex ican People and the Oil
Companies, Mexico, D.F.: DAPP, 1938, pp. 23f .
1X
See Futuro, Oct. 10, 1938 and XXXIII, Nov. 1938.
Kuhn (German legation, Mexico) to AA, July 25,
1939 in Klaus Volland, Das 3. Re ich und Mex ico,
Frankfur t/Bern : Lang, 1976, p. 152.
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Already in June 1938, Lombardo had stated that reports, that
Mexico would sell oil to Germany, were
" cal urn nie s," and that
Mexico would not sell oil to any fascist After
the Davis deal at the beginning of July 1938 , however, his
critics focused on Nazi politics, while the oil issue became
subordinated in his speeches. His nationalism and subsequent
backing of Cardenas' oil policies at home seemed to prevail
over his ideology at that point.
Nevertheless, Lombardo' s consistent and sharp comments
on Adolf Hitler and German propaganda spurred the German
minister Rud t to deliver a strongly worded note at the end
of 1938 demanding the arrest and criminal prosecution of the
labor Of course, no action was taken by the
Mexican The New York T imes correspondent
Kluckhohn perceived this German move as a trick to expand
its pr opag and ist ic influence:
By heavy spending the German legation is said to
have been able to control the Mexican press with the
exception of the labor organ _EI Po pula r. It is
suggested the real object of the note is to silence
w York Times, June 3 , 1938, p. 5.
York Times , Nov. 30, 1938, p. 17.
p. 16 2.
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that paper
The real reason is probably simpler. The German legation
bore in mind that a warning such as the note would
discipline the labor leader in view of the splendid economic
collaboration. Moreover, Rud t intended to accelerate
Lombardo's declining power, as he erroneously perceived
it.
17
With the Hi tl er-S tal in non-aggression pact in August
1939 and the subsequent outbreak of war in Europe, Lombardo
Toledano's attitude changed in accordance with the new
Soviet posture. Nevertheless his anti-fascist position
remained unaltered, even though less flamboyant, while he
emphasized now the necessity of pro-Allied support. Being
both Marxist and Mexican, Lombardo combined his beliefs in a
pragmatic manner : on the one hand, he insisted that Mexico
must remain neutral, since the war was essentially an
in ter imper iali s t rivalry, while on the other hand, he saw
18
the necessity to cooperate with the U.S.
16
Ibid.
t diary, 193 8, p. 105-109. In Volland, p. 162.
Millan, p. 110-112.
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In this context it is worth mentioning that Lombardo's
pragmatic stance only crystallized after Georgi Dimitrov,
the General Secretary of the Comintern, had announced the
new party line on 17 September 1939. For two weeks Lombardo
strongly supported Mexican intervention. On 2 September 1939
he wrote in El_ Po pul ar:
A new World War has begun. El Popular feels the
obligation to make known, without vacillations or
disgress ions, the position which, as the organ of
the people and the working classes of Mexico, it
assumes toward the war ... We cannot adopt an
attitude of false, hypocritical or cowardly
neutrality when the lives of millions of souls, the
inheritance of all civilization, and even the
destiny of the human species are gravely
threatened
.
Millon neglects this delay towards a neutral position. The
sudden switch of Toledano's opinion was also described
depictively in The Wa sh ing to n Po st:
The Mexican labor front began to squirm. It suddenly
veered from its loudly voiced enmity for Hitler and
Nazism and began to look for new dragons to
attack.
21
The neutral attitude again changed into an ardent urge to
-*- 9Cited in Kirk, p. 87.
20
See Millon, pp. 109ff.
Washing ton Post, Feb. 12, 1940. Cited in Kirk,
p . 87.
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join militarily the allies, after the German invasion of the
Soviet Union in 1941.
In sum, Lombardo's anti-fascist position rooted as much
in his Marxist ideology as in his beliefs in the Mexican
Revolution. He perceived definite Axis aims in
and used his power to sabotage them. Betty Kirk even
perceived the militarized battalions of the CTM as "brave
symbol of an emancipated nation [because they organized]
undisciplined workers, who are, at heart, raw material for
fascism." Thus Lombardo used his position as national
labor leader and his role as international accepted
intellectual as well as his demagogue talents to fight
fascism in general, but especially fascist tendencies at
22Vicente Lombardo Toledano, _En que Consis te la Democrac ia
Mexicana _y Quienes so n su s Enem igo s, Mexico,
D.F.:
Universidad Obrera de Mexico, 1941.
22
See Allan Chase, Fa 1 ang e: The Ax is Secret Army in the
Amer ica s, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1943 , p.
157.
Vicente Lombardo Toledano, National Sovereignty and
Continental Defense. Nationalization o f German and Ital 1a n
Na zi fa sc ist~ Properties in Latin America, (Speech at the
meeting of the National Council of the CTM) , Mexico, D.F.:
1941.
2 5
Ki rk, pp . 84f .
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home. In this respect, his pragmatism also sought the
cooperation of the U.S. and used the hemispheric solidarity.
His concerns about this threat outlasted WW II and the end
of the fascist powers. In 1960 , he published a scholarly
book to the problem of neo-Nazism in the German Federal
Republic .
'
Surprisingly, the radical left was not united against
Nazism and fascism in Mexico. Leon Trotzky remarked after
the Mo sc ow-Be r 1 in Pact: "The chaos which the zigzags of the
Comintern produce in the minds of the workers is one of the
most important of the fascist victories."
28
He meant, of
course, the global situation, but his comment is also
verified for the Mexican case.
Kirk argued that the communists' assault was primarily
directed against the socialist Mexican program. Thus they
9 r
4D See Vicente Lombardo Toledano, Como Ac tuan los Na zi s en
Mex ico, Mexico, D.F.: Universidad Obrera de m£x ico, 1941.
See also the pamphlet by Toledano: Fifth Co 1 urn n in Mex ico,
(Translation of a speech delivered on Oct. 17, 1941 m
Mexico City) , New York: The Council for Pan-American
Democracy, 1942.
Lombardo Toledano, _EI Neo-Na zi smo, Sus
Car ac ter isticas Pel igros, Mexico, D.F.: Escuela Nac iona 1
de Cienc ias Po Ift icas y Sociales, 1960.
Kirk , p. 81.
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had the same goals as the right-wing fascistoid groups.
, O Q
Quoting Jan Valtin, she drew parallels to Germany at the
beginning of 1931. Here Soviet instructions served as
"united action of the Communist Party and the Nazis [in
order] to accelerate the disintegration of the crumbling
democratic bloc which governed Germany [while] they
continued to fight each other even more viciously."
3^
While Kirk's argument probably holds true for Germany,
her application to Mexico, however, is dubious. "The abuses
of Communism which caused the public revolt of the socialist
Mexican Republic against the left and opened the doors to
the Nazi fifth column and Falange Espanola." The second
part of her assertion did not materialize, as we already saw
in the relatively modest and uneffective role of fascist
elements in Mexico. Moreover there was no "public revolt"
against communism. The reasons why communism in its various
appearances - Marxism-Leninism, Stalinism
and Trotkyism
- did not succeed in Mexico are essentially the same as the
ones for fascism's failure. Cardenas' PRM provided an all
29
Jan Valtin, Out of the Nighty Chicago: Alliance Book
Corporation, 1943, pp. 293 f .
30
K ir k , p . 266 .
31 Ibid.
absorbing middle ground for all the leftist inclined, which
drew many potential communists to the official Revolutionary
Party. Also, opportunism encouraged this process. In
contrast, because of this absorbing character of the PRM and
Cardenas' continuous endeavor to strengthen the party, the
attempt of Lombardo's CTM to create a Mexican Popular Front
in 1937
, including the peasants, the Communist Party and the
PNR, failed.
22
Fascism and Marxism, as determined above, are in natural
opposition, in which fascism cannot come into effective
existence without the other. In Mexico, the Communist Party
was simply too weak to constitute a worthwhile target for
fascists, though they constantly expressed their disgust for
each other. Both forces usually were in constant rhetorical
guerilla warfare. For example, at the end of 1936, the left-
wing newspaper Novedad e s published a detailed plan how the
Par tid o Comun ista de Mex ico in ten ted to sabotage Germans
living in Mex ico.
22
The two major points stated first,
"exig i r del Gobierno que prohiba la introduce ion al pai*s de
32 • /
See Arturo Anguiano et al., Cardenas y La I zquierd a
Mex icana, Mexico, D.F.: Juan Pablos, 1975. See in
particular the essays by Hernan Laborde, the General
Secretary of the Mexican Communist Party at that time, pp .
313-334.
22Noved ad e s
, Nov. 23, 1936.
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mercancias procedentes de Alemania e Italia," and secondly
to start "una era de sabotaje para las casas alemanas." But
no deeds followed the words, which was probably due to
pressure on the Communists by the Cardenas government.
After all, the influence of the Communist Party was
rather moderate. Cardenas' consistent drift to the left was
dominating, as seen in his educational reforms: "The present
youth [in 1938] of high school and college age is, in
Mexico, overwhelmingly ant i-Fa sci st. . . They talk about
class struggle and imperialism as concrete realities."
0
In
sum, communists rather sought cooperation than conflict with
the Cardenas administration. They were outspoken ant i-
• 35
fascist but moderate in means, members and material.
Finally, there was an anti-Nazi League for German
Carleton Mi 11 an, Mex ico Reborn, Boston: Houghton-
Mifflin, 193 9, p. 237.
left's general anti-fascist attitude and its
readiness to fight for it, is well reflected in a poll of
the weekly _EI Tiem po . It asked "Should Mexico enter the
War?" on 2 0 May 1942 , shortly after the Mexican tanker
"Potrero de Llano" had been sunk by a German submarine.
'Leftist organizations' answered most affirmative (92.2%),
followed by
' government-employed workers' (67.9%). In
contrast, the 'Man in the Street' was strongly opposed and
only 21.6% responded with yes for Mexico's entrance of the
war. See Howard F. Cline, The Un i ted States and Mex ico,
Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1963 (2nd. ed .) , pp. 268ff.
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Cul tur e can posed by German nationals in Mexico. The League
arranged a series of lectures on National Socialism
discussing Nazi racial doctrines, sociology and politics.
Many prominent Mexican gave presentations: Luis
I. Rodriguez, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, Francisco Mug ica ,
Alejandro Carrillo and others . However, "many anti-Nazi
Germans were terrorized [by the Gestapo] into staying away
from the lectures." Overall, the League served to report
about German atrocities against Jews, nations and against
its own people. Hence its main purpose was counter pr opag and a
by providing authentic information about the Reich, however,
without getting involved in active political action.
The Press in the United States
Criticism of German activity in Mexico derived from two
concerns: first, and predominantly, American observers
became alarmed about the rapid increase of German-Mex ican
trade relations. The two countries' closer economic
cooperation naturally jeopardized the traditional strong
U.S. market in Mexico. The critics heightened in particular
after Mexico had announced that it would sell their oil to
36
Jaime H. Plenn, Mex ico Marches, Ind ianopol is, N.Y. : The
Bobb s-Me rril 1 Co., 193 9, p. 72.
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Germany.
J '
Secondly and directly juxtaposed with the economic
concerns were fears of a German or fascist "Fifth Column" in
Mexico.. More often than not the perceived ideological
penetration by German propaganda was usually directly linked
with and thus made responsible for the intensified economic
cooperation between Germany and Mexico. Even though Germany
had succeeded more in other Latin American countries in
respect to the political and economic intrusion, the
geographical vicinity caused a much greater uneasiness in
the U.S. press in regard to Mexico. Overall, this kind of
press rather supported business interests than political
convictions. Thus it sought to bring the public opinion on
the side of business in general, and of the oil companies in
par tic ul ar .
A good collection of these two types of criticism
political cartoon on the next page.
■^ 8
See Howard J. Trueblood, "Trade Rivalries in Latin
America," Fore ign Pol icy Re po rt s 13 (1937/8) , pp. 154 -16 4 .
See also Ka zuo Okamoto , "Italy and Germany in Latin
America," Con temporary Japan 9 (1940) , pp. 1051-1056 ,
Carleton BeaT", "To talitar lan Inroads in Latin America,"
Foreign Af fair s 17, 1 (Oct. 1938) , pp. 78-89 and Percy
W. Bidwell, "Latin America, Germany and the Hull Program,"
Fore ign Af fair s 17, 2 (Jan. 1939) , pp. 374-390 .
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Service With a Smile
Source: Burt M. McConnell, Mexico at the Bar of
Public Opinion, New York: Mail and Express
Publishing Company, 1939, p. 227.
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provides Burt M. McConnell in his book Mex ico a t the Bar o f
Public Significantly it was sponsored by Standard
Oil in 1939. For McConnell, as for the New York Herald
Tr ibune, the German threat can go either way: "Trade follows
the flag - and political ideologies follow trade."
40
Quoting
the St. Paul Pioneer Pres s, one cannot separate the two. "If
it were merely a matter of commercial competition, American
export industries could hold their own. But the Germans
bring their political propaganda with them."
4^
Nevertheless, these writers mainly complained about the
unjust nature of the German-Mex ican trade principles. The
Detroit Free Press commented:
Germany's trade policy is based on an attempt to
balance exactly its exports and imports to and from
each foreign country. Thus Germany ... agrees with
Mexico that it will buy so much Mexican oil if
Mexico will buy German goods of equivalent value.
... Secretary Hull contends that this policy
to erect barriers to general international trade.
t M. McConnell, Mex ico at the 3ar of Pub lic Opinion,
New York: Mail and Express Publishing Company, 1939.
40
ID id . , p. 25 9.
lb id . , p. 25 8.
lb id . , p . 261.
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The German Askimark system was mainly made responsible
for the decline of U.S. trade in Latin America. The North
Amer ican Ne ws pa pe r All iance declared that "the Germans are
the most firmly entrenched [country] in the southern
continent. Through the 'blocked* or ' Aski' marks ... the
Nazis have succeeded in building a large trade.
McConnell also blamed high Mexican import duties,
disadvantaging U. S. products vis a vis the cheaper imports
by barter deals. For instance, "in the first half of 1938,
Germany increased her sales [of typewriters in Mexico] to 3 6
percent of the total ... selling at around 100 pesos,
compared with the 400 to 50 0 pesos which the American
machines are sold for.
"44
The New York Pos t added that the
barter with Germany meant "the 'No Sale' sign for American
machinery. Along with the Ge rma n-1 tal ian contacts, [this] is
4 5
a Mexican boycott of American goods." These comments
apparently forgot that these repercussions for American
export business were caused by the boycott of the American
oil companies.
lb id
. , p. 26 0.
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Most writers agreed, however, that these trade
advantages were mainly triggered by the oil expropriation,
since it opened the possibility of barter deals. They
neglected the fact that the German trade had consistently
increased in Mexico in the years before, as shown in the
first part of the paper. Therefore and the fact that all
fascist countries were "hard pressed for oil," the Courier
suspected that "Hitler had some influence in causing the
confiscation of British, Dutch, and American oil properties
4 6
in Mexico." By the way, the word
" confic ation" instead of
"expropriation" was regularly used by these oil companies'
protagonists .
With Germany's commercial breakthrough came her
propaganda, since "the end sought, of course, is the spread
of totalitarian ideology in Latin American countries." The
Loui sv ille Courier Journa 1 concluded that "the strengthening
of pol itic al-econom ic ties with dictatorial nations
endangers the security of the The danger comes "from
within" Mexico by "ideological invasion" and soon, by
application of the domino theory, the spread of fascism
becomes ir re si stable . Therefore the Gl over sv ille , New York,
46
Ibid.
, p.
258.
lb id . , p. 26 0.
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Herald recalled that Mexico had been a "hotbed" of German
espionage in WW I and was in danger of becoming a "breeding
ground for Nazi tenets" in the Western Hem isphere
Consequently, the Washington Star depicted a doomed future:
The political fact cannot be ignored that the
establishment of vital economic ties, such as Mexico
now appears to be creating with Germany, inevitably
link Mexican interests with the ultimate destiny of
Nazi-Fascism in Europe. ... That connection will be
difficult to break. *
One might wonder how these writers saw Cardenas' attitude
towards fascism.
So what is to do? The article clippings of McConnell's
book did not really provide any answers, since they blamed
entirely the Cardenas' administration, while the U. S.
government and the business community, especially the oil
companies, did not have a blot on their scutcheons. Thus the
New York Post concluded with resignation:
We can do several things. We can get mad as hell. We
can retaliate. We can drop the 'Good Neighbor'
policy. But these reactions, while they might soothe
our feelings, won't help American business in
Mexico
.
®
lb id . , p . 2 81.
lb id
. , pp.
269 f.
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The ultimate motives of the generated scare, of course,
were of economic concern, though many might have felt uneasy
about the political The type of quotes in
the McConnell book, as biased they were, indeed appeared
ub iqui tio usl y in the U. S. press. Time even asserted that
"Germany has set up a machine [of propaganda and intrigue in
Mexico] that functions like a well-oiled Messer sc hm it t
plane." Therefore the magazine feared a Putsch possibility,
in tr ansigated by the Nazis. Overall, the impression was
generated that Mexico was "in chaos," an allegation which
5 3
led by the way to a sharp decline in tourism from the U. S.
Yet, some journalists attempted to put the German
activity in Mexico in the right proportion. In particular,
the liberal Nation tried to set the record straight:
C 1
The fear was not limited to Mexico alone. See for
example Herbert J. Sel igmann , "The Nazi Invasion of the
U.S.A. ," New Re pub lic , June 22, 193 8. See also Alton Frye,
Nazi Germany and the Amer ican Hemisphere 1 933 -1941 , New
Haven/London: Yale Univ. Press, 1967.
52
T ime, June 3 , 1940 , p. 36.
CO
See Lorenzo Meyer, Mex ico and the United States in the
Oil 1 917 -1 942 , Trans. Mur ie 1 Va
sconcfellos
,
Austin/London: UnivT of Texas Press, 1977, p. 204. "The
total dollar income from tourism in 1938 was down one-third
from the year before." In respect to the picture of Mexico
"in chaos," see the cartoon on the next page.
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Careful, Young Fellow!
Source: Burt M. McConnell, Mexico at the Bar of
Public Opinion, New York: Mail and Express
Publishing Company, 1939, p. 115.
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If the U.S. is concerned over the increase of German
trade with Mexico, the remedy lies ready to hand.
President Cardenas has repeatedly affirmed his
country's preference to sell oil to the democratic
nations. But while the U.S. and Great Britain,
through their international oil oligarchies, have
combined to impose a boycott against Mexico, the
Nazis, pursuing their own advantage, have bought
Mexican petroleum and helped the country to weather
a difficult economic and political crisis. Under the
circumstances, it would have been sheer insanity for
Mexico to refuse German orders on the around that
they were motivated by ulterior purposes.
By the same token, the article refuted Mexican sympathy for
Nazism. Admitting Nazi influences, the reader was reminded
of Cardenas' "profound opposition to fascism." Mexico's help
to the Spanish Republic, her tradition to grant asylum to
anti-fascists and Mexico's voice in the League of Nations
"in defense of the rights of weak nations victimized by
fascist aggression," all these facts were indicators of
55
Mexico's democratic position.
J
In the same manner I.F. Stone noted "the [U.S.] squeeze
on Mexico." For him, "the good-will of the people of
Mexico is more important to our national security than the
5 4 "K 1 uckhohn' s Case," Nation, Jan. 28, 1939, p. 110.
xb id.
Stone, "The Squeeze on Mexico," Nation, 151, Nov
30, 1940, pp. 523 f .
good-will of the Standard Oil Company." Stone recommended
to ease pressure on Mexico by putting pressure on Standard
Oil through "Congressional spotlight." L.O. Prendergast had
already pointed out earlier that the "consequences of the
oil expropriation played directly into the hands of the
reactionaries" and that the "future attitude of the oil
S 7
companies is of decisive importance."
Indeed, "with the oil crisis in Mexico, Latin America
suddenly [became] a center where international axes cross
and clash." The question was only, whether these clashes
were imagined or real. The "press war" on this topic was
fully in action in the U. S. during 1938/9 , right after the
expropriation. George Creel in Collier
1
s for example asked
"Can We Prevent Chaos in Mexico?" and predicted a Humpty-
Dumpty crash in Mexico. Then "a proletarian horde ... will
seize power, its excesses inevitably precipitating savage
civil war, making Mexico another Spain." L.O. Prendergast
countered in Nation:
5 7
L.O. Prendergast, "Oil and Mexico's Future," Na t ion,
146, June 25, 1938, p. 717.
Janeway, "Mexico, Tokyo, Berlin and the Oil Axis,"
Asia, Sep. 1938, p. 518.
Creel, "Can We Prevent Chaos in Mexico?,"
Collier's, July 23 , 193 8.
186
Any well-informed observer, unless [George Creel]
himself, will testify that if the Cardenas
government is overthrown it will certainly be
succeeded by the fascist groups now frantically
engaged in the search for a leader. °
Apparently, the press war on Mexico was partially the
result of a battle between left and right in the U.S.,
projecting their different views on the political situation
in Mexico. But there are more reasons for the biased reports
on Mexico. Betty Kirk summarized the other motives
and
their consquences:
First, ... a section of the American press, either
on its own initiative or by inspiration of interests
related to the oil industries, has been inaccurately
depicting Mexico as a nation where law and order
have broken down and anarchy prevails. A 'smear
Mexico' drive is rapidly taking shape.
Secondly, certain political opponents of the New
Deal are seizing upon the Mexican oil issue as the
most vulnerable point in the Roosevelt Good Neighbor
program. The danger of such a course obviously is
not the expression of opposition opinion, which all
sides would concede to be legitimate, but that the
rough and tumble of politics would lead to
exaggerated and even politically slanderous
defamation of a friendly nation.
0
Regardless of these motives, the effects of the anti-Mexican
Prendergast, "Press War on Mexico," Nation, Sept.
3, 193 8, p. 223 .
Kirk, "Smearing Mexico," Christian Sc ience
Monitor, April 8 , 193 9, p. 6.
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reports of "such propagandists" only intensified Mexican
latent fears of the U.S., while forcing "wider the door to
German penetration and trade."
02
Indeed, the unfavorable press in the U. S. only
deteriorated the tensions between Mexico and the U.S. which
were enforced by the unresolved and delayed question of
compensation for the oil companies. In sum, the only result
was mutual suspicion and a heightening of anti-Americanism
- which Nazi Germany successfully exploited and nourished
within the described limits. Yet, the "squeeze on Mexico"
might be also viewed as a reflection of U.S. public opinion,
which, of course, was influenced by the press. Since public
opinion in turn influenced the press, the result was a
spiral effect leading to an increased uneasiness about the
fascist threat. In any case, American public opinion clearly
blamed the fascist regimes as the main threat to world
peace. In a poll in 193 8 77% of the American votes
considered some particular nation or nations responsible for
the arms race. Of these, 80% blamed anti-Comintern powers
- Germany, 38%; Italy, 32%; Japan 10% - while 9% blamed the
Soviet Union. In an earlier poll (April 6, 1937) 46%
believed that the United States would have to fight Germany
6 2
Ibid . , p. 7.
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again in their lifetime.
63
American Official Reaction
The State Department and American embassy in Mexico were
in general concentrating more on a solution of the oil
expropriation problem. German activities, therefore, were
only regarded peripherally. In any case, the maintenance of
the Good Neighbor policy curbed intervention in Mexico's
domestic matters in this respect. Only when the Roosevelt
administration felt that German actions might jeopardize
U.S. security, did the embassy under Josephus Daniels
undertake official steps. More important, of course, in the
view of American officials, was the consistent loss of
Mexican markets to Germany.
President Roosevelt himself openly expressed the
American position in respect of a possible political
struggle between democracy and fascism in Mexico. On April
20, 193 8 the President said at a press conference, probably
under the impression of the amounting tension around Cedillo
and the oil expropriation:
63
See Paul B. Taylor, "Problems of German-American
Relations," For e ign Pol ic y Re por t s XIV, 9, July 15, 193 8 ,
p . 98 .
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Suppose certain foreign governments, European
governments, were to do in Mexico what they did in
Spain. Suppose they would organize a revolution, a
Fascist revolution, in Mexico. Mexico is awfully
close to us. Suppose they were to send planes and
officers and guns and were to equip the
revolutionists and get control of the whole of
Mexico and thereupon run the Mexican Government, run
the Mexican Army, and build it up with hundreds of
planes. Do you think the United States could stand
idly by ...? ... it is a long distance across the
ocean. We would not be attacked from across the
ocean, however, if they came from Mexico. ... Spain
is three days from Germany, and Mexico is only seven
days from Germany. 4
FDR's affirmative answer to his rhetorical question
whether the U.S. "could stand idly by" was emphasized by his
Undersecretary of State for Latin America, Sumner Welles.
Recalling the Monroe Doctrine he made clear that
any attempt on the part of non-Am erican powers to
exert through force their political or material
influence on the American continent would
immediately be a matter of the gravest concern not
only to the U.£>. but to every other American
republic as well.
05
From the vantage point of the American government there was
not much doubt that the resistance of the U.S. to the
4
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perceived threat in Mexico would be decisive. The two quotes
above indicate this role as 'policeman' for the hemisphere,
meaning that any danger coming from the United States' next
door neighbor must be suffocated from the beginning. In this
respect, the U.S. had already expanded the Monroe Doctrine
to include defense of ideological integrity in the Americas
at the Rio de Janeiro Conference in 1937.^
In 1938 and 1939
,
when voices grew louder about a
"second Spain" in Mexico, the general attitude was that the
U.S. cannot stand aloof and "repeat [the same] folly" in
Mexico, alluding to the U.S. neutral isolation policy in
regard to the Spanish Civil War. When the as fascist
perceived Cedillo revolt took place, the New Re pub lic
pointed out that "it is in accord with international law and
American diplomatic tradition to support, especially on this
continent, legitimate governments contending with armed
6 6
See Rippy, p. 242. See also Antonio Gomez Robledo, The
Bucareli Ag r eements, Mexico, D.F.: Imprenta Nacional de
Mex ic o, 1940, pp. 190 f . According to Ezequivel Obregon,
Mex ico _y l° s Estados Unidos ante el Derecho Internac ional,
ico, D.F.: Herrero Hermanos Sucesores, n.d . , pp. 159-171,
Mexico was the field of the old struggle between the U.S.
and Europe. Moreover he lamented the lack of equilibrium in
Anerica which in Europe prevented any one power from
acquiring so much force as to threaten its neighbors. In
view of the German expansionism at the time, this was a very
weak argument.
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rebell ion."
67
These views resulted from the assumption to react "just
in case" pro-Nazism would become to strong in Mexico.
Consequently, as ambassodor Daniels recalled in his memoirs,
the American embassy gave
every aid in the preparations of our country against
the totalitarian threat. We were vigilant to detect
any Nazi infiltration across the Rio Grande, to make
a complete Black List of concerns aiding the enemy,
and to obtain from Mexico the rich variety of war
materials needed to strengthen the American
arms- for-de fense.°°
This strong cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico, of
course, was determined by the already one year old war in
Europe. But the war only strengthened the joint anti-Nazi
effort, since "from the President down, official Mexico was
heart and soul against the forces of which Hitler was the
6 9
head and front," stressing the fact that throughout the
whole pre-war period the Mexican government was "as zealous
in hostility to Nazi-ism as the officials in [the U.S.]
We Aid Mexican Fascism," New Republic , 95, June
1, 1938, pp. 87f.
® 8Josephus Daniels, Sh irt SI eeve Dipiom a t, Chapel Hill:
Univ. of N. Carolina Press, 1947 , p. '49 7.
69 Ibid
. , p. 498.
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government." Consequently Daniels' efforts to sabotage
German influence and trade were a source of considerable
annoyance to his colleague Baron von Rud t, the German
Minister.
71
A good example of this mutuality took place at the
beginning of 1939. Dr. Hagemann , a representative of the
German Junkers Ai rcraf t, had offered, in alliance with
Davis, to exchange thirty Junkers' military planes to the
Mexican army for 400,000 British pounds worth of
7 ?
expropriated oil. Soon the military attache at the U.S.
embassy in Mexico, Colonel William R. Freehoff, informed
Daniels. "Within 24 hours," the ambassador called the
Mexican foreign office to express the U.S. government's
disapproval of the deal. "It fell through." Later the
Mexican ambassador in Washington, Dr. Castillo Najera,
70
Ibid
.
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Rudt to AA, April 3 , 1938. In Documents on German
Foreign Pol icy, Series D, Vol. V, Washington: The Government
Printing Office, 1953, pp. 827-29.
Times (London) , Feb. 19, 1939. See also Norman
P. MacDonald, Hitler over Latin America, London: Jarrolds,
1940, p. 239.
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denied any further considerations of the German proposal.
Moreover, Daniels advised a prominent American businessman
in Mexico City to turn down an offer to serve as adviser to
a Mexican mission trying to expand oil sales in Germany,
pointing out that so long as the State Department regarded
it as "stolen oil" no American should "have any part except
acting for his country, no matter what his feelings were."^
On the other hand, the U.S. had helped to get rid off
Mexican internal right-wing elements. In August 1936 , the
U.S. authorities allowed the expelled General Nicolas
f 7
Rodriguez, the head of the Dorados, to enter the U.S.
Sumner Welles, however, could not hide his objections:
The Department views with some uneasiness an
apparent tendency on the part of the Mexican
authorities, as exemplified in the case of former
President Calles and possibly in the instant case,
to impose upon the country certain Mexican citizens,
whose presence in Mexico is considered undesirable
because of their alleged political activities, and
at the same time to expect the Government of the
United States to adopt measures to prevent these
persons while in the United States from engaging in
activities directed against the Government of
Mexico. The illogicality of such a position is
p. 239.
75
Cited in Cronon, pp. 235ff.
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See Daniels to Secretary of State, Aug. 11, 1936, in
FRUS
, 1936, Vo 1. V, p. 778.
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believed to be obvious.
Overall, however, official U.S. and Mexico shared the same
political attitude in respect to direct and indirect Nazis'
menaces.
In contrast, German economic penetration was welcomed by
Mexico, as shown above, while the exporting American
business community was outraged by it. It naturally lobbied
for its interests in the FDR administration.
78
Yet, trade
matters were compl ic ated. Here the two different economic
conceptions of Germany and the U.S. clashed. Therefore the
issue will be treated in the larger context of Latin America
but with references to Mexico.
Germany had employed the New Plan (1934) which envisaged
balanced terms of trade and autarchy by bilateral trade,
opportunistic means, protectionism, and economic state
7 9
coordination and monopoly. In short, the German economy
Welles to Daniels, Aug. 15, 1936 in Ibid.,
p . 780.
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See Hans-Jurgen Schroder, "Die Vereinigten Staaten und
die national-sozial istische Hand el spol i t i k gegenuber
La teinamer ika 19 3 7/8 ," J'ahrbuch fur Geschichte von Staat,
Wirtschaft und Gesell schaf t Lateinamer i kas, 7, 1970 , pp .
309
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was conveniently centralized, offering the Askimark system,
barter deals and bilateral trade agreements in Latin
Amer ica.
On the other hand, the U.S had embraced the Trade
Agreements Act (1934) , which included the principle of
reciprocity coupled with the unconditional most-favored-
nation policy. Traditionally, reciprocity had ensured
export markets for U.S. home production.
BB
New was the
combination with the unconditional most-favored-nation
stipulation which empowered the president to conclude trade
treaties with foreign nations, reducing up to 50% of the
American tariff barriers. Then the unconditionality, or
equality, provision allowed that any third state could apply
the reformed tariff concessions, which the bilateral or
reciprocal trade treaty of the U.S. and a second country
had concluded. At the same time, Washington also
participated at any tariff reduction which her trade partner
had conceded to other nations. Therefore the agreement was
80
See B.H. Kaiser, "The Principle of Reciprocal Trade
Agreements," World Affairs Interpreter, 7, 1936/7 , pp .
10-13.
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reciprocal and unconditional.
OJ
-
The father of the Trade Agreement Act, Secretary of
State Cordell Hull, explained the underlying philosophy of
his, hence so-called Hull Program: "Without expansion of
international trade, based upon fair dealing and equal
treatment for all, there can be no stability and security
O T
either within or among nations." The quote already
indicates the juncture between trade and foreign policy.
Significantly, the economic program was designed by the
Secretary of State. In this regard, trade competition in
Mexico, and in Latin America in general, was also a
political and ideological struggle between the U.S. and the
Reich. Or in Hull’s appropriate short style: "The political
8 3
line up followed the economic line up."
The strict bilateral nature of Schacht's New Plan was
81g ee Paul P. Taylor, "Problems of German-Amer ican
Relations," Foreign Policy Reports, XIV, 9, J'uly 1938 ,
p. 104. See also Grace Beckett, "Effect of the Reciprocal
Agreements upon the Foreign Trade
of the U.5.," J'o ur na 1 o f
Economics, 55, 1940, pp. 199-2 09.
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Hans-J urgen Schroder, Deutschl and und die Vereinig ten
Staaten 1 933-1939 , Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1970 , p. 142.
82 Cordell Hull, The Mem oi r s of Co rdel 1 Hul 1, New York:
Macmillan Co., 1948, Vol. 11, p. 365.
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therefore perceived as "undemocratic." U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State Francis B. Sayre probably alluded to
Germany when he angrily pointed out in 1936 that
some countries by arbitrary quota restrictions, by
exchange control, by government monopolies, or by
the requirement of import or export licences have
strait-j acketed their foreign trade in a manner
wholly inconsistent with American traditions. ... In
sharp contrast our Trade Agreements program follows
the democratic American tradition of equality to all
and freedom for private initiative.
Thus Germany's New Plan and the Hull Program competed in
the markets of Mexico and Latin America, where the U.S.
possessed a traditional economic hegemony. With the decline
°f U.S. trade in the hemisphere and the slow and
painstaking domestic recovery by F.D.R.'s New Deal plus the
consciousness of U.S. economic support for Germany in the
20' s by the Young and Dawes loans, both fear and anger
distinguished the economic experts in Washington. These
concerns had two correlated effects:
analysis of the present economic situation of the
U.S. for Latin America
deliberation of countermeasures against the German
trade intrusion in Latin America.
84
Francis B. Sayre, Reciprocal Trade Ag reements,
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1936 , pp. 10'£ .
See also by the same author: Most Fav or ed -Nation vs.
Pre feren tial Bargaining, Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1935.
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In respect to the latter point, Under Secretary of State
Sumner Welles released on 8 January 1938 a circular order to
all missions in Latin America to find out what the extent
and nature of German trade competition was. Therefore he
issued the following guidelines for consideration:
1. The commodities in which German competition
has been most severe so far as the United
States exports are concerned.
2. Methods of payment in effect and types of
currency employed (this should include a
discussion of discounts on "Askimarks" or
compensation marks) .
3. Evidence of premiums above world market
prices being paid on designated imports
into Germany, as reflected in greater
returns being actually received by the
exporter in his own currency (at prevailing
rate for Askimarks) for exports to Germany
than for similar exports to foreign
marke ts.
4. Evidence of subsidy payments on German
exports.
5. Extent to which imports from Germany are
required to be paid for in free exchange.
6. Official efforts to encourage or control
imports from or exports to Germany.
7. Any renewals of or modifications in trade
agreements or arrangements with Germany
during 1937.
8. Trade figures showing imports and exports
by value in trade with Germany, the United
States, and the aggregate of all other
countries from the beginning of 1934 to
200
d ate
.
8
The answers of the various American missions in Latin
America indicated that the immense rise of exports from
Germany in 1935/6 was recurrent, while the American share of
total imports in Latin America had increased (1936: 31.4 %;
1937: 34. 3%) . Therefore the author of the survey, James
Watson Gantenbein, concluded that there is "slight ground
for alarm from German competition in 1 938 ."
88
He proved to be wrong. German share of total imports in
Latin America picked up again in 1938 (1936: 15.4 %; 1937 :
15.3%; 193 8: 16. 2%), while the share of the U.S. dropped to
33.9% in the same year. With justification an American
diplomat noticed in 1938 that "the progress of German
compensation trade in Latin America generally has been so
marked as to arouse considerable apprehension and concern in
the U.5.87.
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Indeed, i t did . In fact, the appropriateness of the Hull
State Department, Jan. 8, 1938. Cited in
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Program was called into question. A memorandum for the
Secretary of Treasury Morgenthau summarized the situation.
I do not mean to imply that our trade agreements
program has not achieved results. I merely wish to
point out that these results are being vitiated by
the policy of aggressor nations and that the
continuation of the present trend may see a complete
disruption of the program.
°
The apparent loss of markets in Latin America pressured
for an answer to the question "What should America do?" In
sum, the alternative was between
an active policy of trying to divert into other
channels trade between South America and the
dictator countries, and a more passive policy of
building up our own trade with the nations to the
south by all legitimate means without any direct
attack on Latin American trade relations with the
rest of the world.
In short, the choice was to scrap the Hull Program and even
follow the German methods, or to enforce the trade
9 0
agreements more vigorously. Most policy makers tended to
Harry Dexter White, Oct 10, 1938. Cited in
Schroder (Handelspo 1 itik) , p. 323.
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favor the second alternative. "The German aggression is a
challenge. But it should be met, not by imitating German
policies, but by applying our own more boldly and more
e f fee tiv ely .
In this context, however, the U.S. faced a serious
problem. Distrust or at least suspicion to the Good
Neighbor policy prevailed in the region. "Yankee
imperialism" and "Big Stick" policy were still catch words.
Many Latin Americans perceived - probably correctly - that
the Trade Agreement Act was primarily designed for U.S.
Q O
trade hegemony in the hemisphere. Therefore, many North
Americans realized that trade success was also dependent on
mutual respect in political matters.
The pendulum has swung from arrogance to supineness.
It must seek its balance because only then can we
trade as a respected friend with these [Latin
American] nations which we shall always treat as our
political equals.^
For the case of Mexico, the land and oil expropriation
issue did not make this lofty goal easier. The following
91
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table visualize the transfer of some Mexican markets from
U.S. imports to German imports, which increased 138% between
1929 and and 66% between 1933 and 1938:
Pe rcen tag eSh are ri Total Imports of Me xi c o
Source: Percy W. Bidwell, "Latin America, Germany
and the Hull program," Foreign Affairs,
17, 2, Jan. 1939, p. 379.
However, as Bidwell pointed out in a current issue of
Fo reig n Affairs, Mexico is rather an exception. "The German
gains in practically all [Latin American countries] have
been made at the expense of the United Kingdom, or some
95
other country, rather than at the expense of the U.S."
Despite losses in the markets of Mexico, however, the U.S.
still clearly dominated the Latin American market.
As in the wider context of Latin America, economic
analysts equally asked for the Mexican case "Are the Germans
Virginia Prewett, "Nazi Trade Invades Mexico,"
American Mercury, 52, 1941, pp. 336-343 .- 43.
, p. 379.
Co un try 1933 1937 J a n
.
-J u n e
1938
U
.
S. 59.9 62.8 58.5
Germany 12.0 15.6 19.9
U.K
. 8.9 4 . 6 5.2
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responsible for the U.S. decline?" No, not entirely,
answered Virginia Prewett, detecting a lenient, even
arrogant attitude of American manufacturers towards their
traditional Mexican market. "They have regarded foreign
trade merely as a channel through which to dispose their
surplus." Of course, Nazi credit policy, cheap production
at home, the German government supported distributing system
plus conscious price competition had facilitated the "Nazi
trade invasion" of Mexico. But another serious and
psychological problem was caused by laxity of the American
businessmen: while Americans employed high pressure sales
methods, tailored for the U.S. public and seeking immediate
profits, the Germans had adapted to the Mexican way. They
had learned Spanish and had taken their time to convince the
Mexicans about the higher quality of cheaper articles,
"hecho en Alemania." Also, Germans tried to get local
control of American trade by obtaining Mexican
representation for American products. All these methods
combined contributed, in Prewett's view, to the success
9 8
story of German trade in Mexico.
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Even Fernando de los Rios, former Spanish ambassador of
the Azana government to Washington, admitted the superior
trade methods of the Nazis in Mexico. Rios, who had no
reason whatsoever to praise German trade patterns, wrote at
the end of 1940 in Social Research:
High political and military personages of Mexico ...
summarize Germany's commercial methods in the
following way: first, Germany began by a study of
the taste of the market, adapting her products to
the id iosyncracies of national tastes; second, her
customers receive import certificates in proper
form; third, the goods received are exactly equal to
the samples; fourth, the credits are almost always
long-term; fifth, as a rule German goods are cheaper
and delivery is more expeditious. Taking account of
all these factors, of the lack of markets in the
United States for Argentine and Mexican goods, and
of these countries' need for machinery, the barter
system is regarded as advantageous.
*
Overall, the trade rivalries between the U.S. and
Germany in the Western Hemisphere also led to a trade
decline between ‘themselves. The Hull Program and the New
Plan were simply too different in their political and
economic outlook to permit harmony. In particular the
underlying ideological conceptions proved to be
incompatible, though - one might argue - they served similar
goals. As Germany used her bilateral trade principle for
economic and political control of Central Europe, the Trade
de los Rios, "Nazi Infiltration in Ibero-
America," Social Research 7, Nov. 1940 , pp. 404f..
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Agreements Act also entailed stalwart goals, namely securing
the hegemonial position of Washington in Latin America.
Since a mod us v ivend i between the two exporting competitors
was neither found nor sought, the clash seemed to be
inevitable. As seen in the next section the U.S.
consequently used the Pan-American Conferences to cement
their traditional position and (or through appeal of) the
hemispheric solidarity.
The Pan-American Conferences in Buenos Aires (1936) and
Lima (1938)
The two conferences will be reviewed in the continental
context, because their importance lies in the unanimity of
all twenty-one participating American republics to formulate
and adopt resolutions for peace and cooperation in the
hemisphere. In fact, both conferences were a direct response
to the Fascist threat coming from Europe. Despite the
limited value of an analysis based on an Pan-American common
nominator, the discussion serves to complete the picture of
Mexican policies towards the Reich for the period in
question.
The Mexican Under-Secratary of State Ramon Beteta (since
1936) remarked that "La t i n-Araer ic an ism has always been a
Mexican ideal; not so, Pan-Americanism." However, "the
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change in attitude of the U.S - the Good Neighbor policy
being an expression thereof - has created a new situation,
and [thus] the Mexicans have modified their opinion, as have
also the other peoples of Latin America.
"100
on the basis of
these altered perceptions, the two conferences met.^^
The Buenos Aires Conference took place between the
regularly scheduled International Conferences of American
States at the suggestion of Roosevelt. FDR's invitation
stating the purpose to "supplement and reinforce the efforts
10 2
of the League of Nations ... in seeking to prevent war,"
and the Conference very name "For the Maintenance of Peace"
already indicated two implications. First, it sought
hemispheric means to insure continental security in view of
the Fascist power politics in Europe. Secondly, it admitted
the insuffiency or inability of the League of Nations to
curb the Fascist expansionistic drive.
100
Ramon Beteta, "Mexico's Foreign Relations," The Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
Vo 1 .“TO 8, 1940, p.173.
101
For the development of Pan-Amer icanism up to 1940,
including a discussion of the confusion and bias in respect
of the Monroe Doctrine, see the good summary by: Howard
J. Trueblood, "Progress of Pan-American Cooperation,"
Foreign Po 1 icy Reports 16, 1940, pp. 286-300.
102
Sumner Welles, "The New Era in Pan-American Relations,"
Foreign Affairs XV, 3, April 1937, p. 446.
208
The most important result of this Conference was the
unanimously approved Consultative Pact which declared "joint
responsibility" of the American republics in case of
hostilities between them. Although no "collective security"
had been established, the solidarity of the Western
hemisphere was implied in case of extracontinental threats.
Moreover, the Protocol of Non-Intervention effectively
limited future misapplications of the Monroe Doctrine. Since
the Protocol considered an attack by a non-American state as
a matter of collective concern, the "theory of mutual
benefit [supplemented] the doctrine of unilateral
exploitation," with which the Monroe Doctrine was hitherto
associated. Also, the principle of the "equality of
sovereign and independent states," plus the restatement of
certain fundamental principles of international law and
their clarification in regard to their application, all
served for a new mutual understanding in the hemisphere.
The Buenos Aires Conference was a good demonstration of
"mutual confidence and good will attending the elaboration
of conventions and resolutions."
104
Despite its vague
100Charles g. Fenwick, "The Buenos Aires Conference:
1936 Foreign Pol icy Reports XIII, July 1, 1937 , p. 98.
104
lb id.
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formulations, the Conference reflected the new confidence of
the Hispanic countries towards the U.S., while it
simultaneously reminded the totalitarian nations, though
only implicitly, about the solidarity in the New World.
105
"There is no doubt that the delegates who took a leading
part in the Conference had their eyes on the world at
large."
lo °
Overall, the Conference signaled - in the words of
Sumner Welles - "the new era in Pan-American relations."
"The nations of the Western World demonstrated [at Buenos
Aires] their capacity to devise a sane balance between
10 7
nationalism and international cooperation." From the
10 5
One fundamental reason for its vague formulations was
Argentina's position. Her strong ties to Europe plus her own
perception as the "Queen of the Hemisphere," thus
challenging and opposing the U.S. hegemony in the region,
led to the mitigating formulation of the Consultative Pact.
Thus she refused an antagonizing rhetoric in regard to
Europe. Consequently, the joint resolution referred only in
general terms to the situation arising "in the event that
the peace of the American Republics is menaced," and it
called in such event for mutual consultation by the American
republics "for the purpose of finding and adopting methods
of peaceful cooperation." The absence of any discriminating
reference concerning extracontinental threats to peace made
it easier for the Argentine delegation to accept the
agreement. For excepts of the Resolutions, see Fenwick,
p. 100.
10 6
I b id ~ p . 99.
Welles, pp. 443-4 54.
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Mexican point of view, "true Pan-Americanism was born."
Mexico's efforts were rewarded in discussing the
interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine.
108
Her vital role in
the Conference was probably best reflected by the fact that
Dr. Francisco Castillo Najera, the head of the Mexican
delegation and ambassador to the U.S., was elected chairman
of the Committee on the Organization of Peace, which was the
I fIQ
most important one at the Conference. Mexico's anti-
fascist commitment had been already stated before the
conference, when had pledged Mexico's opposition to
the Italian invasion of Abyssinia declaring: "Mexico desires
to co-operate in every manner and with all nations to insure
world peace."
110
In many respects, the Buenos Aires meeting, due to its
ad hoc origins, laid only ground-work for the much more
specific resolutions of the Lima Conference at the end of
1938. At that point, the fascist regimes' totalitarian and
aggressive nature had been unveiled beyond doubts. Austria's
annexation, the Czechoslovakian crisis and the subsequent
p. 174.
100
Fenwic
k, p. 92.
irk, p. 36.
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Munich Conference had revealed Hitler's true intentions to a
large degree. Moreover the publication of Nazi atrocities
and pogroms against German Jews sharpened the significance
of the Nazi campaign. Under these circumstances the
Declaration of Lima exceeded all previous statements of
inter-American solidarity.
lll
The issue of Latin American
regionalism, still the prevalent issue at the Buenos Aires
Conference, was now pushed into the background, and the
Conference was forced to expand its focal points on a global
scale.
11^
However, despite the acknowledged and pressuring need
for solidarity, Cardenas' expropriation policy had caused
friction and awakened U.S. fears regarding the position of
hostile disposition against the Reich by the
individual Latin American countries is summarized by: Reiner
Pommerin, Da s Reich und Lateinamerika, Dusseldorf:
Droste, 1977, pp. 49-52.
observers stressed now the danger of Germany's
traditional perception of "nationhood." It distinguished
Kultur and Zivilisation as the basis for the foundation of a
nation. While the cultural idea of a nation is rooted in
language, literature and religion - thus forming a
Gemeinschaft (community) the concept of civilization is
rather attributed to territorial nations - thus forming a
Gesellschaft (society) . "The cultural and political
ambitions, thus conceived, have never recognized geograhical
limits. This was emphasized by Hitler in his Reichstag
speech of February 20, 1938, proclaiming a protectorate over
German minorities abroad." See Fernando de los Rios, "Nazi
Infiltration in Ibero America," Social Research 7, Nov.
1940, pp. 389 ff.
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foreign capital in other Latin American countries. "The
honeymoon period of the Good Neighbor policy in Latin
America appeared to be ended, and some suspicion had
developed that the U.S. was exploiting the fascist menace
111
for its own interests," seeking to strengthen her
economic and political hegemony in the region.
As a consequence of all these developments, the Lima
Conference met under the severe handicap of great
expectations that it would solve these juxtaposed
problems.
Yet, all Latin American nations followed Secretary of
State Hull's urge for inter-American solidarity against "the
ominous shadow thwart the continent." As in Buenos Aires,
only Argentina defected somehow, refusing to be alarmed by
the immediacy of the Nazi-Fascist menace. Nevertheless she
compromised on the topic which led to a slightly more
113
Tr ueblood, p. 290.
political cartoon on the next page.
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Under the Southern Cross
Source: Burt M. McConnell, Mexico at the Bar of
Public Opinion, New York: Mail and Express
Publishing Company, 1939, p. 254.
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restrained language in the final accord. Mexico, in
alliance with Brazil and Cuba, had urged a stronger and more
explicit statement in regard to a definition of "external
threats", but fell in line for the sake of an unanimous
lIS
compromise.
J
Thus, the Declaration of Lima, which
represented the most significant achievement of the
conference, reaffirmed "continental solidarity" of the
American republics and "their purpose to collaborate." It
defended those principles "against all foreign intervention
or activity that may threaten them" and expressed "their
I I £
determination to make effective their solidarity."
In regard to a direct military threat the Lima
general tendency to follow rather the U.S. proposal
instead the Argentine one, is reflected in the official
minutes of the conference: it recorded "grandes aplausos"
after Argentina's Foreign Minister Cantilo's speech, while
it noted "prolongados aplausos" after Hull's speech. See
Samuel Flagg Bern is, The Latin Amer ican Pol icy of the United
States, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1943, p. 450,
footnote 5.
The diverging views between the U.S. and Argentina are
well summarized by Samuel Guy Inman, "Lima Conference and
the Totalitarian Issue," The Annals of the Amer ican Ac ad any
of Political and Social Science 204, 1939, pp. 9-167 This
article also includes an interview with Cantilo.
Charles A. Thomson, "Results of the Lima
Conference," Fo reign Pol icy Re ports XV, 1939/40 , p. 4.
116
Ibid
.
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Declaration certainly amplified and made more explicit the
will for common action than the Buenos Aires Conference did.
It also addressed the problem of subversive action of German
and Italian propaganda. A declaration was unanimously
adopted
that, in accordance with the fundamental principle
of equality before the Law, any persecution on
account of racial [and] of religious motives which
makes it impossible for a group of human beings to
live decently, is contrary tQ the political and
juridical systems of America.
Though this clearly denounced German propaganda practises, a
stronger worded resolution was refused in order to "avoid a
direct slap at Germ any ."
-'--*- 8
In respect to the economic intrusion by the Reich in
Latin America, Hull recommended "reasonable tariffs in lieu
of other forms of trade restrictions [and] the negotiation
of trade agreements, embodying the principle of non-
discrimination." This formulation was unanimously supported,
since no enforcement mechanism was required. A resolution
favored periodic inter-American meetings to coordinate
policies on exchange and other economic problems.
lb id . , p . 5.
118
lb id.
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Aside from the Lima Declaration, the achievements of the
Eighth Pan-American Conference were few. Yet,
in contrast to Munich, it stood not for coercion but
for voluntary agreement. In this field, Lima
conserved the gains made at Montevideo and Buenos
Aires. It took no backward steps. At a time when
general retreat characterized the forces of peaceful
cooperation and international understanding, it held
ground previously won and kept the road open for
further advance in the future.
Indeed, its effectiveness in regard to the hemispheric
120
solidarity, was amply demonstrated in the Panama meeting
of the American ministers on September 23, 193 9 - less than
three weeks after the outbreak of the European war. It was
felt that "the New World [was] insulated from the war in
Europe." The Conference had been called "in accordance
with the agreements unanimously reached in Buenos Aires and
Lima
.
1,122
lb id
. , p. 8.
i ? n
See Charles G. Fenwick, "Lima Conference in Relation to
World Peace," The Annals o f the Amer ican Academy o f
Political and Social Science 204, 1939, pp. 119-125, and
L.S. Rowe,
-
"The
-
Larger Significance of the Lima Conference,"
in the same issue pp. 137-140.
Bern is , p. 36 3.
1 TO
Welles, State Department, Bu 11 etin ,
Sept. 16, 1939, p. 251.
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Mexico ardently supported the principles of both
conferences and was surely one of the more active countries
to push strong-worded resolutions against the totalitarian
threat. Significantly, she was one of the four countries
which drafted the Declaration of Lima.
123
Cardenas' New Year
message of 1 938 made this desire for a collective security
system in the hemisphere clear:
Mexico
... hopes that these [American democratic]
nations form a solid block, putting themselves at
the service of all America to prevent its being
swayed into the turmoil overwhelming other
continents. Besides the profound reasons of a moral
order which exist, we may say that the peculiar
conditions of the New Continent, the plentitude of
natural resources and opportunities of all sorts,
its relatively scant population, its geographical
position and the absence of diverse creeds,
languages, interests and dissimilar cultures, show
unmistakenly the possibility of solving any problem
which might arise, by means of adequate procedures
in sympathy with the democratic institutions
inspired in the will of the national majorities. ...
In consequence, any new tentative to restore a
dictatorship has to be judged as inadequate to our
present social and political situation and we must
also wish that it be proscribed from all the nations
of this Continent.
24
Mexico's perception at the Pan-American Conferences must
be seen as part of hemispheric self-defense. Though "the
is
, p. 358.
Cefrdenas, New Year's Message 1 938 , Mexico, D.F.:
DAPP, 1938, pp. 18f f .
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Mexican government [had] given its undivided support to the
League of Nations," it also admitted the League's failure in
its fundamental aim, the maintenance of peace. Thus her
foreign diplomacy was eager
to seek neither offensive nor defensive alliances or
international entanglements, but anxious to live
peacefully as an independent nation ... on the
complete equality with all states; ... to show
respect for other political systems no matter how
different from her own and to demand the same
respect for her own system.
26
Overall, the Mexican position at the conferences was
consistent with her general attitude towards Nazi Germany.
However, the oil expropriation and Mexico's subsequent
barter deals through the Davis Company complicated her role
in Lima. "Every effort was made to keep the [Davis] deal
quiet in view of the formal opening of the Pan-American
Conference." But, again, despite or because of Mexico's
pragmatism in her economic affairs, she took the political
responsibilities to stem the Nazi menace in her own country
as well as within the hemisphere.
p. 175.
126
Ibid
. , p. 180.
19 7 .
'Norman P. MacDonald, Hi tl er over Latin America, London:
Jarrolds, 1940, p. 237.
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Interesting in this context is the indifference of the
Department IX of the German Foreign Office. There was no
attempt to influence the opinion of the various delegates at
the Conference.
128
The various German missions in Latin
America overemphasized the North American pressure in this
regard which Pommerin perceives as "an alibi for their own
confusion" and disinterest in the New World's affairs.
129
Perhaps it was also frustration, since the Lima mission
reported about the general unpromising attitude towards the
Re ich.
For the time being, the New Germany has not one real
friend on the American continent. The scale of the
negative attitude by the twenty-one American
Republics towards the Third Reich appears only
gradually different; it varies through all facets
from profound hate to superficial antipathy, coupled
wi th fear
.
188
Of course, at the time the Foreign Office was busy enough
trying to justify Hitler's adventurism in Europe. Therefore,
the AO, the foreign organization of the Nazi Party, was the
most active institution in the Western hemisphere.
pommerin, pp. 52-59.
12 9lbid
. , pp. 58 f.
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Cited in Pommerin, pp. 56f . My translation.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
The period between 1936 and 1939 saw the rise of
international fascism. In particular, National Socialism
sought the dissemination of its " anti-ideology" by
propaganda. However, the German ideological penetration
faced a stiff resistance throughout the Western hemisphere,
as reflected by the American solidarity at the Pan-American
Conferences in Buenos Aires (1 936) and Lima (1938). In
Mexico, National Socialism encountered Cardenas' well-
established one party system, which impeded an extensive
absorption of the Nazi beliefs. Moreover, the Mexican
president himself was strongly anti-fascist. In consequence,
the Spanish Civil War, with Germans and Mexicans supporting
and fighting on different sides, set a c aesur a in the
political relations between the two countries.
Though some right-wing Mexican groups and movements
adapted some features of the Nazi system in regard to
organization and exterior appearance, they always remained
distinctively Mexican. Those groups had goals which only
220
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applied to Mexico and therefore, they avoided the connection
with international fascism. Yet, traces of anti-semitism
and a strong anti-U.S. sentiment, already traditionally
existent, supported the Nazi cause.
Overall, Nazi ideology fell on no fertile ground in
Mexico, despite or perhaps because of Hitler's bragging
megalomania, announcing a New Germany in the region:
We shall create a New Germany there [in South
America]
.
We shall find everything we need there.
... We shall not land troops like William the
Conqueror ... Our weapons are invisible ones.
These weapons proved to be blunt. Nevertheless, the
totalitarian menace in Mexico was greatly exaggerated at the
time, in particular by North American writers, but also by
many Mexicans and Latin Americans. The reasons herefore
were manifold. Some wrote out of a genuine feeling of
national self-defense, while others supported the cause of
vested business interests. Especially the American oil
companies manipulated public opinion in this respect.
In contrast to the relative unsuccessful propaganda
efforts of the Nazis, the German economic breakthrough in
Latin America in general, and in Mexico in particular, was
1 "3 1 ,
J -'-Hi tier to Rauschning. Cited in Kirk, p. 264.
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welcomed. While the United States, of course, feared for her
"traditional" markets, Mexico perceived the favorable barter
conditions of the Reich and the Askirn ark device as an
opportunity to counterbalance her market dependence on the
U.S. Consequently, trade between Mexico and Germany
increased considerably during the period in question. In
respect to the Mexican oil deliveries to the Reich, which
was accomplished by the broker function of Davis, Mexico had
no choice. Since American and British interests boycotted
her oil, the only lucrative customer was Germany.
Therefore, Cardenas' policies towards Germany in the
antebellum period may be described as Realpolitik: The
economic needs of the country were pragmatically balanced
with the possible limits of political cooperation with the
Reich. Or in other words, economic considerations determined
the Ge rman-Mex ican relations, while the fundamental
ideological antagonism was kept aloof.
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